In these consolidated cases we are required yet again to consider the parameters of civil liability for governmental agencies and police officers when a police chase results in injuries or death to a person other than the driver of the fleeing vehicle. More specifically, the question in these cases is whether the city of Detroit or individual police officers face civil liability for injuries sustained by passengers in vehicles fleeing from the police when the fleeing car caused an accident. As explained below, we hold that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
First, we hold that the police owe a duty to innocent passengers, but owe no duty to passengers who are themselves wrongdoers whether they help bring about the pursuit or encourage flight. A passenger who seeks to recover for injuries allegedly caused by a negligent police pursuit bears the burden of proving personal innocence as a precondition to establishing the duty element of a cause of action. Because the record does not allow us to conclude as a matter of law whether plaintiffs were innocent as a matter of law,1 we are required to address additional grounds *445on which defendants assert they are entitled to prevail.
Second, we hold that the city of Detroit is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because one cannot reasonably conclude under a narrow reading of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), that plaintiffs’ injuries resulted from the operation of the police vehicles. We agree with Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), that an officer’s physical handling of a motor vehicle during a police chase, can constitute “negligent operation ... of a motor vehicle” within the motor vehicle exception. However, plaintiffs’ injuries did not, as a matter of law, result from the operation of the police cars where the police cars did not hit the fleeing car or physically cause another vehicle or object to hit the vehicle that was being chased or physically force the vehicle off the road or into another vehicle or object.2 Thus, we overrule Fiser and Rogers v Detroit, 457 Mich 125; 579 NW2d 840 (1998). Contrary to Rogers, we also hold that an officer’s decision to pursue does not constitute the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
Third, we conclude the individual police officers are immune from liability because their actions were not “the proximate cause” of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, we overrule Dedes v Asch, 446 Mich 99; 521 NW2d 488 (1994), and hold that the phrase “the proximate cause” as used in the employee provision of the *446governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2), means the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury, not “a proximate cause.” Because the conduct of the individual police officers in these cases were not “the proximate cause,” i.e., the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause, of the passengers’ injuries, the officers are entitled to governmental immunity.
I. REVIEW OF OUR CASE LAW
Our first opinion addressing police chase liability was Fiser, supra, where this Court considered a lawsuit filed by a plaintiff who was injured when his car was hit by a car driven by someone who was fleeing the police. The plaintiff sued the city of Ann Arbor and the police officers involved in the chase. The trial court granted summary disposition to the city and the police officers. The Court of Appeals affirmed.3 This Court reversed with respect to the city and two of the police officers, holding that the excessive speed of the fleeing vehicle could be said to have resulted from the fact that the driver was being pursued by the police and that it was this high speed that caused the fleeing driver to lose control. Id. at 475. The Court further held that the issues of negligence and proximate causation of his injuries was for the jury. Id.
More recently in Rogers, supra, we considered two consolidated police chase cases. Both cases involved car chases in which the fleeing vehicle crashed into vehicles occupied by innocent parties. The defendants *447argued that the conduct of the police officers could not be a proximate cause of the injuries. The majority held that it was for the factfinder to determine whether the actions of the police officers in operating the pursuing vehicles were causes in fact of the plaintiffs injuries, i.e., the jury could effectively conclude that the police were causing the flight. Id. at 129. The Rogers majority reaffirmed Fiser and expanded on it by holding that the municipal defendants could be held hable for their officer’s decision to commence pursuit or to continue the pursuit. Id. at 143-145.
Thus, pursuant to Fiser, police officers face a conundrum wherein they have a sworn duty to apprehend suspected lawbreakers yet simultaneously face legal liability if anyone but the fleeing driver is injured when they give chase. Under Fiser this liability is imposed even where the police car does not hit the fleeing car or physically cause another vehicle or object to hit the fleeing car or physically force the fleeing car off the road or into another vehicle or object. Pursuant to Rogers, even more remarkably, liability may attach for the mere decision to give chase to a suspected lawbreaker.
n. FACTS AND LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS
In Cooper, plaintiffs Marlon Cooper and Martell Morris, both fourteen years of age, were passengers in a stolen Jeep Cherokee driven by Damian Collins, who was also fourteen years old. The Detroit police initially noticed that Damian Collins appeared too young to drive and that the Jeep’s steering column was broken. The officers, who were in a partially marked police car, attempted to stop Collins by turning on their car’s lights, briefly using the siren, show*448ing Collins a police badge, and instructing him to pull over. Instead of stopping, Collins sped away. The police pursued him. After a chase through a residential neighborhood, Collins crashed the Jeep he was driving into a house. Collins was killed, while Cooper and Morris were seriously injured.
The parents of Cooper and Morris filed a lawsuit4 against the individual officers and the city of Detroit. The defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). After argument, the trial court granted summary disposition for both the officers and the city. The trial court held that the officers were entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiffs had failed to state a claim in avoidance of the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. The trial court also concluded the officers owed no duty to plaintiffs. The trial court further held that the city was entitled to governmental immunity because the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim within the motor vehicle exception.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officers were not entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiffs’ claims avoided the employee provision of the governmental immunity act and also that the officers owed a duty to plaintiffs.5 6The Court of Appeals also held that the city was not entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiffs’ claims fell within the motor vehicle exception.
In Robinson, Courtney Henderson, age fifteen, was walking to his summer job when neighbor Marcelle *449Blakeney offered him a ride. Henderson sat in the back seat; Marlon Smith, age eighteen, was in the front passenger seat. The Detroit police observed Blakeney weaving from lane to lane. When the police activated the lights on their police car, Blakeney began to flee rather than stop. The police turned on the siren and began to pursue the vehicle. This pursuit ended when Blakeney’s car collided with a nonpolice vehicle. Henderson died in the accident.
Plaintiff, as personal representative for Henderson’s estate, filed a lawsuit against the city of Detroit and the police officers involved in the pursuit. Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The trial court ruled that the officers were entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiff had failed to state a claim in avoidance of the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. The trial court also held the officers owed no duty to Henderson. The trial court ruled that the city was not entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiff’s claim fell within the motor vehicle exception. The trial court nevertheless concluded that summary disposition in the city’s favor was proper in light of its duty ruling.
After a conflict panel was convened, the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, holding that the police owe no duty to a voluntary passenger in a fleeing driver’s vehicle.6
*450This Court granted leave in both Robinson7 and Cooper8 and ordered the cases to be submitted together. After oral argument, we set the case over to the present term and asked the parties to file additional briefing regarding whether Fiser, Rogers, and Dedes were properly decided.9
m. THE QUESTION OF DUTY
In Fiser, supra at 469-473, this Court implicitly held, in the context of a police pursuit, that the police owe a duty to innocent bystanders. In Jackson v Oliver, 204 Mich App 122, 126-127; 514 NW2d 195 (1994), the Court of Appeals distinguished Fiser and held that in the context of a police pursuit the police do not owe the fleeing suspect, i.e., a wrongdoer, a duty to refrain from chasing the suspect at speeds dangerous to the suspect. The Jackson panel’s holding was premised on public policy:
*451Out of concern for public safety, police must sometimes allow fleeing suspects to get away. However, it would be absurd to conclude that the police, out of concern for the safety of a fleeing criminal suspect, must cease pursuit of the fleeing suspect or risk possible civil liability. [Id. at 126.]
The cases at bar concern a scenario not considered in either Fiser or Jackson, i.e., whether the police owe a duty to a passenger in a fleeing vehicle. The Court of Appeals in Cooper held that the police had a duty to passengers, while the conflict panel in Robinson resolved this issue consistently with Jackson, holding that the police do not owe a duty to passengers in a fleeing driver’s vehicle.
We conclude that it is irrelevant whether a wrongdoer is a driver or a passenger or whether an innocent person is inside or outside the vehicle. Consistent with the reasoning in Fiser and Jackson, whatever their location, there is a duty to innocent persons, but not to wrongdoers. In other words, the police owe a duty to innocent persons whether those persons are inside or outside the vehicle. Conversely, the police owe no duty to a wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer is the fleeing driver or a passenger.
Our conclusion that police officers giving chase owe a duty to innocent persons is consistent with the statutes governing operation of emergency vehicles. MCL 257.603(3)(c); MSA 9.2303(3)(c) authorizes emergency vehicles to exceed prima facie speed limits, but only as long as “life or property” is not endangered. Similarly, MCL 257.632; MSA 9.2332 exempts police officers from speed limits when chasing violators of the law, but does not exempt the police from the consequences of a “reckless disregard of the safety of others.” Further, MCL 257.653; MSA 9.2353, *452which requires drivers to pull over upon the approach of an emergency vehicle with flashing lights, specifically states that the statute does not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of persons using the highway.
The statutory references to endangering life and the safety of others demonstrates that the Legislature has placed a duty upon police officers toward innocent persons when they are giving chase.10
We place on the plaintiff the burden of proving that a passenger was an innocent person and that the police therefore owed the passenger a duty. Where no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the status of a passenger, summary disposition may be appropriate. However, when a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether a passenger is innocent or a wrongdoer, and thus whether the police owed a duty, the question is appropriately resolved by the trier of fact. See, e.g., Holland v Liedel, 197 Mich App 60, 65; 494 NW2d 772 (1992) (although the issue whether a duty exists is generally a question of law for the court to decide, where the determination of duty depends on factual findings, those findings must be made by the jury). In the cases at bar, the issue of the passengers’ status has not been sufficiently devel*453oped, thereby making summary disposition on the basis of duty inappropriate at this time. Thus, we turn to consideration of defendants’ additional defenses.
IV. THE motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity
Plaintiffs contend the city of Detroit may be liable pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. This statute provides in relevant part as follows:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner .... [MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105).]
In Fiser, supra at 469, this Court held that a police officer’s pursuit of a fleeing vehicle could fall within the motor vehicle exception as the “negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” The Court so held even where the police vehicle did not hit the fleeing car or physically cause another vehicle or object to hit the fleeing car or physically force the fleeing car off the road or into another vehicle or into some other object.
In Rogers, supra at 145-146, the majority went beyond Fiser and concluded that negligent operation of a motor vehicle encompasses not only the pursuit itself, but also a police officer’s decision to commence a pursuit. The dissent would have held that the phrase “negligent operation of a motor vehicle” encompasses the manner in which a police vehicle is driven during a pursuit, but does not encompass an *454officer’s decision to pursue a fleeing vehicle. Id. at 158-161 (Taylor, J., with Weaver, J., concurring).
As indicated in footnote 9, we have been asked on numerous occasions to revisit Fiser. See, e.g., Frohman v Detroit, 181 Mich App 400, 414-415; 450 NW2d 59 (1989):
When a situation occurs, such as in the instant case, where an officer performs his legal duty by attempting to catch a fleeing lawbreaker, conducts the pursuit in what one may minimally call a negligent manner, and does not strike any vehicle with his vehicle, it is a remarkable legal principle that he can be said to have “caused” the resultant accident. To prevent the accident, all the fleeing driver need have done is stop. For the law to incorporate the presumption that a person will violate the law and to thereby hold that the officer’s pursuing the violator is a proximate cause of an accident involving the fleeing person makes society the insurer of a risk no private corporation is required to assume under the law. Furthermore, the ordinary person in society has no such obligation or even a right to pursue such a lawbreaker, whereas a police officer has.
We conclude that in police pursuit cases an initial legal decision should be made to determine whether the nature of the pursuit is such as to create a question which must be submitted to a jury. We invite the Supreme Court or Legislature to establish a bright line test which provides that a decision to engage in pursuit, as a matter of law, cannot be the basis of a claim of negligence. Only when the officer’s driving itself is a direct cause of an injury would the question of negligence be submitted as a fact question to the jury. The determination should not turn on how the officer was conducting the pursuit but rather on what effect the manner in which the officer drove his vehicle had on the cause of the accident. Fiser’s legal fiction, that a police pursuit of a lawbreaker should give rise to a legal expectation the lawbreaker will flee, should be re-examined, especially in light of Ross [v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984)] ....
*455We begin our analysis with the basic principle, of which there is no longer any dispute, that the grant of immunity in MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(l)11 is broad and that the statutory exceptions12 thereto are to be narrowly construed. Kerbersky v Northern Mich Univ, 458 Mich 525, 529; 582 NW2d 828 (1998); Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749 ff; 575 NW2d 762 (1998); Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 166; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).
In this regard, we note that Fiser was decided before this Court’s seminal governmental immunity opinion in Ross v Consumers Power Co, supra, where we held that statutory exceptions to governmental immunity are to be narrowly construed. Previously, of course, this Court had given the exceptions broad readings. As explained in Horace v City of Pontiac, two cases decided by this Court before Ross that had given a broad reading to the defective public building exception to governmental immunity were no longer good law once Ross determined that statutory exceptions were to be narrowly construed. Id. at 750, n 3. Fiser meets a similar fate. Fiser may have been proper when decided, but it is no longer “good law” after Ross. Contrary to Ross, Fiser requires a broad reading of the motor vehicle exception to conclude *456that a police vehicle, merely by the fact of pursuit, proximately caused a subsequent accident when the police vehicle did not hit the fleeing car or force it off the roadway or into another vehicle or object.
In Robinson, the plaintiff alleged that the city was negligent “through the conduct of one or more of its police officer employees in failing to operate the police vehicle at all times in such manner as to avoid placing the general public in danger . . . .” In Cooper, plaintiffs alleged that the city was liable because the pursuing officer “[flailed and neglected to operate the vehicle owned by Defendant city of Detroit in a safe, prudent and reasonable manner at all times and to obey all traffic laws and regulations.” Notably absent from the plaintiffs’ allegations is the assertion that the police vehicles hit the fleeing car or otherwise physically forced the fleeing car off the road or into another vehicle or object.
The motor vehicle exception requires that a plaintiff’s injuries result from the operation of a government vehicle. MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105). Because there is no case law that has previously examined the phrase “resulting from” we turn to the dictionary.13 The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Ed, p 1054, defines “result” as: “To occur or exist as a consequence of a particular causef;] To end in a particular way[;] The consequence of a particular action, operation or course; outcome.” Given *457the fact that the motor vehicle exception must be narrowly construed, we conclude that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the “resulting from” language of the statute where the pursuing police vehicle did not hit the fleeing car or otherwise physically force it off the road or into another vehicle or object.14
We also agree with the dissenting opinion in Rogers that the decision to pursue a fleeing motorist, which is separate from the operation of the vehicle itself, is not encompassed within a narrow construction of the phrase “operation of a motor vehicle.”15 Further, allowing a police officer’s decision to pursue to be construed as the “operation of a motor vehicle” and therefore fall under an exception to governmental immunity, conflicts with the police officer’s duty to apprehend criminal suspects. The officer should be able to rely on MCL 257.602a; MSA 9.2302(1) and MCL 257.653; MSA 9.2353, which mandate that a motorist not wilfully fail to obey a police officer’s direction to stop. We thus reject the holding in Rogers that a police officer’s decision to pursue a fleeing *458vehicle falls within the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity.
V. THE EMPLOYEE PROVISION OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
The plaintiffs also sued the individual police officers, seeking to hold them personally liable. The tort liability of governmental employees is governed by the employee provision of the governmental immunity act, which states in pertinent part:
Each . . . employee of a governmental agency . . . shall be immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property caused by the . . . employee . . . while in the course of employment . . . while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:
(a) The . . . employee ... is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
(c) The . . . employee’s . . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. [MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2).]
There is no question that (a) and (b) are met in both of these cases. As to subsection (c), in Dedes, supra at 107, this Court effectively interpreted “the proximate cause” in subsection (c) to mean “a proximate cause.” The Court further explained that “the” proximate cause does not mean “sole” proximate cause. Id. We overrule Dedes to the extent that it interpreted the phrase “the proximate cause” in subdivision (c) to mean “a proximate cause.” The Legisla*459ture’s use of the definite article “the” clearly evinces an intent to focus on one cause. The phrase “the proximate cause” is best understood as meaning the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury.
Because the Legislature is presumed to understand the meaning of the language it enacts into law, statutory analysis must begin with the wording of the statute itself. Carr v General Motors Corp, 425 Mich 313, 317; 389 NW2d 686 (1986). Each word of a statute is presumed to be used for a purpose, and, as far as possible, effect must be given to every clause and sentence. Univ of Mich Bd of Regents v Auditor General, 167 Mich 444, 450; 132 NW 1037 (1911). The Court may not assume that the Legislature inadvertently made use of one word or phrase instead of another. Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453, 456; 235 NW 217 (1931). Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court must follow it. City of Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 649; 97 NW2d 804 (1959).
These rules of statutory construction are especially germane in the cases now before us because Michigan strictly construes statutes imposing liability on the state in derogation of the common-law rule of sovereign immunity. Johnson v Ontonagon Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 253 Mich 465, 468; 235 NW 221 (1931); Detroit v Putnam, 45 Mich 263, 265; 7 NW 815 (1881). This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that governmental immunity legislation “evidences a clear legislative judgment that public and private tortfeasors should be treated differently.” Ross at 618.
The majority in Dedes interpreted the phrase “the proximate cause” to mean “a proximate cause.” It did *460this on the basis of an analysis that not to do so would produce a marked change in Michigan law, and that the Legislature, in its “legislative history,” gave no indication that it understood that it was making such a significant change. This approach can best be described as a judicial theory of legislative befuddlement. Stripped to its essence, it is an endeavor by the Court to use the statute’s “history” to contradict the statute’s clear terms. We believe the Court had no authority to do this. After all, the judiciary has always adhered to the principle that the Legislature, having acted, is held to know what it has done, i.e., to know the difference between “a proximate cause” and “the proximate cause.” Yet, in this circumstance, it is not necessary to rely on theoretical surmises to conclude this, as the Legislature has shown an awareness that it actually knows that the two phrases are different. It has done this by utilizing the phrase “a proximate cause” in at least five statutes16 and has used the phrase “the proximate cause” in at least thirteen other statutes.17 Given such a pattern, it is particularly indefensible that the Dedes majority felt free to read “the proximate cause” as if it said “a proximate cause.” The error will not be compounded, as today *461this Court corrects the flawed analysis of the Dedes majority.18
Nevertheless, the fact that the Legislature sometimes uses “a proximate cause” and at other times uses “the proximate cause” does not, of course, answer the question what “the proximate cause” means other than to show that the two phrases should not be interpreted the same way. Our duty is to give meaning to the Legislature’s choice of one word over the other.
We agree with the following analysis found in the dissent in Hagerman v Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich 720, 753-754; 579 NW2d 347 (1998):
Traditionally in our law, to say nothing of our classrooms, we have recognized the difference between “the” and “a.” “The” is defined as “definite article. 1. (used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an) . . . .” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, p 1382. Further, we must follow these distinctions *462between “a” and “the” as the Legislature has directed that “[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language .... MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1). Moreover, there is no indication that the words “the” and “a” in common usage meant something different at the time this statute was enacted ....
Further, recognizing that “the” is a definite article, and “cause” is a singular noun, it is clear that the phrase “the proximate cause” contemplates one cause. Yet, meaning must also be given to the adjective “proximate” when juxtaposed between “the” and “cause” as it is here. We are helped by the fact that this Court long ago defined “the proximate cause” as “the immediate efficient, direct cause preceding the injury.” Stoll v Laubengayer, 174 Mich 701, 706; 140 NW 532 (1913). The Legislature has nowhere abrogated this, and thus we conclude that in MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c) the Legislature provided tort immunity for employees of governmental agencies unless the employee’s conduct amounts to gross negligence that is the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury or damage, i.e., the proximate cause.
Applying this construction to the present cases, we hold that the officers in question are immune from suit in tort because their pursuit of the fleeing vehicles was not, as a matter of law, “the proximate cause” of the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. The one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries was the reckless conduct of the drivers of the fleeing vehicles.19
*463Accordingly, summary disposition for the defendant officers was proper because reasonable jurors could not find that the officers were “the proximate cause” of the injuries. Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 28, n 36; 506 NW2d 816 (1993).
VI. STARE DECISIS
In overruling Fiser/Rogers and Dedes we have given serious consideration to the doctrine of stare decisis.20 Stare decisis is generally “the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”21 However, stare decisis is not to be applied mechanically to forever prevent the Court from overruling earlier erroneous decisions determining the meaning of statutes.22
*464Courts have cited numerous factors to consider before overruling a prior case. For example, Helvering v Hallock, 309 US 106, 119; 60 S Ct 444; 84 L Ed 604 (1940), states:
[S\tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
We must also recognize that stare decisis is a “principle of policy” rather than “an inexorable command,”23 and that the Court is not constrained to follow precedent when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned.24
Further, as Justice Powell stated concurring in Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600, 627-628; 94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974), “[i]t is thus not only our prerogative but also our duty to re-examine a precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is fairly called into question.”
Courts should also review whether the decision at issue defies “practical workability,” whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the questioned decision. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 853-856; 112 S Ct 2791; 120 L Ed 2d 674 (1992).
The first question, of course, should be whether the earlier decision was wrongly decided. We believe the decisions at issue here were. As previously explained, *465we conclude that Fiser has fallen victim to a subsequent change in the law, that Rogers reflects a misunderstanding of the statute that establishes the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, and that Dedes misconstrued a plainly worded statute.
However, as this discussion makes clear, the mere fact that an earlier case was wrongly decided does not mean overruling it is invariably appropriate.25 *466Rather, the Court must proceed on to examine the effects of overruling, including most importantly the effect on reliance interests and whether overruling would work an undue hardship because of that reliance.
The “practical workability” of Fiser has also been suspect. As set forth in footnote 9, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly questioned Fiser.
As to the reliance interest, the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.26 It is in practice a prudential judgment for a court.
We conclude that these cases have not become so embedded, accepted or fundamental to society’s expectations that overruling them would produce significant dislocations. It is apparent that the fleeing drivers, as they sought to evade the police, were undoubtedly not aware of our previous case law, nor is it likely that they drove as they did in reliance on the theory that they or the person injured as a result of their fleeing might have recourse against the municipality or individual police officers. In fact, it seems incontrovertible that only after the accident would such awareness come. Such after-the-fact *467awareness does not rise to the level of a reliance interest because to have reliance the knowledge must be of the sort that causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his conduct to a certain norm before the triggering event. Such a situation does not exist here.
Further, it is well to recall in discussing reliance, when dealing with an area of the law that is statutory (which Fiser/Rogers and Dedes do), that it is to the words of the statute itself that a citizen first looks for guidance in directing his actions. This is the essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what the rules of society are. Thus, if the words of the statute are clear, the actor should be able to expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by all in society, including the courts. In fact, should a court confound those legitimate citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest. When that happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s misconstruction. The reason for this is that the court in distorting the statute was engaged in a form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional violation, the courts have no legitimacy in overruling or nullifying the people’s representatives.27 Moreover, not only *468does such a compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant, it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts repeat the error.
In summary, we are compelled to overrule Dedes because our responsibility is to interpret the words of the Legislature and “the proximate cause” does not mean “a proximate cause,” and because this distinction is critical in determining responsibility for the injuries suffered by passengers in fleeing vehicles. We are equally compelled to overrule Rogers because we do not believe that the phrase “operation of a motor vehicle” encompasses the mere decision itself by the police to pursue a fleeing suspect, as opposed to the specific conduct of the police during such pursuit. Finally, we believe it is necessary to overrule Fiser because a narrow reading of the phrase “bodily injury . . . resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle” does not properly characterize a situation in which a police vehicle pursuing a fleeing suspect has neither hit the fleeing car nor physically forced the vehicle off the road or into another vehicle or object.
We return the law, as is our duty, to what we believe the citizens of this state reading these statutes at the time of enactment would have understood the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity and the employee provision of the governmental immunity act to mean.
*469CONCLUSION
Thus, the police owe a duty to innocent passengers and pedestrians but not to passengers who are engaged in encouraging or abetting the fleeing. If an innocent person is injured as a result of a police chase because the police physically force a fleeing car off the road or into another vehicle that person may seek recovery against a governmental agency pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. Plaintiffs in the cases at bar do not have causes of action against the city of Detroit under this exception because the injuries did not result from the police physically hitting the fleeing car or physically causing another vehicle or object to hit the fleeing car or physically forcing the fleeing car off the road or into another vehicle or object.
Innocent persons who are injured as the result of police chases may sue an individual police officer only if the officer is “the proximate cause” of the accident, i.e., the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the accident. Because the officers in the cases at bar were not “the proximate causes” of the injuries, the plaintiffs have no causes of action against the officers.
The result in Robinson is affirmed. Cooper is reversed.
Weaver, C.J., and Corrigan, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.As noted in footnote 6, there was some evidence suggesting that Henderson was not innocent. However, because the test we announce is new, and Henderson’s estate was never on notice of its obligation to produce any evidence to the contrary, we take the more prudent course and decline to find as a matter of law that Henderson was a wrongdoer.
Conversely, if an innocent person is injured as a result of a police chase because a police car physically forces a fleeing car off the road or into another vehicle or object, such person may seek recovery against a governmental agency pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity and also against'the officer operating the police vehicle if the individual police officer is “the proximate cause” of the accident.
107 Mich App 367; 309 NW2d 552 (1981).
Plaintiffs also brought a lawsuit against the personal representative of the estate of Damian Collins. However, that lawsuit is not before us.
218 Mich App 649; 554 NW2d 919 (1996).
225 Mich App 14; 571 NW2d 34 (1997). The three-judge panel in Robinson originally issued an opinion on September 10, 1996, affliming the judgment of the trial court and holding that no duty is owed to a passenger voluntarily in a fleeing car. 220 Mich App 801, 803; 561 NW2d 390 (1996). The Robinson panel then granted rehearing on its own motion to review the apparent conflict between this decision and that of Cooper v *450Wade, which was released fifteen minutes before its decision in Robinson. Id. at 801. On rehearing, the Robinson panel, concluded that it was compelled to follow Cooper and reversed the judgment of the trial court holding that “a duty was owed the present decedent despite the fact that he made obscene gestures to the police and encouraged the flight that led to his death.” Id. at 802. The Court of Appeals then convened a special panel to resolve the conflict between Cooper and Robinson. Id. at 801.
458 Mich 861 (1998).
456 Mich 905 (1997).
461 Mich 1201 (1999). This Court has been urged to revisit Fiser on several occasions. See, e.g., Frohman v Detroit, 181 Mich App 400, 413-415; 450 NW2d 59 (1989) (“We invite the Supreme Court or Legislature to establish a bright line test”); Ewing v Detroit (On Remand), 214 Mich App 495, 499-500; 543 NW2d 1 (1995) (“I urge our Supreme Court to reconsider Fiser," opinion of Doctoroff, C.J.), affd 457 Mich 125; 579 NW2d 840 (1998); Cooper v Wade, 218 Mich App 649, 663; 554 NW2d 919 (1996) (“I concur but suggest this area of the jurisprudence of this state should be revisited by the Supreme Court,” concurring opinion by Michael J. Kelly, X). It is also the case that Dedes and Rogers were decided over vigorous three-justice dissents.
One might even argue that these statutes create a duty toward a fleeing driver. We need not reach that question, but do note that, even if such a duty were found to exist, a fleeing driver would nevertheless be barred from seeking to recover for iqjuries sustained while attempting to evade a lawful order to stop his vehicle under Michigan’s wrongful conduct rule. This rule is rooted in the public policy that courts should not lend their aid to plaintiffs whose cause of action is premised on their own illegal conduct. Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550; 537 NW2d 208 (1995). Culpable passengers have no greater claim to benefit from the wrongful conduct than does the driver.
This statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
The other four statutory exceptions are maintenance of public highways, MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), performance of proprietary functions by government entities, MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113), the public building exception, MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106), and the governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4).
It is appropriate to consult a lay dictionary when defining common words or phrases that have not acquired a unique meaning at law because “the common and approved usage of a nonlegal term is most likely to be found in a standard dictionary and not a legal dictionary.” Horace v City of Pontiac, supra at 756. See also Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163, n 10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999), and MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1).
The dissent suggests that there should be liability where a police vehicle forces an innocent intervening car to hit the fleeing vehicle causing injury to an innocent person in the fleeing vehicle. However, we do not believe that such a scenario would fit within a narrow reading of the statutory requirement of “resulting from.” The dissent’s position would be more in accord with a proximate cause “but for” analysis. However, the statute does not say that governmental agencies are liable for injuries or property damage “proximately caused” by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Rather, the statute says the injuries or property damage must result from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Because the Legislature did not utilize proximate cause language, we will not import such an analysis here.
The decision to give chase is not the operation of a motor vehicle, just as an inebriated person’s decision to drive drunk is not a crime. Only when the decision is translated into driving can there be the operation of a motor vehicle or the commission of the crime of driving while under the influence of alcohol.
See MCL 436.1801(3); MSA 18.1175(801)(3), MCL 600.2947(6)(a); MSA 27A.2947(6)(a), MCL 600.6304(8); MSA 27A.6304(8), MCL 691.1665(a); MSA 12.418(5)(a), and MCL 750.145o; MSA 28.342A(o).
See MCL 257.633(2); MSA 9.2333(2), MCL 324.5527; MSA 13A.5527, MCL 324.5531(11); MSA 13A.5531(11), MCL 324.5534; MSA 13A.5534, MCL 418.375(2); MSA 17.237(375)(2), MCL 500.214(6); MSA 24.1214(6), MCL 600.2912b(4)(e); MSA 27A.2912(2)(4)(e), MCL 600.2912b(7)(d); MSA 27A.2912(2)(7)(d), MCL 600.2912d(l)(d); MSA 27A.2912(4)(l)(d), MCL 600.2947(3); MSA 27A.2947(3), MCL 600.5839(1); MSA 27A.5839(1), MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c), and MCL 750.90e; MSA 28.285e.
The dissent claims our construction of the word “the” ignores MCL 8.3b; MSA 2.212(2), which states:
Every word importing the singular number only may extend to and embrace the plural number, and every word importing the plural number may be applied and limited to the singular number.
We disagree. First, the statute only states that a word importing the singular number “may extend” to the plural. The statute does not say that such an automatic understanding is required. Moreover, MCL 8.3; MSA 2.212 provides that the rule stated in § 3b shall be observed “unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature.” Second, the Legislature has directed that
[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language .... [MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1).]
There is no indication that the words “the” and “a” in common usage meant something different at the time this statute was enacted.
We recognize that our proximate cause analysis with respect to individual police officers is inconsistent with that found in Fiser. However, *463the employee provision of the governmental immunity act, which requires the governmental actor to be “the proximate cause,” was enacted three years after Fiser was decided as part of 1986 PA 175. Thus, the Fiser Court was not restricted by the statute as are we. The dissent’s broad statement that we are rejecting the Fiser Court’s proximate cause analysis is in error. As previously explained, the Legislature changed Fiser’s proximate cause analysis with respect to the individual police officers when it enacted the employee provision of the governmental immunity act.
Stare decisis means “To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.” Black’s Law Dictionary (rev 4th ed), p 1577.
Hohn v United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998).
Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 944; 114 S Ct 2581; 129 L Ed 2d 687 (1994). It is also the case that “this Court will not close its eyes to a possible error it may have committed in the past.” Wilson v Doehler-Jarvis, 358 Mich 510, 514; 100 NW2d 226 (1960). Moreover, this Court has no obligation to perpetuate error simply because it may have reached a wrong result in one of its earlier decisions. Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis does not tie the law to past, wrongly decided cases solely in the interest of stability and continuity.
Hohn, n 21 supra at 251.
Holder, n 22 supra at 937.
We reject the dissent’s argument that Fiser should not be overruled because of legislative acquiescence. As we recently explained in Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999):
If it has not been clear in our previous decisions, we wish to make it clear now: “legislative acquiescence” is a highly disfavored doctrine of statutory construction; sound principles of statutory construction require that Michigan courts determine the Legislature’s intent from its words, not from its silence.
See further Van Dorpel v Haven-Busch Co, 350 Mich 135, 146; 85 NW2d 97 (1957) (Voelker, J.):
Now this beguiling doctrine of legislative assent by silence possesses a certain undeniable logic and charm. Nor are we oblivious to the flattery implicit therein; double flattery, in fact: flattery both to the profound learning and wisdom of the particular supreme court which has spoken, and flattery to a presumably alert and eagerly responsive State legislature. One pictures the legislators of our various States periodically clamoring and elbowing each other in their zeal to get at the pearls of wisdom embalmed in the latest decisions and advance sheets of their respective supreme courts—■ and thenceforth indicating their unbounded approval by a vast and permanent silence.
Yet there are several dark shadows in this picture. For one, it suggests a legislative passion for reading and heeding the decisions of our supreme courts which we suspect may be scarcely borne out by the facts. For another, pushed too far such a doctrine suggests the interesting proposition that it is the legislatures which have now become the ultimate courts of last resort in our various States; that if they delay long enough to correct our errors those errors thus become both respectable and immutably frozen; and, finally, the larger and more dismal corollary that if enough people persist long enough in ignoring an injustice it thereby becomes just.
Cases that come to mind with regard to reliance that, even if wrongly-decided, we might nevertheless decline to overrule could well be our recent ruling regarding term limits Massey v Secretary of State, 457 Mich 410; 579 NW2d 862 (1998), or this Court’s initial advisory opinion with regard to automobile no-fault insurance. In re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441; 208 NW2d 469 (1973). What it is that singularizes these cases, even as with the United States Supreme Court’s legal tender cases after the Civil War, see Knox v Lee, 79 US (12 Wall) 457; 20 L Ed 287 (1870), is that to overrule them, even if they were wrongfully decided, would produce chaos.
In addition to this, at a very practical plane, we question whether anyone would reasonably have relied upon these controversial opinions, as they were decided with the narrowest of majorities. As was stated in Sommers v City of Flint, 355 Mich 655, 662; 96 NW2d 119 (1959):
*468Younglas [v City of Flint, 345 Mich 576; 77 NW2d 84 (1956)] was decided too recently and by too close a margin to carry great weight under the doctrine of stare decisis.