(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court. In my view, the evidence is insufficient to prove that Butler intended that the joint accounts should become the property of his estate upon his death.
On June 9, 2003, Butler obtained a series of five certificates of deposit from Woodland Bank. Each certificate was issued using a form that provides several “ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP” options. On each certificate, an “X” clearly marks a box next to the option described as “Joint Account — -With Survivorship.” On the second page of each certificate, the account ownership options are explained as follows:
OWNERSHIP OF ACCOUNT AND BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION: You intend these rules to apply to this account depending on the form of ownership and beneficiary designation, if any, specified on page 1. We make no representations as to the appropriateness or effect of the ownership and beneficiary designations, except as they determine to whom we pay the account funds.
Individual Account — Such an account is owned by one person.
Joint Account With Survivorship (And Not As Tenants In Common)— Such an account is owned by two or more persons. Each of you intend that upon your death the balance in the account (subject to any previous pledge to which we have consented) will belong to the swrvivor(s). If two or more of you survive, you will own the balance in the account ownership as joint tenants with survivorship and not as tenants in common.
Joint Account — No Survivorship (As Tenants In Common) — Such an account is owned by two or more persons but none of you intend (merely by opening this account) to create any right of survivorship in any other person. We encourage you to agree and tell us in writing of the percentage of the deposit contributed by each of you. This information will not, however, affect the “number of endorsements” necessary for withdrawal.
Revocable Trust and Pay-on-Death Account (subject to this agreement)—
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Trust Account Subject to Separate Agreement — ....
(Emphasis added.) Butler signed the first certificate in the series.
If a bank account is designated as a joint account with a right of survivorship, and if one of the joint owners dies, the account “belong[s] to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention, or there is a different disposition made by a valid will as herein provided, specifically referring to such account.” Minn.Stat. § 524.6-204(a) (2008) (emphasis added).2 Respondents concede that there is no “different disposi*838tion made by a valid will ..., specifically referring to such account.” Id. Thus, the sole question is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that Butler had a “different intention,” id., that is, an intention different from his expressed intention to create joint accounts with rights of surviv-orship.
At trial, respondents introduced no evidence that Butler had an intention for the disposition of the joint accounts upon his death other than what is expressed on the face of the five certificates. Respondents were unable to offer any such evidence because no one within the family knew of the existence of the joint accounts during Butler’s lifetime and because respondents did not call as a witness the banker who assisted Butler in establishing the accounts. Consequently, no trial witness testified that Butler ever said that he had an intention different from what is shown on the face of the five certificates, and there is no evidence that Butler ever expressed any such intention in writing. The legislature has provided a means by which Butler, during his lifetime, could have changed his original designation of the account “by written order given ... to the financial institution to change the form of the account or to stop or vary payment under the terms of the account.” Minn. Stat. § 524.6-205 (2008). Butler, however, never made such a change prior to his death on February 1, 2008.
Respondents’ evidence is insufficient because it simply is not evidence of Butler’s actual intention. Respondents’ evidence is nothing more than factors that respondents believe Butler should have considered, or reasons why, in respondents’ view, Butler should not have decided to establish joint accounts. Butler presumably was aware of those factors and reasons yet, nonetheless, elected to establish joint accounts with rights of survivorship. Thereafter he never elected to change the designations. The evidence concerning the general provisions of Butler’s will, which he executed seven years before he established the joint accounts, is insufficient because the legislature has expressly required that evidence of “a different disposition made by a valid will” must “specifically refer[]” to the joint accounts. Minn.Stat. § 524.6-204(a). As stated above, respondents concede that Butler’s will does not make specific reference to the five joint accounts.
To affirm the jury’s verdict in this case is essentially to allow other persons — the heirs under a will and a panel of jurors — to second-guess a decedent’s deliberate choice of account designation without regard for what the decedent actually intended. In this way, the opinion of the court infringes on a person’s freedom to make a disposition of property during his or her lifetime with confidence that the disposition will be effected after his or her death. A joint account with a right of survivorship “is ... sometimes referred to as a ‘poor man’s will’ ” because it is a “ ‘simple, inexpensive method of passing funds in the account from a deceased joint owner to the surviving joint owner, avoiding the necessity of probate proceedings.’ ” Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 332 (Minn.2007) (quoting Deutsch, Larrimore & Farnish, P.C. v. Johnson, 577 Pa. 637, 848 A.2d 137, 142-43 (2004)). If a person has made a facially valid written designation of a joint account with a right of survivorship, and if the person never has expressed any contrary intention, the written designation should be impervious to attack at a time when the person is unavailable to defend and reaffirm the desig*839nation. In short, the opinion of the court injects too much uncertainty into this area of the law and is likely to disrupt settled expectations.
The opinion of the court relies on Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 179 N.W.2d 607 (1970), to support its conclusion that respondents’ evidence is sufficient. The Rutchick opinion, however, was issued before the enactment of the Multiparty Accounts Act (MPAA), which includes section 524.6-204(a). See 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 619, § 1, at 1472, § 5, at 1475; see also 1994 Minn. Laws, ch. 472, § 63, at 415 (renumbering statute). The supreme court has noted that, prior to the adoption of the MPAA, Minnesota caselaw was “ ‘scant and conflicting’ ” as to whether ownership of joint accounts was determined by a contract theory, a gift theory, a trust theory, or a joint tenancy theory. Enright, 735 N.W.2d at 331 (quoting Note, The “Poor Man’s Will” Gains Respectability: Using the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act, 1 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 48, 50 (1974)). In Rutchick, the supreme court applied the gift theory by analyzing whether the decedent intended to make an inter vivos gift to the other joint account owner. 288 Minn. at 261-65, 179 N.W.2d at 610-12. But the MPAA subsequently “reject[ed] gift, trust, and joint tenancy theories of ownership as used at common law, and adopt[ed] the contract theory.” Note, supra, at 57-58 (relied on for this point by In re Conservatorship of Gobernatz, 603 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn.App.1999), revieiu denied (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000)). As one commentator noted at the time, “This is a major change from prior Minnesota law....” Note, supra, at 61. Furthermore, in Rutchick, the burden of proof was on the surviving joint account owner to prove that the decedent had made a gift. 288 Minn. at 261-65, 179 N.W.2d at 610-12. Under the MPAA, however, the burden is on the person or persons challenging the survivorship designation to prove a different intention by clear and convincing evidence. Minn.Stat. § 524.6-204(a); In re Estate of Grotta, 386 N.W.2d 319, 320 (Minn.App.1986).
The supreme court has recognized that the legislature’s enactment of the MPAA “may abrogate common law doctrines by express wording or necessary implication.” Enright, 735 N.W.2d at 334 (quotation omitted). It is apparent that Rutchick is inconsistent with section 524.6-204(a) and, thus, that the legislature abrogated Rutchick when it adopted the MPAA. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the supreme court has cited Rutchick only three times but never in a case arising after the effective date of the MPAA. See Lerbakken v. Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 304 Minn. 297, 302, 230 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1975); Stribling v. Fredericks, Clark & Co., 300 Minn. 525, 526, 219 N.W.2d 93, 95 (1974); Erickson v. Kalman, 291 Minn. 41, 45, 189 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1971). Thus, the opinion of the court erroneously relies on Rutchick to support its conclusion that respondents’ evidence is sufficient to prove that Butler did not intend to create a right of survivorship in Kissack.
The opinion of the court also is inconsistent with opinions from other states that apply similar statutes. Our supreme court has stated that Minnesota’s version of the MPAA should be interpreted consistently with the caselaw in “other jurisdictions that have faced the same issue under the Uniform Probate Code.” Savig v. First Nat’l Bank, 781 N.W.2d 335, 346 (Minn.2010). Thus, we note that, in Decker v. Zengler, 883 N.E.2d 839 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), the Indiana Court of Appeals held, as a matter of law, that four siblings who were the heirs under a will did not have sufficient evidence to prove that the decedent, their mother, had a different intention when she established several joint accounts with rights of survivorship in another child. Id. at 841-45. The four siblings *840who challenged the survivorship designations were not aware of the joint accounts during their mother’s lifetime, and no witness was able to testify about the decedent’s actual intent. Id. at 842-43. The court thus held that the four siblings had no evidence that could overcome the statutory presumption of survivorship. Id. at 845.
In similar circumstances, courts in other states have consistently upheld the statutory presumption of survivorship when there was no evidence that the decedent actually had a different intention. See In re Estate of Anderson, 988 A.2d 977, 979-80 (Me.2010) (reversing trial court’s determination that joint accounts with survivor-ship rights should become property of estate according to will); see also Evancoe v. Evancoe (In re Estate of Evanco), 955 P.2d 525, 527-28 (Alaska 1998) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of petition challenging survivorship rights in joint investment accounts and certificates of deposit); Barham v. Jones, 98 N.M. 195, 647 P.2d 397, 399 (1982) (affirming trial court’s finding recognizing joint account owner’s survivor-ship rights in joint bank accounts); Thomas v. Thomas (In re Estate of Thomas), 532 N.W.2d 676, 680-81 (N.D.1995) (affirming summary judgment recognizing joint account owner’s survivorship rights in joint bank accounts). There is no precedent for the proposition that the MPAA’s statutory presumption of survivorship rights may be rebutted by evidence that the decedent should have made a different account designation, without evidence that the decedent actually intended a different account designation.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Kissack.
. The legislature also has provided that a financial institution’s use of certain language in the documents creating a joint account with a right of survivorship is "conclusive evidence of the intent of the depositor, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation ... [or] other disposition made by will.” Minn.Stat. § 524.6-213, subd. 1 (2008). Kissack has not attempted to invoke section 524.6-213, subdivision 1, and neither party cited that provision. Thus, the opinion of the court should *838not be interpreted to express any views as to whether the language used by the bank in Butler's certificates of deposit satisfies the requirements of section 524.6-213, subdivision 1(b).