Morrison v. Chicago Board of Education

PRESIDING JUSTICE BILANDIC,

dissenting in part:

The fixing of a school age is a quasi-legislative function delegated to the Board of Education by the legislature. The Illinois School Code requires a school board to operate schools for all persons in the district over the age of five and under the age of 21, “to secure for all such persons the right and opportunity to an equal education in such schools; provided that children who will attain the age of 5 years by *** September 1 of the year 1988-1989 school term and each school term thereafter may attend school upon the commencement of such term. Based upon an assessment of a child’s readiness to attend school, a school district may permit a child to attend school prior to the dates contained in this Section.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 122, par. 10-20.12.

I agree with the majority that the power to assess the readiness of a child to attend school if the child has not reached the age of five by September 1 is discretionary under the statute. “The legislature has placed the administration of schools within the domain of the school board and courts will not interfere with the exercise of the board’s powers unless such exercise is shown to be arbitrary or capricious. [Citations.] Where the legislature has empowered a school board to perform certain functions, the courts will not interfere with the exercise of such powers or substitute their discretion for that of the school board unless the board’s action is palpably arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. [Citations.]” Tyska v. Board of Education of Township High School, District 214 (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 917, 922, 453 N.E.2d 1344.

In the exercise of power granted to it by the legislature, the Board adopted Rule 6 — 2, which provides in pertinent part:

“All children residing within the limits of the city who are not otherwise disqualified shall be entitled at the beginning of the school year to enter kindergarten *** if they will have reached the age of five *** years *** by September 1 of the 1988-89 school year and each year thereafter. Based upon an assessment of a child’s readiness to attend school, a child may be permitted to attend school prior to the dates contained in this Rule.”

The enabling legislation did not require the Board to assess readiness. “Rules adopted by the school board are to be filed for public inspection in the administrative office of the district. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 122, par. 10 — 20.5.) A school board is bound to act in accordance with the rules and regulations it has made pursuant to statutory authority.” Tyska, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 923.

By the adoption of Rule 6 — 2, the Board assumed the duty to assess a child’s readiness so that the child may be permitted to attend school prior to the dates contained in the rule. If the Board decides that the policy is no longer viable, it is free to amend its rule and discontinue assessments of early readiness.

In my opinion, the majority went awry when it correctly interpreted the enabling legislation as granting discretionary power to the Board, and then ignored the rule by which the Board exercised its discretion.

I, therefore, respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion.