(dissenting).
The findings of the trial court display errors and inconsistencies, repeated by the majority, which in my opinion compel a different conclusion. The trial court refused to admit evidence concerning Chapman’s support obligations in 1979. That ruling seemingly was based on the theory that only Chapman’s circumstances at the time of the accident, in May 1978, were relevant to the question of indigency. Yet the trial court found from Chapman’s 1978 and 1979 earnings that he had “the present or future hope of resources” (emphasis added) sufficient to pay for his hospital and medical expenses. A similar inconsistency is even more apparent in the majority opinion. It boldly states that the question of indigency must be determined on the facts as they exist at the time of hospital admission, but then proceeds to define the standard for indigency as whether Chapman has the “present or future hope of resources to pay for his emergency medical and hospital expenses.” (Emphasis added.) How can it be right both ways? Such a double standard willy-nilly operates unfairly against the alleged indigent.
⅛ If the standard is confined to Chapman’s financial circumstances at the time of his *493hospital admission, then he was indigent as that term is now defined by SDCL 28-13-27(2). All he had was a job, at or near the poverty level, which was then paying him nothing because he could not work. Following his release from the hospital he convalesced for a prolonged period of time during which he likewise earned nothing.
If the standard is “present or future resources,” then the trial court erred in refusing to consider evidence bearing on Chapman’s post-injury circumstances and obligations. After returning to work his affordable payments did not cover the interest on the unpaid balance, even as reduced from other public sources which did recognize his indigency. We concluded in Sioux Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Jones Co., 309 N.W.2d 835 (S.D.1981), that the fact of employment, and particularly low income employment, was not controlling in determining indigency. Consequently, whichever standard is appropriate, the facts and the trial court’s findings fail to support the conclusion that Chapman was not indigent.
I am authorized to state that Justice MORGAN joins in this dissent.