concurring. Although I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s judgment, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion in part I of its decision that the term “medical, dental or similar health-oriented offices” in chapter 60, article X, § 60-10.1 (B), of the New Canaan zoning regulations includes a veterinary facility. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, when a statute or ordinance sets forth a specific enumeration of things, “general terms will be construed to embrace things of the same general kind or character as those specifically enumerated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hackett v. J.L.G. Properties, LLC, 285 Conn. 498, 513-14, 940 A. 2d 769 (2008). Rather than looking at the definition of “health,” the majority should more appropriately look to the spe*645cifically enumerated terms, that is, “medical” and “dental.” These terms, in common parlance, clearly refer to services rendered to people, not animals. Thus, the general item enumerated, “similar health-oriented offices,” also should be interpreted to refer to health-oriented facilities for humans. In my experience, the physical requirements and the problems created by a veterinary office are significantly different from those of a medical office.1 Thus, I would suggest that the regulation never contemplated the inclusion of veterinary clinics in the phrase “similar health-oriented offices.” Although people on occasion may bark at one another, this does not lead to the conclusion that the operation of a veterinary facility is of the same kind or character as a medical or dental office, or that a veterinary facility was contemplated to be within the scope of the zoning regulation.
The named defendant, the zoning board of appeals of the town of New Canaan, apparently recognized these differences because it granted the zoning permit application of the defendant Gen Three, LLC, subject to certain conditions, including (1) limited hours of operation, (2) that it would refer after-hour emergencies to other veterinary clinics, (3) that it would not have boarding or grooming facilities on site, and (4) that it would limit to two the number of facilities for animals that require overnight stays. The trial court appropriately determined that these conditions were illegal, a determination with which the majority agrees.