(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the Legislature did not intend to deny relief under the no-fault act to the dependents of a decedent solely because at the time of death the decedent was unemployed. I also agree that the Legislature did not intend that § 3107a should control the computation of survivors’ benefits under § 3108 where the decedent was unemployed at the time of death.
Survivors’ benefits under §3108 are broader than the work-loss benefits under § 3107a. Survi*68vors’ benefits include the value of tangible items other than, and in addition to, wages and salary, while work-loss benefits are limited to wage and salary income. Therefore, reliance on the language of § 3107a in the construction of § 3108 is inappropriate. Miller v State Farm Mutual Ins Co, 410 Mich 538, 564; 302 NW2d 537 (1981). Where the decedent is unemployed at the time of death, survivors’ benefits are not limited to a computation under § 3107a.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff in this case established that the decedent would have been employed by the forestry service had he not suffered the accidental bodily injury causing death. As the majority of the Court of Appeals panel explained:
The evidence presented at trial showed that on the date of Steven Gobler’s death, he was not employed. It was only on September 6, six months after Gobler’s death, when an "Inquiry of Availability” was received by his wife, that the possibility of employment occurred. This wás not an offer of employment, and because of Gobler’s death, he could not respond to indicate his interest in the potential positions which might be offered. [139 Mich App 768, 776; 362 NW2d 881 (1984).]
I would hold, therefore, that the "Inquiry of Availability” cannot support an award of survivors’ benefits under § 3108 and would remand this case to the trial court for a determination of survivors’ benefits based on past employment which may be calculated by a method analogous but not limited to that specified in § 3107a of the no-fault act.
I also disagree with the majority’s treatment of the penalty interest and attorney fee issues. The Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial *69court’s award of survivors’ benefits based on future employment and denying survivors’ benefits because Steven Gobler was unemployed is evidence that the defendant may have been initially justified in denying plaintiffs claim. Therefore, I would vacate the award of interest and attorney fees and remand this question to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Riley, C.J.{separate opinion). This appeal concerns the problem of calculating survivors’ benefits under MCL 500.3108; MSA 24.13108 of the no-fault act in cases in which the survivor’s decedent was unemployed at the time of his death. I would hold that in determining the amount of income from wages that the deceased would have received, for purposes of calculating benefits under § 3108,1 a method similar to that applicable in calculating the amount of wage-loss benefits under MCL 500.3107; MSA 24.13107 may be employed. I would conclude, therefore, that survivors’-loss benefits may be calculated, in cases in which the deceased was temporarily unemployed, on the basis of an amount determined by reference to the deceased’s past income, analogous to calculating wage loss under MCL 500.3107a; MSA 24.13107(1). I would also conclude that such benefits may be calculated on the basis of the amount of income from wages the deceased would have received after his temporary unemployment would have ended, similar to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals construing § 3107(b) in Lewis v DAIIE, 90 Mich App 251; 282 NW2d 794 (1979), but only when such future employment can be clearly established. In the event that the deceased was, and *70would have continued to be, a full-time student whose past and future income would have been derived only from part-time and seasonal employment, I would approve of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Kennedy v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 87 Mich App 93; 273 NW2d 599 (1978).
In the present case, I would affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court’s calculation of survivors’ benefits on the basis of the salary plaintiff’s decedent would have received if he would have been employed by the United States Forestry Service. I agree with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the factual finding that plaintiff’s decedent would have been employed by the forestry service. I disagree, however, with the Court’s holding that, because plaintiff’s decedent was otherwise unemployed, plaintiff was not entitled to any benefits under § 3108. I would hold that survivors’ benefits should be calculated by annualizing plaintiff’s decedent’s past income in the manner originally proposed by the trial court,2 and, therefore, would remand this case to the trial court for the recalculation of benefits on the basis of that method. Finally, I would address the penalty interest and attorney fee issues which, because of the Court of Appeals disposition of this case, were not thoroughly addressed.
*71I
Survivors’-loss benefits consist of two elements. The first concerns the loss of "contributions of tangible things of economic value” that the deceased’s dependents would have received for their support during their dependency, and the second concerns expenses incurred in obtaining certain services in lieu of those which the deceased would have performed. Miller v State Farm Mutual Ins Co, 410 Mich 538, 554; 302 NW2d 537 (1981). The issue in this case, as in Miller, concerns only the first element. Likewise, the issue in this case concerns only "contributions” that plaintiff would have received from her decedent’s income from wages.3
While the loss of "contributions of tangible things of economic value” compensable under § 3108 differs substantially in theory and in scope from the loss of income compensable under § 3107, the calculation of benefits under each section is similar in some respects.4 For purposes of calculating survivors’-loss benefits under this element of § 3108, for example, a survivor need not establish the amount of financial support she would have actually received from the deceased. Rather, once dependency is established, benefits are calculated on the basis of the gross income the deceased would have received, less an adjustment for payable income taxes, without the deduction of a personal consumption factor.5 Miller, supra. Thus, in cases in which a dependent survivor claims *72benefits under § 3108 solely on the basis of the loss of contributions she would have received from the deceased’s wage income, the calculation of benefits is entirely dependent upon the amount of that income. In such cases, "survivors’ benefits paid for loss of support may fairly be regarded as a partial substitute for work-loss benefits which . . . would have been paid to the injured person . . . .” Belcher v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 409 Mich 231, 249; 293 NW2d 594 (1980).
ii
In the present case, plaintiff claimed survivors’loss benefits which included loss of support from the deceased’s wage income. Defendant denied plaintiff’s claim because, among other things, her deceased husband was a "full time student” at the time of his death and, as such, was not "temporarily unemployed” within the meaning of the no-fault act. Initially, it was not defendant’s position that § 3107a was inapplicable; rather, defendant viewed plaintiff’s claim as derivative of the claim her husband would have had for wage-loss benefits and reasoned that, because he would not have been entitled to such benefits under § 3107a, plaintiff was not entitled to survivors’-loss benefits under § 3108.
Prior to the commencement of trial, the Court of Appeals had released its decision in Kennedy, supra, in which it expressly rejected defendant’s assertion that a full-time student could not qualify as temporarily unemployed. At trial, defendant contended, first, that plaintiff was not entitled to survivors’-loss benefits because she had failed to *73establish any actual loss of financial support. -Defendant reasoned that because plaintiffs income was roughly commensurate in amount to the deceased’s, and that they both contributed relatively equal amounts to their collective support, plaintiff would not be able to establish any actual loss. Second, defendant contended that if plaintiff were entitled to survivors’-loss benefits, the amount could only be calculated on the basis of the déceased’s past employment, as opposed to his potential future employment, because to do so on the basis of the latter would be tantamount to calculating benefits on the basis of future earning capacity.
The trial court rejected defendant’s first contention as contrary to this Court’s decision in Miller, supra, in which the personal consumption factor issue was expressly decided. Finding that plaintiff was a dependent of the deceased,6 and that she had sustained survivors’ loss, the trial court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to recover and that the only remaining question concerned the proper method of computation. In partial agreement with defendant, the court ruled, initially, that benefits could not be calculated on the basis of the deceased’s future potential income. Instead, the court ruled that the proper method of computation would require the annualization of the deceased’s past income pursuant to § 3107a. The court rejected defendant’s assertion that, pursuant to Kennedy, supra, benefits should not be annualized on a full-time basis, but should be limited to annualizing the deceased’s past income on a seasonal or part-time basis. The court found that the deceased *74would have secured full-time employment on the basis of the deceased’s past work history, that he had completed his studies and in fact had received his degree posthumously, that he had no immediate plans for returning to school, and that his plans were to pursue his career. The court found, furthermore, that plaintiffs decedent would have been employed by the United States Forestry Service as a full-time forester, beginning approximately six months after his death, even though the court remained convinced that benefits could not properly be calculated on the basis of the salary the decedent would have received from that employment. Thus, the court annualized the deceased’s past income from seasonal employment, on the basis of an amount stipulated to by the parties, which resulted in an annual income amount of $9,755.06.
After ruling in defendant’s favor on plaintiffs bad faith and fraud counts, the court decided the penalty interest and attorney fee issues. The court awarded penalty interest, but limited that award by ruling that penalty interest was to be computed only on the deceased’s unannualized actual past income, and that such interest would have begun to accrue only after the Court of Appeals decision in Kennedy. The court ruled that penalty interest would begin to accrue after January 1, 1979, and would be computed only on the undisputed amount of the deceased’s income from his last seasonal employment, because to that extent defendant could not deny having received reasonable proof of loss. The court also ruled that plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney fees incurred after January 1, 1979. The court reasoned that, because defendant was also the defendant in Kennedy, and the reason expressed for denying plaintiffs claim in the present case was expressly rejected by the *75Kennedy Court, that after the date of that decision defendant had unreasonably denied plaintiffs claim, at least with regard to calculating benefits on the basis of the undisputed amount of the deceased’s actual past income.
After its initial ruling, but prior to the entry of judgment, plaintiff successfully moved the court to amend its original ruling with regard to the proper basis upon which to calculate survivors’loss benefits. Relying upon Lewis, supra, and the court’s express factual finding that plaintiffs decedent would have been employed by the United States Forestry Service, plaintiff argued that survivors’-loss benefits should be calculated on the basis of the salary and fringe benefits the deceased would have received from that future employment. The trial court amended its earlier ruling accordingly, and entered judgment for plaintiff, calculating survivors’-loss benefits on the basis of its earlier finding that plaintiffs decedent would have received a salary of $11,046 annually, plus $2,000 in fringe benefits for a total of $13,046.
hi
I would affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court’s calculation of survivors’-loss benefits on the basis of the salary and fringe benefits the deceased would have received if he would have been employed by the United States Forestry Service. The record in this case, which includes an inquiry of availability that was forwarded to the deceased sometime after his death, the testimony of a recruitment officer concerning forestry service employment policy and process, and the plaintiffs testimony regarding the deceased’s career aspirations, does not establish that the deceased would have been employed by the forestry service. When *76income from wages that the deceased would have received from future employment after his temporary employment would have ended can be clearly established, I would agree that survivors’-loss benefits should appropriately be calculated on the basis of that future income. In cases in which a contract of employment to begin at some future date was concluded — offered and accepted — prior to the fatal motor vehicle accident, for example, survivors’-loss benefits could properly be calculated on the basis of that future income amount. Circumstantial evidence tending to show that the deceased could have secured particular employment at some time within the three-year statutory period, however, would be insufficient. I agree with the Court of Appeals that the record in this case establishes only the latter.
In cases in which the deceased was temporarily unemployed at the time of his death, and in which his future employment cannot be established by some degree of clear and convincing evidence, survivors’ loss from the deceased’s wage income should be calculated on the basis of the deceased’s past income analogous to calculating wage loss pursuant to § 3107a. In light of the underlying purposes and objectives of § 3108, and the no-fault act as a whole, it would not be reasonable to conclude that the Legislature’s most probable intent was to completely deny the payment of any benefits to dependent survivors in such cases. While § 3108 does not specifically include a provision similar to § 3107a, it should be noted that it also does not include any specific reference to wages. Further, considering the broad language of § 3108, I do not find the omission surprising. Rather, I am persuaded that applying a method of calculation analogous to that which applies in *77calculating wage loss in such cases would be consistent with the underlying purpose and public policy of the act as interpreted through the decisions of this Court. As stated in Miller, supra, 568:
[Section] 3108 itself, and the act as a whole, presumably reflect a balance struck by the Legislature between absolute factual precision in the calculation of benefits and the goal of "assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses.”
Inasmuch as the Legislature intended survivors’loss benefits to be calculated as soon as possible after the fatal accident in any given case, allowing the application of a method analogous to § 3107a in cases in which the deceased was temporarily unemployed would surely further the objective of "minimiz[ing] administrative delays and factual disputes that would interfere with achievement of the goal of expeditious compensation of damages suffered in motor vehicle accidents.” Id.
Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals remanding this case for entry of no cause of action, and would remand this case to the trial court for the recalculation of benefits pursuant to the method provided in § 3107a, and consistent with the court’s initial ruling as reflected in its opinion of December 8, 1981.
With regard to the attorney fee and penalty interest issues, I would conclude that the factual findings upon which the trial court’s judgment was based were not clearly erroneous. I would emphasize that the issues addressed on appeal in the Court of Appeals and in this Court were not directly presented in the trial court, nor do they reflect the reasons expressed by defendant in sup*78port of its initial and continuing complete denial of plaintiff's claim.7
Accepting the trial court’s premise that defendant was properly to be charged with having had knowledge of the Court of Appeals decision in Kennedy, supra, I am not convinced that the court’s finding that defendant unreasonably continued to completely deny plaintiffs claim was clearly erroneous. Thus, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the award of attorney fees. Likewise, I would conclude that the trial court’s limited award of penalty interest pursuant to MCL 500.3142(2); MSA 24.13142(2) was not erroneous. Defendant had received reasonable proof of loss with respect to the limited overdue amount upon which penalty interest was awarded.
Thus, I would remand this case for a recalculation of survivors’-loss benefits, and in all other respects would reinstate the trial court’s judgment.
Griffin, J., took no part in the decision of this case.No evidence other than the decedent’s past and potential future income from wages was submitted by plaintiff in support of her claim for survivors’-loss benefits. The extent of plaintiffs loss, therefore, is limited to the loss of support from the decedent’s income from wages.
Prior to trial, defendant successfully moved the trial court to limit the calculation of any award of survivors’-loss benefits to the method provided in § 3107a. Although the court expressly found that plaintiffs decedent would have secured employment with the United States Forestry Service, and that that employment would have begun approximately six months after his death, the court, consistent with its earlier ruling, held that benefits were to be calculated by annualizing the decedent’s past income from his last employment pursuant to § 3107a. After some posttrial motion practice, however, the court amended its original opinion and held that benefits were to be calculated on the basis of the salary and fringe benefits the decedent would have received during his employment with the forestry service, after his temporary unemployment would have ended.
The survivors’ benefits award in the present case was based solely on the dependent plaintiffs loss of support from the decedent’s income from wages.
See Belcher v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 409 Mich 231; 293 NW2d 594 (1980).
While the nature and language of § 3108 differs substantially from § 3107a, our construction of § 3108 in Miller, supra, renders the *72calculation of survivors’ benefits based on a dependent’s loss of support from the decedent’s income from wages virtually identical to the calculation of wage loss.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs dependency within the meaning of the act was undisputed; she was conclusively presumed to be a dependent of the deceased pursuant to MCL 500.3110(l)(a); MSA 24.13110(l)(a).
The record reflects that the reason for defendant’s denial of plaintiffs claim was that plaintiffs decedent did not qualify as "temporarily unemployed” within the meaning of § 3107a. At trial, defendant argued that, if plaintiff were entitled to benefits under § 3108, the calculation of any award should be limited to the method provided in § 3107a. Defendant did not assert, prior to its appeal in the Court of Appeals, that plaintiff was not entitled to any recovery whatsoever because § 3107a is entirely inapplicable in calculating survivors’-loss benefits under § 3108.