dissenting:
I dissent from the decision of the majority to reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
The majority holds that “an officer is not required to determine or verify the scope of the restricted driving permit before performing a traffic stop when a reasonable articulable basis exists to believe the license of the person behind the wheel is revoked.” (Emphasis omitted.) 389 Ill. App. 3d at 233. Stated another way, once the officer reasonably determines that the person behind the wheel has a revoked driver’s license, that officer can execute a traffic stop to investigate whether the driver was operating the vehicle outside the terms of his/ her RDE Thus, the terms or scope of the RDF have no bearing on the question of whether the officer had a sufficient basis to execute the traffic stop. Instead, the majority finds that an RDF merely creates a statutory defense which allows a revoked driver to avoid a conviction by demonstrating to the officer that he/she is “specifically allowed” by the permit to operate the vehicle at the time of the seizure. 389 111. App. 3d at 233.
I believe the majority’s reasoning is flawed in that it ignores the fact that an officer is only allowed to stop and detain an individual if the officer has “knowledge of sufficient articulable facts at the time of the encounter to create a reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” (Emphasis added). People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275, 769 N.E.2d 10, 15 (2002), quoting People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 434 (1980). Driving on a revoked license is not a crime if the individual is driving within the scope of his/her RDE Thus, in order to effectuate a valid traffic stop, I believe an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is operating the vehicle outside the terms of his/her RDE As in the case of People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 710, 885 N.E.2d 358 (2008), the officer’s stop in the present case was based solely on a hunch, not reasonable suspicion. In the case where a driver of a vehicle has an RDl^ mere knowledge that the driver has a revoked driver’s license is insufficient to support a Terry stop. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 712, 885 N.E.2d at 360. While the majority declines to adopt the reasoning set forth in Johnson, I believe Johnson was properly decided.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court granting defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.