(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I. Constitutional Provisions.
Section 2 of article 3 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution provides:
“The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”
Section 1 of article 4 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution provides:
“The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives.”
The power to appropriate money is specifically set forth as a legislative power in sections 30 and 31 of article 4.
Section 8 of article 7 provides:
“Boards of supervisors shall have legislative, administrative and such other powers and duties as provided by law.”
Section 1 of article 6 of the 1963 Constitution sets forth the judicial power as follows:
“The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided *40into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.”
It was said in Leahey v. Farrell (1949), 362 Pa 52 (66 A2d 577, 578):
“Article Y, Section 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, relates to the judicial power and reads: ‘The judicial power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in courts of common pleas, courts of oyer and terminer and general jail delivery, courts of quarter sessions of the peace, orphans’ courts, magistrates’ courts, and in such other courts as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.’ (Italics supplied.) The fiscal power is vested in the legislature by Article IX of the Constitution. These are coordinate powers which must be construed to work harmoniously.”
II. The Inherent Power of the Courts.
The above provisions of the 1963 Michigan Constitution recognize two fundamental aspects of a government that operates in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers: (1) the power to appropriate funds for operations of government (popularly known as the power of the purse) j_s lodged in the legislative branch of the government, and (2) the judicial power with all that is inherent in that power is lodged in one court of justice.
The first question to be considered is whether the inherent power of the courts is such as to permit the writ of mandamus to issue. There have been various definitions and discussions of inherent power. Some of these are as follows:
*4120 Am Jur 2d, Courts, § 79, pp 440, 441, states:
“Courts have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. It has been said that courts have inherent power to summon witnesses and compel their appearance in court, to administer oaths, to issue or to honor letters rogatory, to prevent abuse of process, to provide counsel for the indigent, to have errors in the records corrected, to relieve a party in default, to discipline attorneys at law, to take appropriate action in cases of contempt, and to do various other things to maintain order and to function properly as a court.”
“The term ‘inherent power of the judiciary’ means that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court.” In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association (1937), 133 Neb 283, (275 NW 265, 266, 114 ALR 151).
“That courts have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration of their office within the scope of their jurisdiction is a well-settled principle of law.” In re Surcharge of County Commissioners (1929), 12 Pa D & C 471, 475.
As was noted in the above-cited case, the inherent power has been used and expense incurred (a) to feed and lodge jurors, (b) for attendance of physicians upon persons who become ill while impaneled, (c) for the transportation of jurors to the locus in quo of a matter in controversy, (d) for appointment of custodians of ballot boxes after elections, (e) for the appointment of bodyguards to protect judges from violence in the performance of their duties, (f) for court interpreters, and (g) for office furnishings, law books, and so on.
*42The inherent power of the courts is undoubtedly one of almost unlimited application since the courts themselves are the ones to say what that power is but the use of inherent power has been and should be exercised with utmost caution. This is particularly true if the use of inherent power will conflict with the legislative power to appropriate.
It was said in Leahey v. Farrell (1949), 362 Pa 52, (66 A2d 577 [p 579]):
“Control of state finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional limitations: Commonwealth v. Liveright, Secretary of Welfare (1932), 308 Pa 35 (161 A 697). The function of the judiciary to administer justice does not include the power to levy taxes in order to defray the necessary expenses in connection therewith. It is the legislature which must supply such funds. Under the system of division of governmental powers it frequently happens that the functions of one branch may overlap another. But the successful and efficient administration of government assumes that each branch will co-operate with the others.” [Emphasis by the court.]
In the case of State, ex rel. Hillis, v. Sullivan (1913), 48 Mont 320 (137 P 392), the Court said (p 395):
“The very conception of inherent power [in the court] carries with it the implication that its use is for occasions not provided for by established methods. When we say that it is primarily the duty and right of the sheriff, either in person or by deputy, to perform all the duties for which an attendant upon the district court may be had at public expense, that if additional attendants are required the county through its board of commissioners shall furnish them, that if the county fail in that regard the court may procure them through the sheriff, we express the normal situation, the orderly method *43which must he observed so long as it is adequate in results. When, however, these methods fail and the court shall determine that by observing them the assistance necessary for the due and effective exercise of its own functions cannot be had, or when an emergency arises which the established methods cannot or do not instantly meet, then and not until then does occasion arise for the exercise of the inherent power. (Citations omitted.)” [Emphasis by the Court.]
I would use the inherent power of the courts only in those cases where it is essential to assure the continued existence or basic functioning of the courts. The test I would apply would he the ability of a court to operate as a court, not whether the court can operate more conveniently or expeditiously if it has some additional means to carry out its functions. For example, a court stenographer is essential for the proper functioning of a court of record. If one were not provided, a court of record under its inherent power could supply one and compel the payment of an adequate salary.
I cannot agree, however, that the law clerks, probationary officers or a judicial assistant are so essential to the operation of the circuit court of Wayne county as to be a proper case for invoking the doctrine of inherent power of the courts. I agree that the courts would operate more efficiently if the judges were provided with law clerks, if the judges had adequate probation services, and if the court had a judicial assistant. In the case of probation officers, I would concede that the question is indeed a close one. But a line must he drawn and, as I have indicated, I would draw it narrowly. I am convinced that the courts will continue to function even if they are not provided with these services. The cost is not insignificant — -at least $200,000 per year. Consequently, this case involves a direct confronta*44tion between the inherent judicial power of the courts and the legislative power to make appropriations. One or the other must give. Under our theory of government, the legislature or a subordinate legislative body has the power to appropriate for all branches of government. Both the executive and judicial branches are required to present their fiscal needs to the legislative branch for consideration by that branch and allocation of available funds to all three branches of government based upon a legislative decision. This is the process that should be followed here.
III. Statutory Authorisation.
There remains for consideration the extent of statutory authorization, if any. There may be an authorization resulting from statutory enactments. If so, the court proceeds under the statutory authority and not in the exercise of inherent power.
Judge Levin in writing for the Court of Appeals undertook to uphold the claims of the judges of the Third Judicial Circuit on the basis of statutory authorization. (15 Mich App 713.) For the employment of law clerks and a judicial assistant, he relied on the revised judicature act, §§ 1471 and 1481, respectively (MCLA § 600.1471 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.1471]; MCLA § 600.1481 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.1481]). He found the power to determine the county’s needs for probation officers and to require appropriation of funds to be vested in the circuit judges by virtue of the provisions contained in §§ 7 and 12, ch 11, of the code of criminal procedure (MCLA §§ 771.7, 771.12 [Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.1137, Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1142]).
The statute relating to law clerks (§ 1471) is permissive as to employment saying only that “circuit courts * * # may employ law clerks” but imposes *45restrictive condition on residence and pay in these words: “Each law clerk shall be a resident of the state of Michigan,” and “The compensation of the law clerks shall be fixed by the judges of the court within the sum appropriated therefor by the legislative body or bodies of the governmental unit or units, other than the state of Michigan, which pays the compensation of such judges.” (Emphasis added.) Section 1481 contains no requirement that a judicial assistant be a resident of the State but does require him to be licensed to practice in all courts of the State of Michigan and in the Supreme Court of the United States with at least 5 years of active practice. Under the statute, “compensation of the judicial assistant shall be fixed by the recommending judges within the sum appropriated therefor by the legislative body of the governmental unit, other than the state of Michigan, which pays the compensation of such judges.” (Emphasis added.)
Judge Levin seeks to avoid the restriction appearing in the foregoing sections upon the payment of compensation only from appropriated funds by saying: “Having in mind the financial circumstances of most counties of this State, we do not think the legislature meant to vest in the county boards of supervisors the discretion to determine whether the legislation regarding probation officers, law clerks and a judicial assistant would be implemented.” To this it might be said, having in mind the financial problems of most counties, it must be doubted that the legislature intended to add to their financial woes, especially in view of the language employed by the legislature in the statute.
The case of Sturgis v. County of Allegan (1955), 343 Mich 209, is cited, with comment, to support the above-quoted conclusion of Judge Levin. An examination of the statutory language under consideration *46in that case will disclose that it did not impose a compensation restriction on the employing authorities. The provision read: “That part of the compensation of the county superintendent of schools as is paid from county funds [plus other items] shall he paid by the county treasurer after the same have been authorized by the county board of education from such amounts as may be appropriated therefor by the county board of supervisors.”
With regard to the Wayne circuit judges’ claim for more probation officers, the Court of Appeals adopted similar reasoning to that applied to law clerks and a judicial assistant. It said (p 725):
“In our opinion sections 7 and 12, ch 11, of the code of criminal procedure also evidence a legislative purpose to vest in circuit judges, not the board of supervisors, the power to determine the county’s needs for probation officers, to cause such supporting personnel to be hired, to fix their compensation and, if need be, to direct the legislative body to appropriate the required funds.”
In a footnote at the same page, this appears:
“At the time of oral argument before our Court we suggested to counsel that the construction of RJA §§ 1471 and 1481 adopted by the trial judge, namely, that the legislature conferred upon the Wayne circuit court the power to hire and fix the salaries of law clerks and a judicial assistant and to direct the payment of their salaries, might as well be the correct interpretation of sections 7 and 12 of the code of criminal procedure concerning the appointment of probation officers.”
To the extent pertinent, the section 7 and 12 provisions are:
“Sec. 7. The circuit court * * * may also recommend assistant probation officers who may be *47appointed by the Michigan corrections commission * * * and who shall receive such compensation as the boards of supervisors of the several counties shall provide. (Emphasis added.)
“Sec. 12. The salary * * * 0f * * * each assistant probation officer shall be paid monthly out of the treasury or treasuries of the county or counties composing the circuit within which such probation officer or officers shall act, where provision has been made by the board of supervisors of such county or counties for their payment.” (Emphasis added.)
These statutes do not empower the circuit court to employ anybody or to fix compensation. The court can recommend appointment and no more.
In my view, the Court of Appeals has confused the implementation of inherent power with the exercise of statutory authority. Inherent power, when it is present, needs no statutory implementation. But where a court is proceeding under a statute, it is bound by the statute’s terms and conditions. The action taken must conform to the statute and may not be in derogation of that part of the statute which imposes restrictive conditions. Because the court proceeds under the statute, there is no legislative encroachment upon the inherent power of the judiciary.
IY. Summary.
In summary: (1) This case is not an appropriate one for the exercise of the inherent power of the courts. It does not involve basic needs for the performance of the judicial function and does involve a direct confrontation with the legislative power; (2) none of the statutes under consideration contain an authorization which permits the courts to proceed solely upon their own authority without legislative appropriation of the necessary funds.
*48I vote to reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court. I would dismiss the action of the Wayne county judges with prejudice. No costs, a public question being involved.
T. M. Kavanagi-i, J., concurred with Adams, J.