(specially concurring).
In Finck v. Finck, 354 N.W.2d 198 (S.D.1984), we recently ruled on an abuse of discretion concerning a trial court’s refusal to permit an attorney to withdraw, holding that there was an abuse of discretion and citing the various Canons of Professional Conduct pertaining thereto. Here, we are confronted with the propriety of a trial court terminating an attorney-client relationship when both attorney and client object strenuously thereto. This case has a different dimension, for it comes before us on a writ of certiorari. There is a procedural nicety which we must address.
We must hurdle the procedural nicety before we partake of the substantive loaf. In reading the old cases in this Court, I glean that a writ of certiorari may be available only in those cases where an inferior tribunal has acted (1) without jurisdiction or (2) in excess of its jurisdiction, and (3) where there is no remedy by way of writ of error or appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. State ex rel. Grey v. Circuit Court of Minnehaha County, 58 S.D. 152, 235 N.W. 509 (1931); Willard v. Civil Service Bd. of Sioux Falls, 75 S.D. 297, 63 N.W.2d 801 (1954). When the old cases discoursed on this extraordinary remedy in the Supreme Court, the “excess of jurisdiction” also came within the ambit of acts by a trial court which “failed regularly to pursue its authority.” Kirby v. Circuit Court of McCook County, 10 S.D. 38, 71 N.W. 140 (1897). When some of the later cases recited the need that the writ could not be granted if there was any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the authority came from early statutory law, going back to C.Civ.P. 1877, § 685; C.L. 1887, § 5507; R.C.Civ.P. 1903, § 754; R.C. 1919, § 2996; SDC 1939 & Supp. 1960, § 37.0401, and which culminated in SDCL 21-31-1. In Sioux Falls Nat’l Bank v. McKee, 3 S.D. 1, 50 N.W. 1057 (1892), we held that the writ of certiorari should be resorted to only when necessary to save rights which would otherwise be lost. As one can read by this Court’s decision in Save Centennial Valley Ass’n, Inc. v. Schultz, 284 N.W.2d 452 (S.D.1979), this Court has hot, in nearly one century, changed its basic position on the scope of review concerning the power to grant a writ of certiorari. We cling to the concept that we shall confine ourselves to the jurisdiction of inferior courts and whether such court (or officer, board, or tribunal) has regularly pursued the authority conferred upon them. Here, we are faced with a singular significant issue: not that the trial court had jurisdiction but whether it exceeded its jurisdiction; or, stated another way, whether it failed to regularly pursue its authority. Our predecessors, nearly a century ago, determined that this Court could decide whether a circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction or failed regularly to pursue its authority and it is the law today as it was the law in 1897.
Therefore, I conclude that this Court may grant a writ of certiorari, fashioning relief, in favor of the petitioner adjudging that the circuit court has substantively exceeded its jurisdiction or failed regularly to pursue its authority.
Relieving Mr. Ellison as counsel for Ms. Richard was improper and arbitrary as (1) it was based upon an ex parte meeting between the trial court and someone at the sheriff’s office; (2) it did not encompass the consent of the client; (3) it not only prohibited representation by Ms. Richard’s attorney but also prohibited contact with him; (4) it interrupted the continuity of the representation which the trial court recognized was very important1; and (5) it vio*435lates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article VI, § 7, of the South Dakota Constitution prescribing the rights of the accused to defend by-counsel. In my view, the trial court was acting within its jurisdiction but it exceeded its jurisdiction. It also failed to “regularly pursue its authority” all as set forth by the five criteria above listed.
The trial court’s “grounds” to bar Ms. Richard’s counsel of choice was upon a finding of “reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Ellison’s further involvement in this case may in fact represent a danger to Ms. Richards [sic] .... ” The trial court made this in-house disbarment without benefit of a hearing being accorded Ms. Richard and her counsel of choice, Mr. Ellison. Counsel was not removed for illness, incompetency, or negligence. It was because, in the mind of the court, he was a “danger” to his client. The client testified, or at least told the court, in Open Court, that “nobody has told me to go off liquids. It was my decision to do so.” When asked by the trial court if she had been threatened or coerced, she responded as follows: “Absolutely not. It would be preposterous for anybody who could think they could make a decision for me to go off water and food.”
Applying the facts of this case to the settled law of this Nation, I simply cannot come to any other conclusion than the termination of the attorney-client relationship was arbitrary and that, thereby, the lower tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. In Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1106 (D.C.App.1978), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that after counsel has been appointed, an attorney-client relationship has been established and that relationship “is no less inviolable than if counsel had been retained.” In Harling, 387 A.2d at 1104, the judge had indicated “Well, I’m satisfied he needs another lawyer.” (Emphasis omitted.) However, the trial judge was reversed in his decision in this regard. In effect, the trial judge here said the same thing. The general body of law is not supportive of the trial judge’s decision, but is, rather, opposed to it. A court-appointed attorney cannot be arbitrarily removed over the objections of the attorney and his client once the attorney-client relationship has been established. See McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1974); Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 68 Cal.2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1968) (en banc); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101; People v. Davis, 114 Ill.App.3d 537, 542, 70 Ill.Dec. 363, 367, 449 N.E.2d 237, 241 (1983); English v. State, 8 Md.App. 330, 259 A.2d 822 (1969); People v. Fox, 97 Mich.App. 324, 331, 293 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1980) (Cavanagh, Presiding Judge, dissenting), rev’d, 410 Mich. 871, 299 N.W.2d 912 (1980). How-" ever, in United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, reh’g denied, 542 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104, 97 S.Ct. 1133, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977), it was recognized that courts traditionally had the discretion to determine who practiced before them and to monitor their conduct. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed: “Since attorneys are officers of the courts before which they appear, such courts are necessarily vested with the authority, within certain limits,' to control attorneys’ conduct.” Dinitz, 538 F.2d at 1219. Again, in Dinitz, id., the Court reflected that the trial court’s refusal to hear the defendant through his chosen counsel, either constituted an abuse of discretion, or did not, upon a case-by-case basis. Therefore, that portion of Acting Justice Wuest’s dissent which expresses that trial courts have inherent powers and responsibilities in the administration of justice, and particularly when we address this subject of who shall practice before the courts, rings with reason. In my view, the removal of counsel from his client is an extremely serious sanction and should be employed by a trial *436court only in rare instances, after hearing, and the entering of written findings.
In addition to those reasons earlier expressed as to why the action of the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to regularly pursue its authority, I join the general expressions of the majority opinion that there are no findings of fact before us and that, under these circumstances, findings should have been entered to justify such an extreme and unusual action by the trial court. When Mr. Ellison, as Ms. Richard’s counsel, took this appeal, the final request was that “this court ... restrain the Honorable Jeff Davis from prohibiting representation by and consultation with Bruce Ellison, her attorney of choice during, the pendancy [sic] of her Grand Jury subpoena.” This was dated November 15, 1984, and the brief was filed November 19, 1984. The dilemma faced by the attorney and client was, at that time, very real and crucial. Ultimately, the fast ended because the Grand Jury was dismissed and Ms. Richard was released. The order continued, and continues, to forbid this attorney from representing his client or contacting her. Therefore, the issue is still very crucial and real. There is no other writ of error or appeal available to petitioner. Moreover, the order appointing and the order terminating Mr. Ellison was never reduced to writing. Yet, judicial power exists, is in force, and continues to preclude an attorney from contacting his client. We owe a duty to rule foursquare on the propriety of the application of judicial power in jeopardizing and severing an attorney-client relationship, not only to determine the excessive jurisdiction of the trial court's decision in this case, but to establish a legal principle which would be binding in future cases and to give guidance to the Bar and Bench. Finck v. Finck, 354 N.W.2d 198, and the case at bar should serve as a reservoir of research and reflection. Thus, I would grant the writ of cer-tiorari.2
. Concerning Mr. Ellison’s prior court-appointment to represent Ms. Richard, the court ex*435pressed: “I think it's sufficient from the past record and Ms. Richards’ [sic] statements today, to find that appointment of counsel would be proper in this case, given the conflict, also given your prior involvements, Mr. Ellison. I think it’s important that continuity be maintained. I have no problem at all in appointing you in representing Ms. Richards [sic].”
. Although the trial court was ordered to certify the record and both parties were to file briefs, the trial court relied upon certifying the record under SDCL ch. 21-31.