dissenting
I respectfully dissent. As we have recently stated in our decision in Adkisson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 175, 178 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), case law has long held that, absent excessive force, one cannot resist even an illegal arrest. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 178 Ind.App. 350, 382 N.E.2d 972, 976 (1978). I acknowledge that Detective Ben-nington was technically not at Leshore’s home in order to “arrest” him. However, once he “entered Leshore’s home and placed Leshore in handcuffs and detained him based upon the provisions of the Writ,” (Op. p. 1076), Leshore was “lawfully detained.” As the majority correctly notes, Indiana Code Section 35^41-1-18 defines “lawful detention" as “(1) arrest; ... [or] (10) any other detention for law enforcement purposes.”
Though Leshore was hiding in a cabinet in the basement, others present at his home permitted Bennington to enter. Bennington told them he had “a warrant, a body attachment for Mr. Leshore — .” Record p. 53. At Leshore’s bench trial, Bennington testified that he had “many times” taken individuals into custody for nonsupport of a dependent. Record pp. 45, 71. It is clear from the transcript in this cause that in Bennington’s mind a warrant and a body attachment were interchangeable; he testified that as an officer of the Allen County Warrants Division, “my duty is to go out and locate individuals that are hiding or disobeying the Court, not honoring warrants' or personal appearances that they should make before the Court and bring them into custody.” Record p. 45. It is also clear that Ben-nington was engaged in a “law enforcement purpose.”
Although the writ in this case was undis-putedly defective, clearly the arresting officer was not aware of its defect. At Le-shore’s bench trial, Bennington referred to the body attachment, which had been introduced into evidence, and testified, “that warrant is a no bond also, which means he is not able to be released without any — no matter how much money was spent.” Record p. 71. The majority reasons that because of the defect, the Sheriff did not have personal jurisdiction of Leshore. I believe Leshore was lawfully detained and my analysis ends there. In the instant case, Leshore was handcuffed and advised that the purpose of his detention was to serve the body attachment. Record p. 59. He believed himself to be under arrest — -as he subsequently told Allen County Detec*1080tive Sergeant King — and fled because he did not want to go to jail. Record p. 81. He then “was able to rip his hand out of the cuffs ... and ... at full speed run out of the door.” Record p. 60. Bennington and another officer chased him, ordering him repeatedly to stop. Id. The officers lost sight of Leshore and he was not found until some twenty minutes later, when the canine unit discovered him in a neighbor’s dog house. Record pp. 6, 75.
Public policy and the law must direct citizens to comply with the reasonable commands and directions of law enforcement authorities. As this court stated in Fields:
To us the question is whether any amount of force should be permitted to be used by one unlawfully but peaceably arrested. We feel that the legality of a peaceful arrest should be determined by courts of law and not through a trial by battle in the streets. It is not too much to ask that one believing himself unlawfully arrested should submit to the officer and thereafter seek his legal remedies in court.
382 N.E.2d at 976. “Such a rule helps to relieve the threat of physical harm to officers who in good faith but mistakenly perform an arrest, as well as to minimize harm to innocent bystanders.” Id. The same rationale applies and is in fact all the more resonant in the case of an escape such as Leshore’s, which involved a protracted chase and could have easily turned violent or dangerous, involving innocent people in the area. The place to contest the validity of a writ of attachment is the courtroom, in the context of the legal system, not while evading police in the neighborhoods of Allen County. I would affirm Leshore’s conviction for escape.