(concurring specially).
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately on the question whether this consent decree so violated public policy as to be void.
Our focus is on a consent decree that was part of an elaborate settlement agreement negotiated and drafted by attorneys representing the parties, approved by the trial court, and duly executed. See McCarthy v. Iowa Dist. Court, 386 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Iowa App.1986). The plaintiff contends this document, though deliberately agreed to and intended to settle the parties’ rights and obligations, should be declared void and unenforceable because it contained terms inappropriate for a judgment rendered by the court. The majority opinion, like the dissent, recognizes that the consent decree was flawed in more than one respect. In my view, however, the majority has correctly parsed the entire document, refusing to uphold invalid portions of the consent decree but saving those portions that the district court had the power to enforce.
In division I the majority makes clear that the consent decree improperly enmeshed the court in the role of interpreter of four answers yet to be given by the Maharishi. But the involvement of the court did not prejudice the plaintiff whatsoever because the Maharishi’s answers clearly and unequivocally saddled the plaintiff with the restrictions it had agreed upon. As the majority emphasizes, a consent judgment is a settlement agreement, not a pure judicial decree. The majority appropriately gives the district court considerable discretion to approve or disapprove the terms of a settlement, then enforce those terms that are not violative of public policy. Indeed, the attorneys and district court were serving an important public purpose in attempting to resolve a complex lawsuit by settlement rather than prolonging the trial. We should commend judges who attempt to resolve disputes by settlement or other alternative methods that involve innovative techniques. See generally T. Lambros, The Judge’s Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 Vil-lanova L.Rev. 1363, 1369-73 (1984).
The plaintiff also contends the consent decree was void because it was not promptly made a matter of public record in the office of the clerk of court. The majority opinion, like the dissent, does not approve the parties’ withholding of the decree from filing in the clerk’s office for nearly four months. Again, however, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the side agreement to withhold the consent decree from public record caused any prejudice to the plaintiff or any other person. Certainly court records appropriate for filing should be made a matter of public record, but the rule is not without exception. Iowa Code section 675.30 permits enforcement of a written agreement, approved by the court, compelling support of a child even though there is no provision for filing the document or otherwise disclosing it to the public until a dispute arises in court concerning its validity. See In re Devine’s Estate, 255 Iowa 726, 731-32, 123 N.W.2d 898, 901-02 (1963); Hanke v. Burrier, 368 N.W.2d 729, 730-31 (Iowa App.1985); cf. Iowa Code ch. 678 (1985) (entitled “Submitting controver*180sies without action or in action”). In many cases and varied contexts we have long emphasized that courts should favor the settlement of disputes and encourage agreements to avoid or end litigation. See, e.g., Dyer v. National By-Products, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 732, 733 (Iowa 1986) (“[T]he law favors the adjustment and settlement of controversies without resorting to court action.”); Helms v. Helten, 290 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Iowa 1980) (“We have in the past encouraged [familial] settlements, [citing cases] and continue to do so.”); Moore v. Bailey, 163 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Iowa 1968) (“Offers of settlement are to be encouraged as a means of awarding prolonged, extensive and uncertain litigation.”); Horton Township v. Drainage Dist. No. 26, 192 Iowa 61, 66, 182 N.W. 395, 397 (1921) (“[T]he law favors compromises”; supervisors’ agreement with contractor upheld).
I concur in the majority opinion which holds the plaintiff to the agreements it made, but only to the extent public policy was not violated.
SCHULTZ, J., joins this special concurrence.