(dissenting). The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct1 and was sentenced to a term of twenty-five to fifty years. The Court of Appeals affirmed after a remand at which the same sentence was imposed. The defendant argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a disproportionate sentence. I would hold that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by *339imposing a disproportionate sentence, because the extent of the departure from the sentencing guidelines’ recommended minimum sentence was not supported by the reasons given by the trial court. Therefore, I would vacate the sentence.
i
A jury found that the defendant had engaged in forcible sexual intercourse with his fourteen-year-old cousin, while spending the night of March 5, 1987, at her home. At the July 1987 trial, the victim testified that she had been asleep on the couch when the defendant placed a pillow over her face and penetrated her vaginally. The defendant denied any sexual misconduct.
The trial judge departed from the guidelines’ recommended minimum range of six to ten years, and sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty-five to fifty years imprisonment. The court later denied a delayed motion for new trial.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for two purposes.2 First, the trial court was to conduct a Ginther3 hearing to consider the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Second, if the trial court determined that the trial counsel had not been ineffective, the trial court was directed to re-sentence the defendant. The panel instructed the trial court to articulate on the record its reasons for departing from the guidelines, as required by People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408; 410 NW2d 266 (1987). Further, the panel directed the trial court to comply with the Milbourn 4 principle of propor*340tionality that had been explained by this Court in the interim between the sentencing and the remand order.
In May 1992, on remand, the original trial judge’s successor conducted a lengthy Ginther hearing, which consumed four court sessions over a six-week period. The court rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and immediately resentenced him.
The judge first scored the offense variables under the sentencing guidelines. He scored offense variable 7, Offender Exploitation of Victim Vulnerability, the maximum fifteen points.5 In doing so, the judge stated:
It would be hard for me to imagine a more exploitive situation. We have testimony. . . indicating that the victim, 14 years old, is at her home. Her parents are gone. They’re out of town to attend the brother’s funeral and the young woman’s granddaddy’s funeral. And while they’re *341gone, this defendant, Mr. John Henry Houston, exploits the family relationship to get in the door, to even get in the home. The young woman was told by her parents not to let anybody in while they were gone. . . . And he gets in only because the way he exploits and used the family relationship. He exploits and uses that relationship to get close to that young girl, to get her to trust him. He uses and exploits that relationship to be in a situation where he can ultimately grab the pillow, put it over her face while he rapes her there on the floor in her own home. He uses the great difference in their size and age to carry that out. He exploits the fact that he’s so much bigger and she’s got nowhere to cry for help. I can’t think of a more exploitive situation than this man who weasels his way and exploits his way into the home of that young girl, waits until they can get alone and then takes her physically against her will right there in the home of her own — in [sic] the. floor of her own home. I’m giving 15 points only because I can’t give any more.
The judge then determined that the guidelines recommended a minimum sentence of between twenty-four and ninety-six months.. However, he again imposed the sentence of twenty-five to fifty years.
After remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, finding that it was proportionate under Milbourn.6
n
In Milbourn, this Court found "shocks the conscience”7 to have been an unsatisfactory formulation of the standard for reviewing sentences. Rather, we explained that a sentencing court *342abuses its discretion if it imposes a sentence that is not "proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). We drew this conclusion by examining the work of the Legislature, which sets the parameters of judicial sentencing discretion. It cannot be doubted that the Legislature intends judges to apply a principle of proportionality, when it is evident that such a principle has informed and guided the Legislature’s own decisions in the area of sentencing. Id. at 650-651.
In Milbourn, we further explained that the second edition of the Sentencing Guidelines reflects an attempt to parallel this principle of proportionality scheme. Recognizing the limitations of the guidelines, however, we noted that a departure from the guidelines would be appropriate in a situation in which the guidelines did not adequately reflect legitimately considered circumstances of the párticular offender and the seriousness of the particular offense. Id. at 657. We cautioned that a sentencing court’s failure to give adequate reasons for such departures, and for the extent of such departures, should signal the appellate court that the sentence may be disproportionate. Id. at 659-660. By approving departures based on ambiguous reasons, the appellate court risks the danger of allowing the sentencing judge to improperly consider factors twice.
The instant case presents an opportunity to refine further our Milbourn discussion on departures from the sentencing guidelines. I would hold that a sentencing court that departs from the guidelines must clearly articulate its reasons for doing so, and must explain why those reasons warrant the extent of the departure. Most importantly, if the court is relying on reasons that are *343already accounted for in the sentencing guidelines or are already an element of the particular offense, I would hold that the court must explain how those reasons have not been fully accounted for in the sentence that the guidelines recommend. In Milbourn, we noted that
there will be occasions when the conduct or the criminal record to be scored under the sentencing guidelines is extraordinary in its degree, and thus beyond the anticipated range of behavior treated in the guidelines. [Id. at 660, n 27.]
However, I believe the sentencing court should not cover the same ground twice.
hi
We now turn to the guidelines departure in this case. On the sentencing information. report (sir) departure evaluation form, the trial court listed five reasons for departure outside the recommended range:
(1) In general, the guidelines for esc offenses fail to adequately address the seriousness of the crime. Guidelines are based upon actual sentences imposed during a time prior to the "feminist movement’s” success in having society in general, and judges in particular, recognize the "special” nature of such violent crimes.
(2) The guidelines fail to take into account the family relationship between the actor and the victim.
(3) This is a resentencing. The guidelines fail to take into account the eleven prison misconducts by this defendant since the original sentence.
(4) Guidelines fail to take into account defendant’s absolute lack of remorse and low potential for rehabilitation.
*344(5) Guidelines are not sufficient to reflect the very high degree of exploitation in this case.
At the resentencing, the judge further commented on his departure reasons. In doing so, he revealed a disdain for the guidelines in general.
Let me begin by saying that I find these guidelines to be totally inaccurate — inadequate in regard to the situation. Guidelines are historical and guidelines are based upon what sentences have been given in the past, and I think that the guidelines for this offense reflect a time when young women were treated as property, when this wasn’t considered a very serious offense at all. We have seen what I find to be ridiculously low guidelines in the offense of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First Degree, just in general.
The defendant contends that the judge impermissibly discarded the guidelines merely because he disagreed with them in general. The defendant cites Milbourn, and People v Schnepp, 185 Mich App 767; 463 NW2d 183 (1990), for the proposition that a trial judge may not simply disregard the guidelines. I agree. In Milbourn at 656, we stated that the second edition of the sentencing guidelines was the best "barometer” for sentencing a given case. Further, the second edition better reflects current sentencing practices, and, therefore, it should be used as the starting point for sentencing. The sentencing court should not summarily disregard the guidelines altogether.
Regarding the sentencing judge’s contention that the guidelines reflect archaic attitudes toward sexual assault, the defendant reminds us that the second edition of the sentencing guidelines went into effect in 1988, long after the criminal sexual *345conduct act8 took effect. I am unable to join the judge in supposing that the 1988 second edition of the guidelines reflects a failure of the state’s judiciary, as late as the mid-1980s, to recognize the seriousness of criminal sexual conduct.
The trial court also based departure from the guidelines on the defendant’s blood relationship with the victim. The prosecutor and the defendant both state that the blood relationship was the element of the charge that elevated the crime to first-degree criminal sexual conduct.9 The defendant further argues that had the defendant not been related to the victim, the maximum that he could have been convicted of was third-degree criminal sexual conduct.10 The defendant contends that the guidelines range would then have been twelve to twenty-four months. He argues that, in this case, the blood relationship, in and of itself, raised the applicable guidelines range to twenty-four to ninety-six months. I would agree. I believe that the recommended range of minimum sentences for this defendant, in this case, already reflected a family relationship between the defendant and the victim. I do not believe that the trial judge explained how this elevated range did not sufficiently account for the blood relationship factor.
During resentencing, the judge also commented *346on the defendant’s lack of remorse, on the potential long-term psychological effect on the victim, and on his own desire to send a message to the community. I would find that the judge has not sufficiently explained how these considerations are not already reflected by the sentencing guidelines as applied to criminal sexual conduct convictions.
For instance, the court scored zero points for offense variable 13 (psychological injury to the victim), citing an insufficient record caused by the victim’s failure to come forward. However, after scoring the guidelines, the trial court stated:
I am concerned that the guidelines do not take into account long-term effects of this type of sexual assault. Certainly we have one little category that says five points if there’s a psychological injury to the victim, but do we have something that’s going to take into account the entire life of that 14-year-old who was raped there in her own home under these extraordinarily cruel circumstances?
The judge further rejected the attorney’s attempt to add that the victim had recovered. The trial court opined that the victim was suppressing her feelings because her relatives had been unsupportive. He further explained:
I’ll take that into account, that she is leading an apparently on-the-surface normal life, but I cannot accept the fact that there is not a potential for serious psychological damage to occur, and if it hasn’t exhibited any manifest signs at this point, that doesn’t mean it won’t occur in the future, and the possibility is one of the things that does concern me.
Every forcible sexual assault inflicts lasting psychological harm. That is one of the many reasons that the Legislature provides a maximum of life *347imprisonment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and it is reflected in the sentences imposed by Michigan judges for this offense. The guidelines being a reflection of those sentencing practices, the recommended ranges reflect a recognition of the life-altering nature of this offense. In this case, the judge said that the victim "is leading an apparently on-the-surface normal life,” but has "a potential for serious psychological damage.” What is missing from the record is the judge’s explanation of how this situation exceeds in seriousness the plight faced by every young victim of a forcible sexual assault.
And finally, the court based its departure from the guidelines on the very high degree of exploitation that it found in this case. I would note that the judge had already scored fifteen points for offense variable 7, based on exploitation of the victim by the defendant. My review of the record does not reveal an obvious explanation of why the exploitation by the defendant was "extraordinary in its degree, and thus beyond the anticipated range of behavior treated in the guidelines.” Milbourn at 660, n 27. Here, the victim was asleep before the sexual assault. I would find that the trial court has not sufficiently explained how the exploitation exceeds that found in cases of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in which the fam-. ily relationship is an element of the offense. Neither has the court explained its apparent conclusion that the exploitation has not been fully accounted for by scoring the maximum number of points for offense variable 7.
Because the trial judge failed to adequately explain how some of the reasons that he relied on were not sufficiently accounted for, I believe that the primary remaining reason for sentence departure was the defendant’s prison misconducts. This *348factor alone would not justify the extent of the departure of this case. Because some of the trial judge’s reasons may amount to legitimate departure reasons with a more sufficient explanation of why those reasons are more extreme than the statutory offense and the guidelines reflect, I would remand for further articulation of the reasons. For these reasons, I would vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.11
At the time of sentencing, this defendant was thirty-one years of age. The presentence investigation report contained this rather unremarkable evaluation:
John Henry Houston is a 26 year old native of Birmingham, Alabama. The Houston family migrated to Detroit, MI in 1966. The defendant has some positive factors in his background including a stable upbringing and the continued support of his family. He has no youth bureau contacts or juvenile record. The instant case represents Mr. Houston’s only felony conviction on his adult record. The defendant is in good health and denies a substance abuse history.
There are also a number of negative features in this case. The defendant’s natural parents were never legally married. The defendant’s mother married Cornelius Jones in 1957 and that marriage ended in separation in 1986. The defendant fathered two children (approximately 6 years and 9 years) from different women: the defendant’s mother has had legal custody of the defendant’s older daughter since 1986. The defendant stated he was employed at the Mini-Mart Food Center in Detroit, Mi from 1983 to March 1987, however, per a phone conversation with the owner’s son of this *349mini-mart food store, the defendant last worked there in 1985. Furthermore, the defendant stated from January, 1987 to March, 1987 he held gainful employment at the Orion’s Enterprise located in Livonia, MI before quitting. The directory assistance has no listing for this company, therefore, employment could not be verified. A check with the Detroit Police Department Identification Bureau reveals that the defendant was convicted of Possession of Marijuana on March 2, 1979 before the Honorable William C. Hayes and was fined $25 or four days jail on case # T337742.
The complainant on the instant offense or her family failed to return the victim’s impact statement, therefore, restitution is not recommended at this time.
The top end of the recommended guidelines range was eight years in prison. However the sentencing trial judge felt that this was far from adequate for this first-time offender. He was of the belief that for this hardly unusual intrafamily esc offense, it was necessary to more than triple the top of the guideline range. This belief will cost the taxpayers of this state some $750,000 in prison costs before this defendant turns fifty-six years of age and serves his minimum sentence. A sentencing judge certainly has the right and obligation to protect society from violent offenders. Surely, however, the circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the offender must be carefully balanced to protect society, to not squander the state’s scarce resources and to see, for a definite, reasonable period of time, that the defendant, in a structured setting, works toward rehabilitation. His probation officer stated: "It is our feelings that his rehabilitation could best be effective in a structured setting where he would derive the maximum help.” In my view, giving time like candy is irresponsible, symptomatic of a simplistic mentality *350and an utter waste of the state’s precious resources.
IV
The defendant also argues that the trial court violated his attorney-client privilege at the re-sentencing hearing by improperly asking his attorney whether it was the defendant who had insisted on calling so many witnesses to testify at the hearing. His attorney’s answer revealed that it had indeed been the defendant who had wanted the witnesses called. The Court of Appeals found no merit to this issue. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the judge asked an irrelevant question and that he treaded dangerously close to violating the defendant’s attorney-client privilege. I believe that the judge was expressing his frustration with the length of the hearing. However, I do not believe that the judge used the information that he obtained to punish the defendant. Because I would remand for resentencing, I would not decide whether the defendant was prejudicially harmed by a violation of his attorney-client privilege. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the defendant waived his privilege.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(b)(ii).
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 19, 1992 (Docket No. 117039).
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
The sentencing guidelines provide for scoring ov 7, Offender Exploitation of Victim Vulnerability, as follows:
15 Offender exploits the victim due to a physical disability, mental disability, youth, agedness, or an abuse of authority status
5 Offender exploits the victim through a difference in size/ strength, or because the victim was intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, asleep, or unconscious
0 No exploitation
Instructions
A. The mere existence of one or more of these factors should not automatically be equated with victim vulnerability.
B. Exploitation refers to the manipulation of the victim for selfish or unethical purposes.
C. Vulnerability refers to the readily apparent susceptibility of the victim to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation.
D. Abuse of authority status refers to situations where a victim is exploited out of fear or deference to an authority figure (e.g., parent-child, doctor-patient). [Michigan Sentencing Guidelines (2d ed), p 45.]
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 13, 1993 (Docket No. 117039).
People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983).
1974 PA 266, as amended, MCL 750.520a et seq.; MSA 28.788(1) et seq.
The criminal sexual conduct statute provides that a defendant is guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct if: 1) there is penetration, 2) the victim is at least thirteen years old, but less than sixteen years old, and 3) the defendant "is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the fourth degree.” MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(b)(ii).
The criminal sexual conduct statute provides that a defendant is guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct if there is penetration and the victim is at least thirteen years old, but less than sixteen years old. MCL 750.520d(1)(a); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(a).
I note that ordinarily we would only remand for an articulation of the reasons justifying departure from the sentencing guidelines. See People v Triplett, 432 Mich 568; 442 NW2d 622 (1989). However, because this trial judge is not eligible for assignments, a remand for resentencing would be required.