dissenting:
I agree that the defendants are immune from liability for negligent conduct and that Maria failed to state a cause of action for breach of a special duty. However, because I believe that the defendants’ failure to alert Maria to the serious risk that her son posed to himself amounted to wilful and wanton conduct, I would hold that Maria stated a cause of action in count III of her complaint. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
To establish liability for wilful and wanton conduct, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that the conduct posed a high probability of serious physical harm to others. See Albers v. Community Consolidated No. 204 School, 155 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 508 N.E.2d 1252 (1987). Wilful and wanton conduct includes a failure, after knowledge of an impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent the danger. Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 69 N.E.2d 293 (1946).
In count III of her complaint, Maria alleged that the school counselor knew that Jason intended to kill himself and knew or should have known that great caution should be used in dealing with a suicidal teenager. We must assume that these allegations are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Classic Hotels, Ltd. v. Lewis, 259 Ill. App. 3d 55, 630 N.E.2d 1167 (1994). Based on these allegations, a jury could find that the counselor had knowledge of an impending danger but failed to exercise ordinary care to prevent the danger. It is true that the counselor responded to Jason’s suicide threats by calling his mother. However, the counselor’s failure to advise Jason’s mother that he might be contemplating suicide could have amounted to a failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. Thus, it would be reasonable for a jury to find that the counselor acted with a conscious disregard for Jason’s life by failing to take aggressive steps to prevent Jason from committing suicide or failing to place Maria on notice that she should take steps to prevent Jason from committing suicide.
Whether the counselor’s conduct was wilful and wanton is a question of fact for the jury (Glover v. City of Chicago, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 436 N.E.2d 623 (1982)), and this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis (Pomaro v. Community Consolidated School District 21, 278 Ill. App. 3d 266, 662 N.E.2d 438 (1995)). In my opinion, asking Maria to pick Jason up at school and advising her that he needed treatment for a drug overdose may not absolve the defendants from liability. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of count III of Maria’s complaint and let a jury determine if the defendants’ actions amounted to wilful and wanton misconduct.