dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority's interpretation of the SVP statute, I respectfully dissent.
According to the prosecution's evidence at trial, defendant, while wearing a mask or sock over his face to conceal his identity, broke into his neighbor's home, and, for over *427three hours, sexually assaulted her and her daughter (victims). After his conviction, the trial court found that, for purposes of this assault, defendant was a stranger to the victims because, while the assaults were occurring, neither victim was aware that defendant was the perpetrator.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that he fits the definition of a SVP. Specifically, he argues that because Re knew the victims, they were not strangers. The majority agrees that the statutory criteria have not been met. I disagree with that determination.
As relevant here, under the third prong of section 18-8-414.5(1)(a), C.R.8.2009, a "sexually violent predator" is "an offender ... [whose victim was a stranger to the offender." See People v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Colo.App.2009). The majority relies upon the statutory phrasing in concluding that the victims must be strangers to the perpetrator. According to the majority, the SVP statute only applies under those circumstances, but not when the perpetrator is a stranger to the victims. In my view, this interpretation is inconsistent with principles of statutory interpretation.
In interpreting a statute, we must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Colo.2006). Whenever possible, we must determine the General Assembly's intent from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 215 (Colo.2005). We discern the clarity or ambiguity of the statutory language by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. People v. Tixier, 207 P.3d 844, 847 (Colo.App.2008). We must read and consider the statute as a whole "to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts." People v. Hernandez, 160 P.3d 263, 264 (Colo.App.2007) (quoting Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119, 180 (Colo.2005)), aff'd, 176 P.3d 746 (Colo.2008). We presume that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective. Tizer, 207 P.3d at 847. We will not follow a statutory interpretation that leads to an illogical or absurd result. Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo.2004).
Under the majority's interpretation, when an offender does not know his vietim or have a "definable relationship" with her, he may be found to be a sexually violent predator, but when the offender knows his victim, he may not. But this interpretation does not give effect to the entire statute. Under the fourth prong of the statute, it is clear that the rationale for the SVP designation is to identify an offender who is likely to subsequently commit another sex offense. What possible reason would the General Assembly have to include perpetrators who do not know their victims but exclude offenders who know their vietim, when their victim does not know them?
For example, under the majority's interpretation, if an offender has some information about his victim (because he may have stalked her, or have seen her picture in a yearbook or on a social networking site on the Internet, or otherwise have identified her as a target), he will argue following convietion that he is not a sexually violent predator because he "knew" the victim, even though she did not know him. Under the majority's interpretation, he will likely prevail.
As an additional example, assume that a perpetrator has chosen at random to sexually assault whoever is inside a particular home, without knowing who the victim is. The perpetrator enters the house at night and assaults the victim in the dark. The victim cannot initially identify the perpetrator, but later discovers that he has left an item that identifies him as an acquaintance she knows from work. At the time of the attack, the offender did not know the victim, but following his conviction, he will assert he did. Is he a sexually violent predator under these circumstances? Under the majority's interpretation, he is not.
These examples lead me to conclude that the majority's interpretation yields an anomalous, if not absurd, result, which we should avoid in statutory interpretation. See Frazier, 90 P.3d at 811. In my view, the broader context of the statute, see Tixier, 207 P.3d at 847, requires that we read "stranger to the *428offender" as meaning either the victim is a stranger to the offender or the offender is a stranger to the victim, when analyzed at the time the offense was committed. The danger to the public that the perpetrator may reof-fend exists in both settings, and this interpretation gives effect to the entire statute.
The Colorado Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB), the agency responsible for oversecing the evaluation, identification, and treatment of sex offenders, see § 16-11.7-103, C.R.S.2009, has developed an SVP assessment screening instrument. Part 2 of the sereening instrument addresses the relationship criterion for classifying an offender as an SVP, and states that "the victim is a stranger to the offender when the victim has never known or met the offender, or has met the offender in such a casual manner as to have little or no familiar or personal knowledge of said offender, prior to the current offense." This definition also suffers from deficiencies, because it appears to look at the issue only from the victim's standpoint. The majority's interpretation is deficient because it appears to define the phrase only from the offender's standpoint.
Nevertheless, we should give deference to the SOMB definition, because the SOMB is the agency charged with administering the assessment. See Coffman v. Colorado Common Cause, 102 P.3d 999, 1005 (Colo.2004) (a reviewing court must give deference to the reasonable interpretations of the administrative ageney authorized to enforce a statute).
Here, on remand, the trial court found:
[The man that came in was a stranger to both of these victims. The fact that they may have known him, or may have met him, or may have been the person next door at the time that this took place and during this entire encounter, as far as they were aware, that was a stranger, that was not a known person.
This case turned on identification. They could not make an identification. The identification was made, I believe, to the satisfaction of this jury based on scientific evidence, and that was the DNA evidence from I think it was only one or two, just a very, very slim hair that was found in the bed and on the floor.... And it is clear that at this time they considered him, and he was not known to them, so he was there as a stranger when the assault started and throughout the assault.... I find that the prong as required by the court of appeals as to whether the victims were strangers, or whether they established or promoted the relationship, it's clear the victims, both these victims in this case, were strangers and I so find.
Applying either my definition, which would look at "stranger to the offender" from both the offender's and the victim's standpoint, or the SOMB definition, I perceive no error in the trial court's determination. The court found that although the victims may have met defendant previously, they did not know it was him when he was perpetrating the assaults, they could not identify him, and the only evidence linking defendant to the crime was DNA from hair left at the seene. Those findings are supported by the record. Therefore, I agree with the trial court that defendant was a stranger to them.
This result is not negated by the evidence the prosecution presented at trial, or by the prosecutor's closing argument at trial that defendant knew the victims. First, nothing in the statute indicates that in making its SVP determination, the trial court is bound by what the prosecutor argues. Second, the trial court makes its findings posttrial, and the evidence provided for conviction is not necessarily the evidence needed to make an SVP determination. Third, the court's findings here are consistent with the SOMB's definition.
Accordingly, because I conclude that defendant meets the criteria necessary to be a sexually violent predator, I respectfully dissent.