(concurring). The dissenting opinion of my colleague states that there are two issues in this case. Firstly, whether there was sufficient evidence to convict; and secondly, whether the jury instructions adequately covered the elements of the offense. The opinion concludes that the. evidence supports a jury finding that the statute was violated and that the judge’s instructions were not reversibly erroneous.
There is, however, only one issue. Defendant’s appellate counsel expressly eschewed appellate consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence. The instructions were, indeed, erroneous. The defect is not a matter of little consequence; there is "reversible error”.
The jury was not "adequately” informed that "carrying” was an element of the offense by instructions which thrice excluded any reference to that element of the offense.
A
The only question stated in the application for leave to appeal, in this Court’s order granting leave to appeal and in Butler’s brief on appeal is whether the trial court committed instructional error.1
*392During oral argument, the sufficiency of the evidence was raised by bench questioning. Butler’s appellate counsel, in his response to the questions, said: "I’m not contesting the sufficiency of the evidence here” and "[t]hat would be in my opinion a jury question”, and if "it turns on credibility then it’s going to have to turn on an accurate jury instruction”.2 (Emphasis supplied.)_
*393The dissenting opinion thus injects a new issue into this case. While a discussion of evidentiary sufficiency may be helpful, it would not be precedential. " 'Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand, are, however illuminating, but obiter dicta and lack the force of an adjudication.’ ” Hett v Duffy, 346 Mich 456; 78 NW2d 284 (1956).
The principle of judicial self-discipline which discourages decision on issues not before the court seeks to economize the time and energy of the court and to avoid erroneous judgment. The adversary system disciplines the judicial inquiry and serves to crystallize the difficult choices with *394which we generally find ourselves confronted. When an issue is not presented in the form of a keenly contested and discrete controversy, a court is denied a valuable resource that contributes both to the legitimacy and wisdom of its judgment.
No compelling reason has been suggested for reaching out to consider the sufficiency of the evidence. The single issue presented on appeal does not concern the sufficiency of the evidence. Nor does it concern what inferences may be drawn in varying factual situations. Nor are we presented with the question whether there is need or justification for formulating a presumption concerning what constitutes a prima facie case.
The view expressed in the dissenting opinion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence constitutes the first expression of views thereon by a member of this Court. In this jurisprudential vacuum, that view, absent an expression from other members of the Court, might be read by some as having our approval. It is for this reason that I feel constrained to make some non-precedential, non-decisional observations of my own which, because they are of that character, will be set forth in a footnote.3
*396B
The dissenting opinion states:
"The first and third of the five quoted paragraphs set forth the charge in the language of the statute which clearly indicates that the principal element, in fact the gravamen, of the crime is carrying a pistol in a vehicle operated by the defendant. The second quoted paragraph particularly emphasizes the carrying element on the charge in such a way that the jury could not fail to understand the importance and necessity of the carrying element.”
The first and third paragraphs4 of the instruc*397tions quoted in the dissenting opinion do not identify "carrying” as an element. They state rather that Butler is charged with carrying a pistol. It was not indicated at all — let alone "clearly” — that the "principal element, in fact the gravamen, of the crime is carrying”.
The second quoted paragraph, which simply repeats that the defendant was charged with "carrying”, does not "particularly emphasize the carrying element”. Neither the first nor the second paragraph makes any reference to what are the elements of the offense or, indeed, to the concept of elements.
The concept that there are elements of an offense is not alluded to in the first and second paragraphs. The jury is composed of laymen. The notion that there are elements of an offense is probably a new concept to jurors. That concept does not appear in the instructions until many paragraphs later. Then for the first time the judge, in the fourth and fifth quoted paragraphs, speaks of the elements of the offense.
*398The judge states that the elements are "very simple”: (i) a pistol, (ii) a motor vehicle owned or operated by the defendant, and (iii) knowledge that the pistol was in the vehicle. The judge then proceeds to repeat those elements two more times and concludes: "Those are the elements of the offense. So it is not a complicated offense in any way, as you can see.”
The dissenting opinion does not discuss the fourth and fifth quoted paragraphs which alone describe the elements of the offense. The conclusion in that opinion that the instructions as a whole clearly informed the jury of all the elements is asserted without acknowledgment that the only elements identified as such to the jury did not include "carrying”.
Nowhere did the judge identify or describe as an element, let alone "clearly indicate”, what the dissenting opinion correctly characterizes as the "principal element”, the "gravamen” of the offense. Nowhere did the judge emphasize "the carrying element on the charge in such a way that the jury could not fail to understand the importance and necessity of the carrying element.”
The statement that jury instructions, "although not as artful as they might have been, adequately informed the jury of the elements of the crime”, may be appropriate in a case where the judge covers the elements in language which, although lacking in elegance, is nevertheless informative. The problem here is not style but substance: The total omission of the carrying element (by thrice omitting it) and its exclusion with the sign-off statement ("Those are the elements of the offense”).
The judge treated "carrying” as a shorthand description (like robbery, breaking and entering, *399arson and murder) of the offense with which the defendant was charged. How could a lay jury be regarded as "adequately” informed if an experienced and knowledgeable judge either did not understand or in a lapse forgot to charge the jury on the principal element, the gravamen of the offense?
Suppose a defendant is charged with breaking and entering. The judge instructs the jury early in his instructions that the defendant is charged with breaking and entering, and, as here, proceeds to discuss the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. He then purports to describe the elements of the offense; he says nothing further about breaking or entering, only that the charged offense requires, as an element, proof of intent to commit a felony. Such an instruction would be misleading and inaccurate even though the judge had told the jury that the defendant was charged with breaking and entering.
It is apparent, upon reading the dissenting opinion, that defining what constitutes "carrying” presents serious and difficult business, but it hardly can be said that this is a "simple” or an "uncomplicated” matter.
Butler’s trial counsel asked for an instruction on "carrying”. The problem that confronts the trial and appellate benches of making intelligible to the lay jury what is meant by "carrying” cannot be solved by permitting a trial judge to ignore the issue and in effect read this troublesome word out of the statute.
The application for leave to appeal stated the question as follows:
"Whether the trial judge erred reversibly when it failed to instruct the jury, as requested by defense counsel, on the essential element of 'carrying’ where the offense charged was carrying a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle and when he refused defense counsel’s request to instruct on appellee’s theory of the defense, mere presence, where the evidence adduced at trial would support that theory?”
This Court’s order granting leave to appeal stated the question as follows:
"The parties are directed to include among the issues to be briefed *392whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury as to all the elements necessary to prove a violation of MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424 and by failing to give the jury a 'mere presence’ instruction.”
Butler’s brief on appeal stated the questions as follows:
"A. In order to convict a defendant of carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle must a jury find both knowledge of the pistol’s presence in the vehicle and participation by the defendant in the act of carrying?
"B. Did the trial judge deny appellant his constitutional right to trial by jury by failing to instruct the jury to resolve whether appellant participated in the act of carrying?
"C. Was the failure to instruct on the essential element of participation in the act of carrying harmless error?
"II. Was appellant denied a fair trial by the trial judge’s refusal to grant the defense request to instruct on mere presence where the evidence adduced at trial would support that theory?”
Defendant’s counsel took pains to emphasize that his appeal was not based on evidentiary sufficiency but on the infirmity of the jury instruction:
"Mr. Fawcett: * * * the Jerome I Smith case [21 Mich App 717; 176 NW2d 430 (1970)] also states that mere presence in an automobile where a pistol is located does not automatically lead to the conclusion that every individual in the car is guilty of involvement with the pistol.
"Justice Williams: Who was the defendant in that case?
"Mr. Fawcett: Who was the defendant?
"Justice Williams: In the Jerome I Smith case?
"Mr. Fawcett: Jerome Smith was the defendant.
"Justice Williams: I know, but was he a driver, or occupant?
"Mr. Fawcett: Back seat. Willie Kirksey was the driver. Ron Ingram was a passenger.
"Justice Williams: That case is not on all fours with this, is it?
"Mr. Fawcett: Well, there were three people and—
"Justice Williams: The defendant was not the driver?
"Mr. Fawcett: Correct, correct. In that case Mr. Kirksey said he got *393out to buy cigarettes and was never around when Mr. Ingram and Mr. Smith, according to a pretrial statement, had then engaged in a discussion about purchasing arms. So I suppose that’s one, one could analogize that Mr. Butler is in the same position as either Mr. Ingram or Mr. Smith unless your Honor’s indicating that perhaps the driver is some indicia of control.
"Justice Williams: I am, exactly.
"Mr. Fawcett: Well your Honor, I’m not contesting the sufficiency of the evidence here. It’s not — we don’t have a problem on whether or not the jury could have gone one way or the other had they been properly instructed. Our contention is that—
"Justice Williams: Well, isn’t that the question whether you participate? The driver has certainly participated in the locomotion of that car. That car is transporting the gun.
"Mr. Fawcett: Well your Honor, if that’s the case, then 750.227 requires only that for commission, anyone could be in a car where there’s a pistol. And—
"Justice Williams: Not at all. The passenger is not operating the car. The passenger may have stepped in after the driver came in, put the gun down, ten mües later a hitchhiker comes in, doesn’t even notice the gun until later on.
"Mr. Fawcett: That would be in my opinion a jury question whether, based upon what testimony is in the case, who was the participant, or both, or neither. And if there is a jury question, it turns on credibility of whatever testimony is in the record. And if it turns on credibility then it’s going to have to turn on an accurate jury instruction.” Argument before the Michigan Supreme Court, October 8, 1980. People v Butler, Case No. 62895, pp 3-4. (Emphasis supplied.)
The dissenting opinion equates the act of transportation with "carrying”. He speaks of "a car carrying” Butler, another occupant, and the gun. The car, then, is the carrier of the gun. It is reasoned that since the car belonged to Butler and he was driving it "one must logically conclude that he [as well as the car] was carrying the pistol in the vehicle just as one must conclude that a man driving a car carrying a load of hay was carrying a load of hay in the vehicle”.
A person driving a car carrying a load of hay ordinarily will necessarily know, before he takes the wheel, that there is a load of hay in or behind the vehicle. A person driving an automobile does not, however, necessarily know that a small object, a pistol, is in the vehicle. Nor, if there is another occupant, will the driver necessarily know whether the other occupant was carrying a pistol on or about his person when he entered the vehicle, or even whether, while the *395driver is operating it, the occupant has removed a pistol from a place of concealment (a jacket, purse or briefcase) and placed it in the interior of the vehicle.
The dissenting opinion states that there must be criminal intent, and that "knowingly” carrying the pistol constitutes criminal intent. Then, because there was evidence that the gun looked like a gun that Butler had in his possession the day before and he had admitted the gun was in the vehicle, that "[w]e must conclude, then, that the operative facts in this case are that the defendant knowingly carried a pistol in his vehicle which he was operating”. I agree that such evidence permits the trier of fact to infer that Butler was aware of the presence of the gun in the vehicle; but it does not follow that he "carried” it in the vehicle.
The dissenting opinion examines the statutory language and states that a much "looser nexus” is required with the defendant where the charge is carrying "in a vehicle” than where the charge is carrying "on or about his person”.
I disagree with the apparent conclusion that the element of carrying is established by merely showing that Butler drove the car knowing that a pistol was located within it. It must be shown that Butler had possession or control of the pistol.
Suppose a driver enters a vehicle with a companion. The companion is carrying a concealed weapon. During the course of the drive the companion turns to the driver and says, "I’m a little uncomfortable.” He then produces the pistol and sets it down beside the driver. The driver sees the pistol but continues to drive. Perhaps the parties’ destination is only a short distance away. Before reaching the destination the vehicle is stopped and the pistol is discovered. On those facts alone the trier of fact could not logically conclude that it was the driver rather than the occupant who carried the pistol.
The statute should be construed to carry out its apparent purpose of deterring the illegal possession of firearms. The evil at which the statute is aimed is not driving or occupying a vehicle in which there is a pistol but rather the carrying (possession) of a pistol concealed on or about one’s person or, whether or not so concealed, in any vehicle.
The statute is aimed at the secreting of firearms and contemplates two distinct situations: the carrying of a pistol "concealed on or about the person” and the carrying of a pistol in "a vehicle”. The offender is the person who is responsible for the secreting of the firearm on or about his person or for placing it in a vehicle. The statute does not subject a person to liability for merely being the driver or an occupant of a vehicle when someone else has possession of the pistol in the vehicle.
Any other interpretation would differentiate in an irrational manner between defendants charged under the statute. If the defendant is caught outside the vehicle, the people must show possession to establish "carrying”. If he is within the vehicle his knowledgeable presence alone suffices to establish "carrying”.
I agree that the statute requires a looser nexus in the sense that "in a vehicle” serves as a proxy for concealment "on or about the person”.
Possession of a pistol within an automobile generally creates the *396same dangers as concealment within the jacket of a person who is walking down the street. The passenger compartment of an automobile is limited in size and a pistol contained within it is easily accessible to its occupants. In most instances, it is as if the pistol were located upon the person or about him. These correspondences suggest that conditioning responsibility upon the possession of the pistol in an automobile is functionally equivalent to conditioning responsibility on possessing a concealed pistol on or about the person.
I would disagree if what is meant by looser nexus is that a person carries a pistol by merely driving a car knowing that there is a pistol in it. While "in a vehicle” substitutes for "concealed on or about his person”, "carrying” is still an element. The looser nexus implies nothing about "carrying”. "Carrying” means possession, whether the weapon is carried on or about the person or in a car.
The Legislature, in eliminating the need for concealment on or about the person and treating the vehicle much as a man’s pocket or a woman’s purse (a depository where the gun is readily within reach), did not eliminate the necessity for proving which person or persons within the vehicle is or are responsible for the gun being there and therefore may properly be found guilty of possessing or "carrying” it or of aiding and abetting such possession or carrying.
The dissenting opinion appears to be concerned with problems of proof which confront a prosecutor when more than one person is in a vehicle where a pistol is found. Those problems (see fn 11 of the opinion of the Court discussing cases decided in other jurisdictions) do not justify reading the word "carrying” out of the statute or giving the word "carrying” differing meanings in the same statute.
Lastly, I disagree with the suggestion that the statute was intended to operate differently depending upon whether the person charged with carrying a pistol in a vehicle is the driver or an occupant. The statute makes no such distinction, speaking without differentiation of an "operator or occupant”.
The dissenting opinion quotes two paragraphs of the instructions *397not quoted in Part I of the opinion of the Court:
"Now, in this case the defendant, Belton Butler, is charged in an information brought by the people of the State of Michigan which alleges that on the 28th day of January, 1976, at John R and Chandler, City of Highland Park, the defendant did then and there carry a pistol, to wit, a .32 caliber, blue steel revolver, seven shot Regent, serial G06594, in a certain vehicle operated or occupied by the defendant, to wit, a Chrysler Imperial bearing 1975 Michigan license number TRK 367, at the above location, which was not a dwelling house or place of business or other land possessed by said defendant without a license to carry the pistol contrary to the statute.
"In other words, the charge is carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle, and to this charge the defendant has pleaded not guilty. Of course, it is up to you, ladies and gentlemen, out of these instructions to resolve that issue.”
In the one and one-half pages intervening between these two paragraphs and the third paragraph quoted in Part I of the opinion of the Court the judge discussed the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and, at some length, reasonable doubt.
He then returned to the charged offense in the instant case and instructed the jury as set forth in the three paragraphs quoted in Part I of the opinion of the Court.