dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Our supreme court has stated:
Probable cause exists when the officer, at the time of arrest, has knowledge of facts and cireumstances which would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the defendant committed the crime. The determination of probable cause is not one of mathematical precision, but rather is grounded on the notions of common sense.
Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind.1998) (emphases added, citations omitted). The Seventh Cireuit Court of Appeals "has consistently held that 'once police officers have discovered sufficient facts to establish probable cause, they have no constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence'" Jones v. Watson, 106 F.3d 774, 781 (7th Cir.1997) (citation omitted), cert. denied. It seems to me that the majority focuses on whether Officer Holt and Deputy Houseworth should have conducted further investigation of the row between Row and the Simons, rather than on whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether they had probable cause to arrest Row at the time of arrest. I believe that no such issues exist and that we should therefore affirm the trial court.
Both Row and the majority emphasize that Krystall displayed no signs of bodily injury when she was interviewed by Officer Holt. It bears mentioning that " '[blodily injury' means any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain." Ind.Code § 35-41-1-4. The majority states that "there was a likelihood that Krystall was the aggressor in a shoving match because Row 'had shoved Krystall back[.]' " Op. at 1085 (quoting Officer Holt's deposition). It seems that "back" could have two meanings here, either "in response to Kry-stall's initial shove" or simply "backward," in which case Row could be viewed as the aggressor. Given that Officer Holt did not state that Krystall pushed Row first, I am inclined to choose the latter.
The majority also suggests that Officer Holt failed to question the Simons' eredi-bility regarding the alleged battery. I cannot agree. The record indicates that whereas the Simons were agitated, Row was intoxicated, and that might well have tipped the balance against him. Also, it is worth noting that Krystall exposed herself to criminal liability in making the affidavit if she knew that the information therein was false. See Ind.Code § 35-44-2-2(d) (false informing). As for Officer Holt's failure to show Row the affidavit before she arrested him, I am unaware of any such requirement in Indiana law.
The majority also highlights what Marshal Stepleton knew about the feud between the parties and what Row had reported to various law enforcement agencies. While this collective knowledge might be relevant in other probable cause contexts, in this case "the police officer's actual knowledge of objective facts and cireumstances is determinative." VanPelt v. State, 760 N.E.2d 218, 223 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (emphasis added). In her deposition, Officer Holt testified that she was "[vlaguely" aware of the *1091feud and that if she had "heard it it was probably onee or twice. It wasn't to my knowledge that it was as big as it is." Appellant's App. at 212. Many assaults occur between people with a history of animosity. Finally, as for whether the officers were acting in good faith at the time of arrest, I fail to see the relevance of Officer Holt's unrelated prior and future disciplinary woes.10
As I see it, the issue is not whether there is a factual dispute regarding what occurred between Row and Krystall; undoubtedly there is. The issue before us is whether probable cause existed to effectuate an arrest. I believe that we must act cautiously in putting law enforcement officers under the microscope as to whether they should have further investigated the existence of probable cause, especially in a case involving a breach of the peace that might have escalated without police intervention. While some of the personalities in this case may be unsympathetic, I believe that we should refrain from attempting to define how the law should be enforced in this context, as opposed to deciding whether it is being enforced.
I am concerned that the majority's opinion may encourage inappropriate attempts to second-guess police officers in situations where they have traditionally-and by necessity-been given considerable discretion. Police officers are charged with the very difficult responsibility of maintaining order in chaotic situations that are far removed from the orderly and deliberative atmosphere of a courtroom with sworn testimony and evidentiary exhibits. While it might have been more prudent for Officer Holt to seek a warrant or conduct additional interviews before arresting Row, I cannot conclude that she acted imprudently based on the facts before her at the time of arrest. Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
. I also fail to see the necessity of mentioning the Bowlings' alleged disparagement of Row, given that they are not defendants in this lawsuit. See op. at 1080-81.