concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the dismissal of the claim for conversion. I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that the trial court erred in dismissing Dominiack's claim for unjust enrichment.
In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must establish that the plaintiff has conferred a measurable benefit upon the defendant under such circumstances that retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust. Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E2d 311 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). This theory is sometimes referred to as restitution, a contract implied in law, quasi-contract, or, somewhat more archaically, an action in assumpsit. Nehi Beverage Co., Inc. of Indianapolis v. Petri, 537 N.E.2d 78 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), trans. denied. Another concept inherent in the theory of unjust enrichment is that the benefit for which the plaintiff seeks recovery was expressly or impliedly requested by the defendant. See Garage Doors of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Morton, 682 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied; Dedelow v. Rudd Equipment Corp., 469 N.E.2d 1206, 1209 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) ("[ulnjust enrichment comes within the purview of an action based on quasi contract or quantum meruit. A party seeking to recover upon such a theory must demonstrate that a benefit was rendered to the other party at the express or implied request of such other party"); Indianapolis Raceway Park, Inc. v. Curtiss, 179 Ind.App. 557, 386 N.E.2d 724 (1979); cf. Wright v. Pennamped, 657 N.E.2d 1223 *192(Ind.Ct.App.1995), clarified on denial of reh'g (in order to recover under the theory of quasi-contract, a plaintiff is required to establish that the defendant impliedly or expressly requested that the benefit be conferred), trams. denied; but cf. Olsson v. Moore, 590 N.E.2d 160 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (the principles of equity prohibit unjust enrichment in cases where a party accepted the unrequested benefits another provided, and had the opportunity to decline those benefits). In fact, this court has gone so far as to say that "a party who has not expressly or impliedly requested the benefit is under no obligation to pay for the benefit." Garage Doors of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Morton, 682 N.E.2d at 1303.
In the instant case, Kizer, Daulton, and Gee accepted invitations to attend the basketball game, but there is nothing of ree-ord to suggest-indeed, Dominiack does not even contend-that they impliedly or expressly sought their invitations from Dunbar. Most importantly, this fatal deficiency in Dominiack's case is evident in the pleadings. See Hosler ex rel. Hosler v. Caterpillar, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 193, 196 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ("[Iwle will affirm a T.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal when a complaint states a set of facts which, even if true, would not support the relief requested in the complaint"), trans. denied. For this reason alone, I believe that the trial court's decision in this respect should be upheld. See Garage Doors of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Morton, 682 NE2d 1296; Dedelow v. Rudd Equipment Corp., 469 N.E.2d 1206; Indianapolis Raceway Park, Inc. v. Curtiss, 179 Ind.App. 557, 386 N.E.2d 724; cf. Wright v. Pennamped, 657 N.E.2d 1223.
Finally, I take this opportunity to look beyond the pleadings and make the observation that this is not the sort of case where equity demands a court should step in to right a wrong. Unjust enrichment is, after all, largely an equitable principle. See Olsson v. Moore, 590 N.E.2d 160; but see Nehi Beverage Co., Inc. of Indianapolis v. Petri, 537 N.E.2d at 85 (unjust enrichment .... is the product of a long tradition in law, and is an action at law"). In this case, Dominiack's employee embezzled money and spent it, presumably in a variety of places and a variety of ways. One such way was to throw an extravagant party for invited guests. Certainly, under these cireumstances, equity does not compel our courts to assist Dominiack in recouping a portion of its losses from guests who attended the event while completely unaware of the illicit source of the party's funding. Cf. Rollings v. Smith, 716 N.E.2d 502 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (restitution, a similar equitable remedy, seeks only to return or restore what the defendant has gained in a transaction, thus focusing more on remedying the defendant's unjust enrichment rather than plaintiff's loss).
In summary, I would affirm the trial court and dismiss the claim for unjust enrichment based upon my conclusions that (1) the Appellees did not request the benefits bestowed upon them and therefore Dominiack has not presented a legally adequate claim of unjust enrichment, and (2) Dominiack has not offered a compelling argument for equitable relief with respect to the guests at the party in question. I would affirm the trial court and dismiss the claim for unjust enrichment.