dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I conclude that the majority has construed the term "assembly" too narrowly and the evidence is sufficient to sustain Oliver's conviction for disorderly conduct as a class B misdemeanor.
Oliver was convicted of disorderly conduct pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-45-1-8(8) (1998), which provides that; "A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally ... disrupts a lawful assembly of persons commits disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor." As we noted in D.R. v. State, the phrase "a lawful assembly of persons" has not been defined by the legislature. 729 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Thus, in accordance with our rules of statutory interpretation, we must look to the plain language of the statute and attribute the common, ordinary meaning to terms found in everyday speech. Id. In determining the plain and ordinary meaning of a term, we may use English language dictionaries as well as consider the relationship with other words and phrases. Id.
In D.R., we dealt with what was clearly not an assembly one person. Id. We did not have before us whether the disruption of the passage of a large number of pedestrians en route to, and little more than a block away from, the site of a professional sports game would constitute an "assembly." The dictionary definition of "assembly" also encompasses the process of assembling. For example, the Webster's New World Dictionary defines "assembly," in part, as "an assembling or being assembled." WeBstEr's New Worn Dictionary *100882 (3rd ed.1988). See also Hill v. State, 381 So.2d 206, 212 (Ala.Cr.App.1979) (holding that in the statute governing the offense of disturbing religious worship, the phrase "any assemblage of people" includes a period of time before the services commence and a reasonable time after the services terminate), writ denied by Ex parte Hill, 381 So.2d 213 (Ala. Mar.28, 1980); 27 C.J.S. Disturbance of Public Meetings § 3(c)(B) (1999); 24 AmJur. 2d Disturbing Meetings § 7 (1998). Consequently, the majority opinion takes much too narrow a view of "lawful assembly."
As for the sufficiency of the evidence, it is clear from the record that a great part, if not all, of the pedestrian traffic was en route to the RCA Dome to attend the Indianapolis Colts football game. Thus, although it is not without dispute, there is evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Oliver "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally" disrupted the flow of persons assembling for the Colts game. As a result, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Oliver's conviction for disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor. Accordingly, I would affirm on this issue and address the remaining issues raised by Oliver.