dissenting:
This appeal is unlawful and should be dismissed. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the State could not have obtained review of the circuit court’s order by means of a supervisory order. Under article VI, section 16, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16), this court’s supervisory authority must be exercised “in accordance with [the court’s] rules.” This is a criminal case, and our rules specifically provide that the only method of review in a criminal case is by appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 602.
Whether the State may appeal a nonfinal order entered by the circuit court in a criminal case is determined exclusively by Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 151 (1997). Under Rule 604(a)(1), the circumstances under which the State may prosecute an appeal are narrowly circumscribed. The rule clearly provides:
“In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantial effect of .which results in dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.” (Emphasis added.) 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).
There is no dispute that the order at issue in this case, which merely precludes the State from seeking a particular sentence, does not fall within any of these categories. Where, as here, an appeal by the State does not fall within any of the provisions of our Rule 604(a)(1), the State has no right to appeal the order to this or any court of review. The State’s appeal must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 153.
The authorities cited in the majority’s opinion (194 Ill. 2d at 459) do not alter this conclusion. Unlike the present case, People ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552 (1973), did not involve an appeal by the State from the circuit court’s judgment. It involved a challenge to a judgment entered by the appellate court following an appeal by the defendant. People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26, 37-38 (1986), stated that our court may exercise its supervisory authority to intervene in a case where the circuit court has exceeded its authority and impermissibly exercised powers belonging to the executive branch, but those circumstances are not present here. Doherty v. Caisley, 104 Ill. 2d 72, 79 (1984), was not a criminal case. At issue there was whether the circuit court of one county exceeded its authority when it appointed the public defender of another county to represent two inmates confined in a state penal institution in civil actions the inmates had brought. Although People ex rel. Baricevic v. Wharton, 136 Ill. 2d 423 (1990), did arise from criminal proceedings, it was not a direct appeal by the State. It was an original action brought in our court to challenge the way in which a circuit court judge had been interpreting and applying the substitution of judge provisions in section 114 — 5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114 — 5(c)). The propriety of our jurisdiction to rule on that matter was not raised by the parties or addressed by this court.
Even if we had jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal, which we do not, I still could not join in the result reached by the majority. There are no circumstances in which the State should be allowed to seek the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). It is therefore void and unenforceable.