(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree that under our holding in Johansen v. Johansen, 305 N.W.2d 383 (S.D.1981), that portion of the judgment imposing child support obligations upon appellant is juris-dictionally valid.
If I could agree that SDCL 15-7-2(9), as added by 1983 S.D.Sess.Laws ch. 156, § 1, was retroactively applicable to this case, I would join in upholding that portion of the judgment imposing the obligation to pay alimony, attorney fees, and costs. The day is past when a valid attack can be leveled against the constitutionality of statutes granting in personam jurisdiction in the class of cases covered by SDCL 15-7-2(9). See, e.g., Bunker v. Bunker, 261 Ark. 851, 552 S.W.2d 641 (1977); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 237 Ga. 895, 230 S.E.2d 486 (1976); Baker v. Baker, 100 Idaho 635, 603 P.2d 590 (1979); Scott v. Hall, 203 Kan. 331, 454 P.2d 449 (1969); Fliter v. Filter, 383 So.2d 1084 (Miss.1980); Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679 (1968); Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.1975); Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis.2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1978); Note, “Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases,” 73 Columbia L.Rev. 289 (1973).
In the absence of a statute granting extra-territorial in personam jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, however, the rule referred to in Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 345, 24 N.W.2d 327, 329 (1946), still obtains, with the result that a court’s jurisdiction over a non-resident in a divorce action extends only to the marriage relationship itself and cannot support a personal judg*845ment for alimony or child support. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Vogel, 293 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1980); Wiles v. Wiles, 211 Or. 198, 315 P.2d 131 (1957); 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation §§ 542, 544, 828 (1966).
It is true that in Johnson v. Kusel, 298 N.W.2d 91 (S.D.1980), we held that later-enacted provisions expanding the scope of SDCL 15-7-2 should be given retroactive effect in view of SDCL 15-7-4, a section of the enactment that gave rise to SDCL 15-7-2(3), which states that the provision of SDCL 15-7-1 and 15-7-2 are to apply to causes of action arising before the enactment thereof. Were it not for the fact that the 1983 enactment contained an emergency clause, I would be hard-pressed to hold that the legislature did not intend that SDCL 15-7-4 should give retroactive effect to the several subsections contained in Chapter 156, given the legislature’s presumed knowledge of our holding in Johnson v. Kusel. The fact that an emergency clause was appended to Chapter 156 indicates to me, however, that the legislature did not intend that the 1983 amendments be given retroactive effect, for such retroactive application would have made it unnecessary to give immediate force and effect to the provisions of Chapter 156. Accordingly, I would hold that SDCL 15-7-2(9) has no application to the case before us.