(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition as to plaintiffs breach of contract claim and that the trial court properly denied summary disposition on the fraud and misrepresentation claims. I also agree that defendant Michigan Basic Property Insurance Association may be a "place of accommodation” under the Civil Rights Act. I dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that defendants Metropolitan Adjustment and Honeyman could be liable under the act. In moving for summary disposition, defendants brought forth affidavits stating that Michigan Basic and their agents knew nothing about plaintiff’s ethnic origin and that whatever his origin was, it had nothing to do with their decision. Moreover, the affidavits set forth that neither Metropolitan Adjustment nor Honeyman had the authority to deny plaintiffs claim on behalf of Michigan Basic. Once defendants identified by supporting affidavits those facts which they believed could not be genuinely disputed, plaintiff had the burden of showing that a genuine issue of disputed fact existed. Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 168 Mich App 619, 626; 425 NW2d 480 *218(1988). Plaintiff has not, by affidavit or other documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact whether defendants Metropolitan Adjustment and Honeyman were aware of plaintiff’s national origin or had the requisite authority to deny defendants’ claims. MCR 2.116(G)(4); Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Reist, 167 Mich App 112, 118; 421 NW2d 592 (1988), lv den 431 Mich 877 (1988). Accordingly, I would find that plaintiff’s cause of action under the Civil Rights Act as to defendants Metropolitan Adjustment and Honeyman is prohibited.