(concurring in part, dissenting in part). This case poses two issues for the Court’s consideration. First, we must decide whether in an action for mandamus to compel the spreading of a tax authorized by statute and a vote of the electorate of the Delta College District in 1968, the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel is available to challenge the validity of the 1968 election where it appears that plaintiff misled the electorate through the wording of the ballot proposal and through its campaign literature. I concur with my Brother Kavanagh’s judgment that the defense of equitable estoppel is not available for that purpose in the circumstances of this case, and that a writ of mandamus must issue.
Second, the parties raise the issue of when the 1968 millage authorization is to terminate. The 1968 millage authorization is to terminate in 1978, as asserted by defendant-appellant Saginaw County Board of Commissioners.
I — Facts
In May of 1958, appellee Delta College won approval from the electorate of the Delta College District of a grant of tax authority allowing a levy of up to one mill for debt retirement and up to .5 mill for operating expenses, for a period of 20 years.
The stricture that no more than .5 mill of the 1.5 mills authorized be allocated to operating expenses apparently was felt to be too limiting and inflexible by Delta College as the size of the school and its operating expenses grew in the 1960’s, for in 1968, Delta launched a campaign to "replace” *571the 1958 millage authorization with an "unrestricted” millage grant of 1.5 mills which, it was said, would cost the electorate no more in taxes while providing the college the flexibility it needed iri\budgetary matters. The fact that the new grant of tax authority would "replace” the 1958 millage grant was emphasized strongly in the campaign in support of the new grant.1 Moreover, the ballot proposal specifically stated that the new authorization would "replace the authorization voted May 27, 1958”.
Similarly, the campaign literature in support of the new authorization repeatedly emphasized that the new authorization would cost no more than the 1958 authorization of 1.5 mills. These assurances went so far as to include a chart presenting sample calculations of the "Total Delta Tax” under the proposed millage authorization. These calculations of the "total” tax used a 1.5-mill levy.2 Significantly, this campaign literature also stated that the new unrestricted authorization would be used for debt retirement as well as operating expenses, and building and equipment costs.
In November of 1968, the proposition authoriz*572ing the new millage was approved by the electorate of the Delta College District, and in April of 1972, appellee Delta College gave notice to Appellants Saginaw County Board of Commissioners that that same electorate should be taxed at a rate of 1.62 mills in 1972. One and three-tenths mills was to go for operating expenses, and .32 mills for bond retirement.
In September of 1972, appellant board of commissioners adopted a resolution disapproving any levy in excess of 1.5 mills, and authorized a levy up to 1.5 mills only.
Two weeks thereafter, appellee Delta College initiated an action for mandamus to compel appellant to spread and assess a total mill tax of 1.62 upon the assessment rolls of Saginaw County. Appellant board of commissioners responded with the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel alleging that plaintiff misled the voters into thinking that no millage greater than 1.5 mills would, be levied under the 1968 authorization. On October 2, 1972, Judge Joseph R. McDonald of the Saginaw County Circuit Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus, dismissing the action by summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court judgment on January 21, 1974, and ordered a remand for entry of a writ of mandamus.
This Court granted leave on June 24, 1974.
A key fact, nowhere mentioned in the ballot proposal or the 1968 millage campaign, helps illuminate the instant controversy. In 1966, under new authority granted by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Legislature enacted the Community College Act of 1966 which empowered the board of trustees of each community college to levy a tax as pertinently follows:
*573"Sec. 144. (1) The board of trustees of each community college district may levy * * * a tax which shall not exceed the rate which has been heretofore or is hereafter authorized by the qualified electors of the district * * * . The funds may be used for any and all purposes authorized except that the foregoing limitation shall not apply to taxes imposed for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued, which taxes may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount. * * * ” MCLA 389.144; MSA 15.615 (1144). (Emphasis added.)
Appellee Delta College relies on precisely this statutory authorization to tax beyond the rate approved by the electorate where the tax imposed is for the retirement of debt, to justify its demand for a 1.62 levy.
II — Termination of the 1968 Millage Authorization
While the validity of the 1968 millage authorization is no longer subject to challenge, for reasons outlined by my Brother Chief Justice Kavanagh, we think it clear that the authorization terminates in 1978, the year that the 1958 authorization would have terminated. The voters in the 1968 election were apparently never explicitly informed either in the ballot proposition itself, or in the campaign literature whether the new authorization would terminate in 1978 or would continue indefinitely. However, an examination of the ballot language and the campaign literature indicates that the 1978 termination date is the most reasonable interpretation.
The ballot language in the 1968 election read as follows:
*574"Shall the Board of Trustees of Delta College, Counties of Bay, Midland and Saginaw, Michigan, a public community college of the State of Michigan, be authorized to levy a tax on the real and tangible personal property within the College District not to exceed the annual rate of one and one-half mills on each dollar ($1.50 on each $1,000.00) of the assessed valuation of such property as state equalized in the manner and for the purposes provided by Section 144 of Act 331 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan of the year 1966 as amended, which authorization shall replace the authorization voted May 27, 1958?” (Emphasis added.)
The fact that the ballot language states that the new authorization "shall replace the authorization voted May 27, 1958” (emphasis added), coupled with the absence of any reference to a specific termination date, suggests that it was intended that the new authorization was to take on the termination date of the 1958 authorization.
This interpretation is certainly consistent with the impression created by Delta in the campaign literature supporting the new authorization. For example, the campaign literature invariably emphasized that the new authorization would mean no increase in the 1958 millage authorization, as the following excerpts make clear:
"5. Will this new authorization cost more than the original 1958 authorization?
"NO! This authorization only replaces the original authorization.”
* * *
"WHAT ARE WE ASKING FOR?
Replace 1958 millage with 1-1/2 mills unrestricted. THERE WOULD BE NO INCREASE FROM THE ORIGINAL AUTHORIZATION.”
"WHAT ARE WE ASKING FOR?
*575In 1958,1-1/2 mills was voted.
This amount was Restricted
1 mill for building
1/2 mill for operating.
In 1968, we are asking you to replace the restricted 1958 with 1-1/2 mills unrestricted.
This means no increase in authorization.
A YES vote means NO INCREASE in authorization.”
Yet clearly, replacing a 1.5 mill tax for a limited period of years with a 1.5 mill tax for an indefinite period of time would constitute an increase in the millage authorization.
Moreover, a reading of Delta’s campaign literature creates the impression that the new authorization would have one, and only one, effect: to increase the flexibility of Delta’s budgeting by lifting the restrictions on the 1958 authorization. Nowhere in the campaign literature before us is it indicated that a change in the 1978 termination date was desired.
Consequently, it would seem clear that Delta College said and intended that the new authorization was to take on the 1978 termination date of the 1958 authorization.
We therefore conclude that the ballot language of the 1968 referendum substituted an unrestricted 1.5-mill tax for the restricted 1958 tax, terminating in 1978.
Furthermore, if such were not the intent of the referendum, then Delta College is guilty once again of misleading the public in the 1968 election. While we have concluded that the defense of equitable estoppel is not available to challenge the validity of the 1968 election because of the exclusivity of the quo warranto procedure, no such problem arises in applying the doctrine of equita*576ble estoppel to the issue of when the 1968 authorization is to terminate.
The central principle of equitable estoppel is that one who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Holt v Stofflet, 338 Mich 115, 119; 61 NW2d 28 (1953). If Delta College did not intend that the 1968 authorization take on the 1978 termination date, then its representations to the electorate were false and misleading, and the public has relied on those misrepresentations. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we will not allow Delta to breach the expectations of the public on this issue.
My Brother Chief Justice Kavanagh does not resolve the issue of the termination date of the 1968 authorization, apparently because he does not feel the issue was sufficiently raised by the parties. I disagree.
In both its brief and in oral arguments, the board of commissioners clearly asserted that the termination date of the 1968 authorization was 1978. The parties’ argument on this issue centered on the meaning of the phrase "which authorization shall replace the authorization voted May 27, 1958?”, which appeared in the 1968 ballot proposal. Delta argued in both its brief and in oral arguments that this phrase meant that the 1958 authorization was repealed. This would imply that the 1978 termination date would no longer have effect. The board of commissioners argued that the phrase meant that the 1968 authorization was intended to incorporate the 1958 authorization’s termination date and 1.5-mill limitation, changing the earlier authorization only by lifting the restric*577tion on how the 1.5 mills could be spent. See appellants’ brief, pp 10-11.
The effect of avoidance of the termination date issue would be to unnecessarily require the parties to litigate this issue at some future date. The issue was raised and should be resolved.
This idea appeared on each piece of campaign literature which was presented to us. See Appellant’s Supplemental Exhibits 1 and 2.
An excerpt from one of the pieces of campaign literature supporting the new authorization reads as follows:
"4. What will it [the new authorization] cost me?
Market Value State Equalized Of Your Property Valuation Total Delta Tax
$2,000 $1,000 $1.50
$4,000 $2,000 $3.00
$6,000 $3,000 $4.50
$8,000 $4,000 $6.00
$10,000 $5,000 $7.50
$20,000 $10,000 $15.00
$30,000 $15,000 $22.50
"For the State Equalized Valuation of your property contact your county tax collector.”