James v. State

CLIFFORD, J.,

with whom SAUFLEY, C.J. Joins, dissenting.

[¶ 28] This case requires us to address the interaction between 17-A M.R.S. § 1252 (2007) and 15 M.R.S. § 103 (2007), and to apply both sections to the unique circumstances of James’s case. I can find nothing in the statutes vesting the trial court with authority to interrupt a criminal sentence, or to choose, as a matter of judicial discretion, between requiring James to complete his criminal sentence, pursuant to section 1252, and committing him to the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 103. In my view, when properly construed, these two statutory provisions are reconcilable and not in conflict, and require that James complete his criminal sentence before he can be committed pursuant to section 103. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

[1129] Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(1)(B)(2) requires that a person be committed to the Department of Corrections, whereas 15 M.R.S. § 103 requires commitment to the custody of DHHS. Both statutes contain mandatory language, and neither contains express language allowing the commitment to be delayed. Section 1252(1)(B)(2) provides that the court “must commit” the defendant to the Department of Corrections upon conviction for a crime. Section 103 provides that the court “shall order” a defendant’s commitment to DHHS when that defendant is found to be “not criminally responsible by reason of insanity.”

[¶30] Because the language in both statutes is mandatory, the Court finds these two provisions to be in conflict. Unable to reconcile the two provisions, the Court turns to and relies on the trial court’s judicial discretion as the only way to resolve the perceived statutory conflict. Even though there is mandatory language in both statutes, neither statute allows for a commitment, once commenced, to be interrupted, nor does either statute grant to the trial court, as a matter of judicial discretion, the authority to decide where James is to be placed.

[¶ 31] We are bound to interpret harmoniously -the seemingly contradictory provisions of the two statutes. See Yeadon Fabric Domes, Inc. v. Me. Sports Complex, LLC, 2006 ME 85, 901 A.2d 200, f 20, 901 A.2d 200, 206 (“When two statutes appear to be inconsistent, we should harmonize them if at all possible.”). In my view, the language of sections 1252 and 103 can be harmonized to resolve this case without the necessity of invoking judicial discretion. The statutes should be construed to provide that a person such as James, already serving a criminal sentence, and then found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, must complete his sentence of incarceration with the Department of Corrections as is required by section 1252, and upon completion of that sentence must be committed to DHHS custody pursuant to section 103.

[¶ 32] Requiring James to complete his criminal sentence before being committed to DHHS is consistent with the limits of the court’s statutory authority. We have never recognized, and with one explicit and limited exception,7 there is no statutory provision authorizing a sentencing court to *1161terminate, amend, commute, interrupt, or in any way alter the terms of a sentence imposed in a prior unrelated matter. See State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 803 (Me.1982) (stating that the Maine Constitutional principle of separation of powers prohibits the extension of judicial power to modify a criminal sentence).

[¶ 33] Our decision in State v, Flemming, 409 A.2d 220 (Me.1979), further supports such a harmonious construction of the statutes. In that case, we affirmed the Superior Court’s decision to defer the commencement of Flemming’s sentence to the Department of Corrections for committing the crime of escape from the Bangor Mental Health Institute until he was released from his commitment to what was then the Bureau of Mental Health and Corrections (a predecessor of DHHS) following a previous trial at which he was found not guilty of two counts of murder by reason of mental disease or defect. Flemming, 409 A.2d at 225-26. In affirming the trial court, we noted that the only way for Flemming to be released from his commitment to the Bureau of Mental Health and Corrections was pursuant to the predecessor statute of 15 M.R.S. § 104-A (2007), which provides that once committed to the Bureau of Mental Health and Corrections pursuant to section 103, a person may be released or discharged from the custody of that Department only if, after a hearing, it is determined that it is without likelihood that the person will cause injury to that person or to others due to mental disease or mental defect, Flemming, 409 A.2d at 225. We stated that, despite Flemming’s subsequent sentence to the Department of Corrections following his criminal conviction for the crime of escape, the Bureau of Mental Health and Corrections “never lost its right, indeed its obligation, to hold Flemming” in accordance with the previously existing disposition of his two murder charges. Id. Flemming, thus, had to complete his previously imposed psychiatric commitment to the Bureau of Mental Health and Corrections before he could be ordered to begin his subsequently imposed criminal sentence. Id. at 225-26. The logic of Flemming supports the conclusion that pursuant to the statutory law applicable to this case, and absent additional statutory language, when a defendant is currently in prison pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1252, or in a psychiatric institution pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 103, the existing commitment must be completed before the subsequent commitment can be commenced.8

*1162[¶ 34] Understandably, the Court is concerned, as was the Superior Court, that correctional institutions may not be the most appropriate places for persons with serious mental health problems. We have expressly held, however, that despite a trial court’s concern for the kind of care and treatment that may be available to a person committed to the Department of Corrections on conviction of a crime, the trial court has no authority to impose special conditions, including mental health treatment, on a defendant’s commitment to the Department of Corrections. Dep’t of Corr. v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d 1131, 1134-35 (Me.1993) (per curiam).

[¶ 35] Moreover, our statutes already provide a procedure pursuant to which persons serving a criminal sentence with the Department of Corrections can receive the mental health treatment they need. See 34-A M.R.S. § 3069 (2007). Title 34-A, section 3069 sets out an administrative civil commitment procedure for an inmate serving a sentence in a correctional institution to be committed to a mental health facility when appropriate. That section also provides a procedure for return of the inmate to prison to finish the criminal sentence once released from the mental health institution. 34-A M.R.S. § 3069(1)(D). Thus, as an inmate serving a criminal sentence in a correctional institution, James may be committed to a psychiatric hospital while continuing to serve his sentence through the Department of Corrections.9 See 34-A M.R.S. § 3069(1). Such a commitment preserves the priority of the preexisting sentence to the Department of Corrections.

[¶ 36] I agree with the State that the Department of Corrections has never lost its right or its obligation to hold James, see Flemming, 409 A.2d at 225, and that, pursuant to the applicable statutory law, he must complete his criminal sentence before being committed to the custody of DHHS. I would vacate the judgment and remand for the entry of a judgment to that effect.

. Tide 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(1) (2007) does specifically allow a court to order that an undischarged term of imprisonment be tolled and a consecutive sentence imposed for a crime committed while in prison to commence immediately.

. Although not applicable to this case because of its recent enactment, the Legislature has enacted legislation that would have required Flemming to complete his criminal sentence before being committed to what is now the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). See PL.2007, ch. 475, § 3 (to be codified at 15 M.R.S. § 103-A(1)). It provides that a person who has been committed to DHHS custody pursuant to section 103, who is then either convicted of a crime or who has violated conditional release terms, must serve the subsequently imposed sentence of imprisonment with the Department of Corrections before being returned to DHHS to complete that commitment: "the person must be placed in execution of that punishment, and custody pursuant to the commitment order under section 103 must automatically be interrupted thereby.” P.L.2007, ch. 475, § 3. That was precisely the situation in Flemming. Thus, if the circumstances of Flemming were to occur now, section 103-A would require that Flemming serve his sentence of incarceration immediately, and then be returned to DHHS custody afterward.

The enactment of section 103-A is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates a legislative preference that a definite term of imprisonment be served before an indefinite psychiatric commitment period can be completed. Second, by enacting such an express provision, the Legislature has made clear that it is the Legislature, and not the judiciary, that has the authority to decide whether a criminal sentence to a correctional institution or a commitment to a mental health institution has priority.

. Tide 34-A M.R.S. § 3069(1) (2007) provides, in pertinent part;

1. Involuntary. When a prisoner of a correctional facility has been determined by a competent medical authority to require inpatient treatment for mental illness, the chief administrative officer of that facility shall make application in accordance with Title 34-B, section 3863.
A. Any person with respect to whom an application and certification under Title 34-B, section 3863 are made may be admitted to either state mental health institute.
B. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, Title 34-B, chapter 3, subchapter 4, Article 3 is applicable to the person as if the admission of the person were applied for under Title 34-B, section 3863
C. A copy of the document by which the person is held in the facility must accompany the application for admission.
D. If the sentence being served at the time of admission has not expired or commitment has not been terminated in accordance with law at the time the person is ready for discharge from hospitalization, the person must be returned by the appropriate officers of the correctional facility.
E. Admission to a mental health institute under this section has no effect upon a sentence then being served or a commitment then in effect. The sentence continues to run and the commitment remains in force, unless terminated in accordance with law. While the sentence or commitment is in effect, the person may not receive a privilege, including, but not limited to, a furlough or its equivalent, a funeral or deathbed visit or the use of tobacco, unless the chief administrative officer of the correctional facility approves the receipt of the privilege.