State v. Bayer

FOSHEIM, Chief Justice

The circuit court reversed the magistrate’s order to the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Revenue) to refund monies paid by Barry Bayer (Bayer) under terms of a plea agreement. Bayer appeals. We affirm.

In 1981 Bayer was charged with three felony violations of SDCL 10-45-49.1 for his failure to file sales and service tax returns related to his book-making busi*224ness. Under a plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to two counts of failure to secure and hold a sales tax permit in violation of SDCL 10-45-48. Bayer was sentenced in magistrate court to ten days in the county jail; ordered to pay $62,500.00 for back taxes, penalties, and interest for the period July 1, 1979, through April 1, 1981; and given probation under the conditions that he pay the agreed sum, adopt appropriate sales tax records, and have no violations of SDCL ch. 10-45 nor commit any felonies.

Five days of the sentence were suspended. The schedule for payment of the taxes, penalties, and interest was amended. Bayer has paid $46,407.56 of the $62,500.00 to the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Revenue).

Following this court’s decision in Bayer v. Johnson, 349 N.W.2d 447 (S.D.1984) (Bayer I), the magistrate vacated the conviction on August 13, 1984. In Bayer I, we held that sales tax licensing requirements under SDCL ch. 10-45 could not constitutionally be applied to prohibited gambling activities.

Following the vacation of the judgment, Bayer moved the magistrate court for a refund of the sums he paid under the plea agreement. The magistrate concluded that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, that Revenue did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim, and that Bayer was entitled to a refund because the money was imper-missibly collected by Revenue. The magistrate ordered Revenue to pay Bayer $46,-407.56 plus interest at 15% from the date of the order.

The circuit court in reversing the magistrates order found that Bayer made no payments under protest of illegality; he continued to violate the state constitution with his gambling venture, and, accordingly, has waived his right to protest the voluntary plea agreement. The judge found that Bayer had “purchased the right to continue an unconstitutional [profitable] business” and so could not now “blandly demand his purchase price back from the law and [constitutionj-abiding taxpayer.” Finally, the circuit court further ruled that the magistrate had neither duty nor right to order that Bayer be made whole.

The central issue presented on appeal is whether the magistrate had jurisdiction to order Revenue to repay Bayer money paid under terms of the plea agreement. We affirm the circuit court but on a different rationale. See Owens v. City of Beresford, 87 S.D. 8, 201 N.W.2d 890 (1972).

The money paid by Bayer to Revenue was either taxes, penalty and interest or it was paid as a fine. It had to be fish or fowl. If paid as a fine, it far exceeded magistrate court jurisdiction. SDCL 16-12A-6. It obviously was never contemplated as resembling a fine headed for the public school funds. See S.D. Const, art VIII, § 3; SDCL 23A-27-25. The sentence clearly denominates the money as taxes, penalty and interest. At no time were these sums considered fines or costs which arguably could be returned to Bayer pursuant to State v. Piekkola, 90 S.D. 335, 241 N.W.2d 563 (1976). It was pure and simply regarded as unpaid sales taxes. Though SDCL 23A-31-1 retains jurisdiction for the magistrate court to correct an illegal sentence, it does not authorize refund of the monies paid pursuant to Bayer’s plea agreement. Our legislature has provided an exclusive means for recovery of sales taxes paid and requires that jurisdiction is absent if the procedure established is not strictly followed. See SDCL 10-55-1, through -8 (effective through June 29, 1982) and 10-55A-1, through -11.

If we look closely at the agreed terms of the plea and appropriate disposition signed by counsel for both State and Bayer, we find that Bayer agreed to pay the taxes, penalties, and interest for the period July 1, 1979, through April 1, 1981. These sums were to be remitted directly to Revenue. Finally, payment for that time period, in addition to continued compliance with South Dakota Sales Tax Laws, SDCL ch. 10-45, and adoption of appropriate sales tax records, were agreed terms of Bayer’s probation. No appeal was taken from the magistrate’s disposition.

We affirm.

*225MORGAN, J., and WUEST and HERTZ, Acting JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., dissents.