concurring in result.
I agree with the majority that the small claims court effectively denied Zimmerman his constitutional right to present his case in court, and as such the dismissal of Zimmerman's cause of action should be reversed. However, I write separately to address the appointment of counsel issue, specifically the majority's application of Sholes on this matter.
As properly outlined by the majority, Sholes instructs that the statutory procedure for the appointment of counsel under Indiana Code section 34-10-1-1 requires both a determination of "indigence" and "sufficient means." Applying Sholes, the majority concludes that the small claims court did not follow this procedure because it failed to make specific findings when it denied Zimmerman's motion for appoint, ment of counsel. I disagree.
Zimmerman, pro se, filed a "Motion for Relief from Fee in Civil Action," which included a statement from Zimmerman regarding his state of indigency, a printout of the liens existing against his prison fund account, and a certified counselor's statement. The small claims court granted Zimmerman's motion, issuing a generally worded order on July 24, 2000, that simply recognized the contents of Zimmerman's motion and then waived filing fees and court costs. Yet, on February 22, 2001, the small claims court denied Zimmerman's "Motion for Appointment of Counsel." While the aforementioned orders came prior to our supreme court's decision in Sholes, they are nevertheless in accord with its rationale.
More specifically, the small claims court was presented with a litigant that was *759"indigent" but yet equipped with "sufficient means" to prosecute his claim. Zimmerman was incarcerated, had liens against his prison fund, and by all accounts could not afford to retain counsel. Yet, with access to a prison library, Zimmerman was able to present timely, coherent, even persuasive pleadings, in furtherance of his cause of action. In Sholes, our supreme court held in part as follows:
[TJhe court should look to the particular issues presented in the action and make a determination of whether the indigent applicant requires counsel.
Sholes, 760 N.E.2d at 161. Here, the nature of Zimmerman's dispute was not complex, and his ability to effectively use the legal system was readily apparent.5 Therefore, I see no need to require the small claims court to provide special findings in support of a judgment that is plainly supported by the Record. I agree with the result of the small claims court's decision not to appoint counsel for Zimmerman; namely, that his action does not necessitate the expenditure of public funds. For the above reasons, I find the small claims court's order denying Zimmerman the appointment of counsel fully effecting the dictates of Sholes.
. Moreover, in a separate cause of action, entitled Zimmerman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 337 (Ind.2001), Zimmerman, again pro se, managed "sufficient means" to reverse the dismissal of a trial court-only to lose at the supreme court level.