dissents with separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the mgjority's conclusion that Jarrett and Denise's daughter was a "victim" of Jarrett's crimes and properly the subject of the no contact order. . The testimony at Jarrett's trial was clear that the daughter was not present during this altercation. - Moreover, there was no testimony at the trial that the daughter was even aware of the altercation, and if she was aware, it was most likely through Denise that she was made aware of the incident. Although Denise testified that she had concern for her safety because of Jarrett's behavior, when asked if she bad any concerns for her daughter's safety, all she said was, "I don't want him around my child at all." Tr. at 65. None of the incidents or behaviors to which Denise testified involved the daughter at all. I recognize that the CPOA authorizes a court to issue an order of protection for the petitioner and "each designated family or household member" and also authorizes the trial court to prohibit indirect communication with the petitioner. Ind.Code. § 34-26-5-9(b). - However, as the majority notes, no petition pursuant to the CPOA was filed in this case and there was no testimony regarding the daughter by which she could be considered a "designated family member" requiring an order of protection. We have already stretched the limits of our statutes by allowing the no contact order in this case in the first place. I feel extending it to the daughter is stretching too far.
Moreover, I note that the CPOA further authorizes the trial court to "[s}pecify ar*815rangements for visitation of a minor child by a respondent and require supervision by a third party; or deny visitation; if necessary to protect the safety of a petitioner or child." Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9(c)(2). I acknowledge that we are not in this case dealing specifically with the restriction of visitation-Jarrett's incarceration accomplishes that as a practical matter even without an order of protection. However, the statute clearly indicates a recognition that a no contact order restricting contact between a parent and a child may be appropriate in cases where it is shown to be necessary. In this case, though, there was no evidence to show that such a severe restriction was necessary. The majority notes that the daughter was a victim of Jarrett's behavior because of his incarceration. - However, I believe that she is no less a victim if we uphold the no contact order and restrict Jarrett's ability to be a parent to her in any way during his incarceration. I recognize, too, the majority's concern that allowing Jarrett to contact his daughter is "setting the stage" for a violation of the no contact order for Denise. However, Jarrett is aware of the consequences of a violation and it is not up to us to try to ensure his compliance.
I would reverse that part of the trial court's order which extends the no contact order to the daughter. In all other respects, I concur in the majority opinion.