(dissenting). We are asked to de*491termine the extent to which an amendment of the labor dispute disqualification provision of the Michigan Employment Security Act1 contained in 1974 PA 104 applies to the 486 claims at issue in this appeal. Implicit in the majority opinion is the conclusion that the amendment is substantive and ought to be applied prospectively. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the claimants’ eligibility may be redetermined for benefit weeks subsequent to the effective date of the amendment.
i
During a labor dispute with Dow Chemical Company, 486 striking workers performed short-term employment in order to terminate their disqualification for unemployment benefits under the labor dispute disqualification provision of MCL 421.29; MSA 17.531. The claimants then applied for and were awarded unemployment compensation benefits.
Dow appealed these awards to an mesc referee and then to the Employment Security Board of Review but was unsuccessful. Dow then filed a consolidated appeal in Midland Circuit Court, but the orders of the Board of Review were affirmed. The decision was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Dow Chemical Co v Curtis, 158 Mich App 347; 404 NW2d 737 (1987).
ii
The labor dispute disqualification provision of *492§ 29(8) in effect at the time the present claimants sought unemployment benefits provided:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for any week with respect to which his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute in active progress, or to shutdown or start-up operations caused by such labor dispute, in the establishment in which he is or was last employed, or to a labor dispute (other than a lockout) in active progress, or to shutdown or start-up operations caused by such labor dispute, in any other establishment within the United States which is functionally integrated with such establishment and is operated by the same employing unit. No individual shall be disqualified under this subsection 29(8) if he is not directly involved in such dispute.
Under the terms of this provision as interpreted by this Court’s decision in Great Lakes Steel Corp v Employment Security Comm, 381 Mich 249; 161 NW2d 14 (1968), the mesc and the courts below looked to the identity of each claimant’s last employing unit to determine whether the unemployment was due to a labor dispute involving the last employer. The Great Lakes Court concluded that the labor dispute disqualification is terminated when a striking employee provides services for an interim employer from whom remuneration is received. Id., 254.
The Legislature subsequently amended § 29(8) by 1974 PA 104 which raised the standards under which a striking employee may terminate the labor dispute disqualification. The amended version, which became effective on June 9, 1974, provides:
An individual’s disqualification imposed or imposable under this subsection shall be terminated by his performing services in employment with an employer in at least 2 consecutive weeks falling wholly within the period of his total or partial unemployment due to the labor dispute, and in *493addition by earning wages in each of those weeks in an amount equal to or in excess of his actual or potential weekly benefit rate with respect to those weeks based on his employment with the employer involved in the labor dispute.
The majority notes that not a single claimant fulfilled the more stringent requirements of the amended statute either before or after June 9, 1974. It is undisputed, however, that all of the claimants involved in the present case terminated their disqualification prior to June 9, 1974, and became eligible for benefits under the terms of the preamendment version of the statute.
The precise question to be decided is whether an amended statute that affects substantive rights can be applied so as to extinguish a claimant’s eligibility for benefits. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that one’s initial eligibility for benefits may be redetermined for benefit weeks commencing on or after the effective date of the amendment. This result was not authorized by the Legislature and is not supported by principles of statutory construction or by prior precedent of this Court.
The Court’s decision in Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 670-672; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), outlines the guiding principles to be used when determining the extent to which a statutory change in the law is to be applied. Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the Legislature has expressly provided for retrospective application. The initial inquiry, then, is whether the Legislature has clearly stated its intention on this question.
I agree with the majority that there is no specific language in 1974 PA 104 indicating that retrospective application was intended. Conse*494quently, although the majority has carefully avoided the use of the word "prospective,” the amendment must be applied prospectively.
The majority holds that the amendatory act is not to be applied to benefits paid prior to the amendment’s effective date. In this respect, the majority has provided for a prospective application. The majority does not, however, provide for a purely prospective application, since it authorizes the termination of the claimants’ rights to benefits, rights which accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment.
The majority has criticized the Great Lakes decision and has heralded the Legislature’s adoption of 1974 PA 104. A preference for the higher standards adopted by the Legislature is not, however, a substitute for the application of general principles of statutory construction and does not justify a departure from established precedent.
When determining the effect of an amendatory act on transactions completed prior to its enactment, we have previously looked to the rule set forth in 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 22.36, pp 300-301:
In accordance with the rule applicable to original acts, it is presumed that provisions added by the amendment affecting substantive rights are intended to operate prospectively. Provisions added by the amendment that affect substantive rights will not be construed to apply to transactions and events completed prior to its enactment unless the legislature has expressed its intent to that effect or such intent is clearly implied by the language of the amendment or by the circumstances surrounding its enactment[2]_
*495In Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531; 377 NW2d 300 (1985), we determined that an amendment of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act3 which was enacted by the Legislature to invalidate this Court’s decision in Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978), effected a substantive change in the law. Because there was no indication of the Legislature’s intent, we concluded that the provision was entitled to prospective application. The section was held to apply only to personal injuries occurring on or after the provision’s effective date. Hurd, supra, 535.
More recently, in White v General Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387; 429 NW2d 576 (1988), this Court provided for a prospective application of § 373 of the wdca4 which imposed a higher standard of disability for those receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits. Once again, the higher standard contained in the amendment was applied prospectively to injuries occurring on or after the effective date of the provision.
In the workers’ compensation context, then, amendatory acts affecting questions of eligibility have been applied prospectively so as to apply to injury dates occurring on or after the effective date of the provision. Hurd, White, supra. Thus, an injured worker’s right to benefits accrues on the date of injury, and the law in effect at the time of the work-related injury is controlling. An amendatory act entitled to prospective application in an unemployment compensation case should be applied to claims on the basis of unemployment dates on or after the effective date chosen by the Legislature, since it is the claimants’ unemployment that *496gives rise to their right to receive benefits.5 In the present case, then, because the striking workers successfully terminated their disqualification for unemployment benefits by performing interim employment, their right to the benefits accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment, and their initial eligibility for benefits may not be redetermined.6
The majority suggests that the mesa authorizes a redetermination of the present claimants’ eligibility for benefit weeks following the effective date of 1974 PA 104. I disagree. Section 32(d) of the mesa7 provides in part:
The issuance of each benefit check shall be considered a determination by the commission that the claimant receiving the checking [sic] was covered during the compensable period, and eligible and qualified for benefits.
This section was explained in Roman Cleanser *497Co v Murphy, 386 Mich 698, 705; 194 NW2d 704 (1972), in which this Court stated:
"Under § 32(d), the issuance of each benefit check is a determination entitling the employer to a redetermination of the former employee’s current eligibility and qualification. A redetermination may, thus, be obtained at any time upon a claim that there has been a change of facts or of law. But, absent a change of facts or of law, questions already decided may not be reopened unless 'for good cause’ the commission 'reconsiders’ under § 32a.”
Neither the Roman Cleanser decision nor § 32(d) of the act compels the conclusion reached by the majority. If the Legislature had expressly provided for a retroactive application of its amendatory act, § 32 would provide the procedure under which an employer could seek a redetermination of the claimants’ eligibility. The Legislature chose not to do so in this instance.
The majority of this Court has determined the application of 1974 PA 104 by looking to the extent to which the employer will be burdened by charges against its rating account. The purpose of the mesa, however, is not advanced when the appropriate application of amendatory acts is determined by looking to the financial effects on an employer.8 Indeed, our function is much more *498narrow, and, absent some indication of legislative intent, a decision to apply a substantive amendment so as to take away accrued rights would represent an intrusion into the Legislature’s authority to determine questions of policy that govern this area of the law.9
I find no indication in the statute or in the provision governing its effective date10 that the *499Legislature intended to require a claimant to terminate the labor dispute disqualification by locating suitable interim employment on more than one occasion. Once a claimant has established his eligibility for benefits under this provision, a subsequent amendatory act determined to be substantive and entitled to prospective application should not be applied so as to require the claimant to terminate his disqualification once again. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that a claimant who has been determined to be eligible for benefits under § 29(8) remains eligible and qualified for any week in which the claimant
(1) is registered for work, has continued to report to the unemployment office as prescribed by the commission, and is seeking work, unless this requirement is waived by the commission, (2) makes a claim for benefits, and (3) is able and available to perform suitable full-time work of a character for which he is qualified. [158 Mich App 359.]
ill
Consequently, I would hold that, as in workers’ compensation cases where an employee’s right to benefits accrues on the date of injury, an employee’s right to unemployment compensation benefits accrues on the date of unemployment. When determining a claimant’s eligibility for benefits, the applicable law is the law in effect on the date of unemployment, not the law in effect on the date each benefit check becomes due and payable. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the award of benefits by the mesc.
Boyle, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.MCL 421.1 et seq.; MSA 17.501 et seq.
See Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 535; 377 NW2d 300 (1985); White v General Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387; 429 NW2d 576 (1988).
MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq.
MCL 418.373; MSA 17.237(373) as amended by 1980 PA 357, effective January 1,1982.
The Court of Appeals stated in Jozwik v Employment Security Comm, 30 Mich App 506, 520; 186 NW2d 755 (1971), that
"the primary mandatory prerequisite in any instance, the key that unlocks the floodgates, is the existence of a state of unemployment. If no unemployment, then no benefits could arise, in any event, regardless of qualifications or eligibility. Unemployment is the indispensable, essential element or ingredient which brings into being and sets into motion all of the other provisions of the act. The operation of the act is dependent entirely upon the existence of a status of unemployment as it is defined in the act.” [Emphasis omitted.]
The Great Lakes Court expressly rejected the employer’s claim that the striking workers were not "unemployed” as that term is defined in §48 of the act. The Court explained that the interim employer became the last employing unit under the labor dispute disqualification provision then in effect when the striking worker obtained employment with that employer. The interim employer also became the "employing unit” under § 48, and the claimants became eligible for benefits because of layoffs by their interim employers. 381 Mich 253-255.
MCL 421.32(d); MSA 17.534(d).
The Legislature expressly declared the policy of the mesa in MCL 421.2; MSA 17.502, which states:
The legislature acting in the exercise of the police power of the state declares that the public policy of the state is as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is a subject of general interest and concern which requires action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his *498family, to the detriment of the welfare of the people of this state. Social security requires protection against this hazard of our economic life. Employers should be encouraged to provide stable employment. The systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment by the setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of relief assistance, is for the public good, and the general welfare of the people of this state.
As we stated in General Motors Corp v Erves (On Rehearing), 399 Mich 241, 251; 249 NW2d 41 (1976), modified 400 Mich 953 (1977), "[t]he costs involved are considered part of the cost of doing business and are reflected primarily in the price of the product to the consumer.”
See Lawrence Baking Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 308 Mich 198, 212; 13 NW2d 260 (1944); General Motors Corp v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 321 Mich 724, 728; 34 NW2d 497 (1948).
The effective date of the provision is governed by MCL 421.66; MSA 17.569(16), which provides in part:
(1) If this 1974 amendatory act is given immediate effect, the effective date of this amendatory act shall be the first day of the calendar week containing the thirtieth day after it is approved by the governor or becomes law without his approval.
(2) An individual who has a current and unexhausted benefit year on the effective date as provided in subsection (1) shall have his weekly benefit rate and the maximum amount of benefits recomputed in accordance with this amendatory act with respect to any week of unemployment beginning on or after that date on that portion of his benefit rights not exhausted prior to that date but his weekly benefit rate and maximum amount of benefits established and not exhausted prior to the aforementioned effective date shall not be subject to reduction or elimination by the recomputation.
The amendment took effect on June 9,1974.