This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a judgment and order of the circuit court for Juneau county, Raymond E. Gieringer, presiding. The circuit court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus upholding the position of the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB),2 respondent, directing the Juneau county village of Lyndon Station (Village), appellant, and its president and board of trustees to remove and discharge William G. Jessen as the chief of police of the village of Lyndon Station. The question in this case deals with the authority of a village to employ a convicted felon as police chief after the LESB has deemed him ineligible for *476appointment to this position and refused to certify him as being qualified therefor citing the Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d), prohibiting the employment of a convicted felon as a law enforcement officer.3 William G. Jessen, the chief of police is not a party to this review.
On April 27, 1973, Jessen, was convicted of 26 felony counts of misconduct in public office, contrary to sec. 946.12 (4), Stats. 1973,4 after being found guilty of falsifying uniform traffic citations while serving as the chief deputy sheriff for Juneau county.5 Jessen was sentenced to 26 concurrent one-year terms in the Wisconsin state prison at Waupun for each felony conviction, but these sentences were stayed and he was placed on probation *477for two years. He completed his probation and received a certificate of discharge from the Department of Health and Social Services effective June 5,1975.
On September 30, 1974, the village board, although aware of Jessen’s convictions for misconduct in public office, hired Jessen as chief of police, sanitary landfill area attendant and sewer operator, believing that a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, constituted a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The village supported its belief that a violation of this statute was a misdemeanor with two letters: one from Richard C. Kelley, the Juneau county district attorney, to Jessen and the other from the judge originally assigned to the case, the Hon. Thomas H. Barland, to the Juneau county clerk of courts.6
The board of trustees’ resolution hiring Jessen on September 30, 1974, provided that his employment as police chief would become permanent upon satisfactory *478completion of a six-month “probationary period.” During this time, the village requested the LESB to certify Jessen as a qualified law enforcement officer.7 In a letter dated December 9, 1974,8 the Enforcement Stan*479dards Board denied certification advising the village that a conviction for a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, was a felony and that Jessen was, therefore, ineligible for employment as a law enforcement officer, pursuant to Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d). The village board did not accept the LESB’s determination and refused to comply with the Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d). Upon determining that Jessen had satisfactorily completed his six-month probationary period, the village hired him on a full-time basis beginning April 1, 1975.
In April of 1977, the LESB, having determined some three years earlier that Jessen’s felony convictions for misconduct in public office disqualified him for employment as a law enforcement officer pursuant to the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards (Wis. Adm; Code LES §2.01(1) (d)), demanded that the “mayor” (president) and board of trustees of Lyndon Station remove *480Jessen from his position as chief of police. On July 5, 1977, after the village had refused to comply with the LESB’s directive regarding the discharge of Jessen as police chief, the Law Enforcement Standards Board petitioned the circuit court for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel the village, its president and trustees, to terminate Jessen’s employment or, in the alternative, to show cause why they should not do so. In its return to the writ, the village alleged that it could not lawfully discharge Jessen because such action would be in violation of the prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of a felony conviction (sec. 111.82(5) (h), Stats., effective November 1, 1977), depriving Jessen of his constitutional right of due process and equal protection. The cause was thereafter scheduled for a hearing on the merits.
While this hearing was pending, the village trustees entered into a written contract with Jessen, setting forth that his employment was permanent and that he could only be removed for cause. Cause was defined as “misconduct or malfeasance occurring in his [Jessen’s] position as chief of police of the village, or physical or mental incapacity of such nature that Jessen is no longer able to perform the duties of chief of police.” The agreement also provided that Jessen “will not be removed from his employment except upon notice and hearing before an impartial decision-maker appointed by the village board.” The written contract was executed on May 29, 1978, some three years after Jessen was hired but was made effective “as of the 1st day of April, 1975.”
Following the hearing, the trial court ruled that the village had violated Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) in employing Jessen as its chief of police and entered a judgment and order granting the peremptory writ of mandamus directing the village and its board of trustees *481to remove Jessen from that position forthwith. The issuance of the writ was stayed pending an appeal to the court of appeals. The appellate court, in affirming the trial court, based its decision that the village was required to terminate Jessen’s employment upon Wis. Const., art. XIII, sec. 3 which prohibits persons who had been convicted of “infamous crimes” from holding “any office of trust, profit or honor in this state,”9 and ignored the Law Enforcement Standard prohibiting the employment of convicted felons as law enforcement officers. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals held that all felonies are infamous crimes within the meaning of this constitutional provision, and further, that the post of chief of police for a village is an office of “trust, profit or honor” and subject to the terms of Wis. Const, art. XIII, sec. 3. Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Lyndon Station Village, 98 Wis.2d 229, 238, 244-45, 295 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1980).
The following issues are presented for our review:
1. Is a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, a felony?
2. Did the creation of sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., by ch. 125, Laws of 1977, relating to discrimination in employment and licensing on the basis of arrest and conviction records invalidate or modify Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) ?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus?
I. Is a Violation of see. 9^6.12(4-), Stats. 1973, a Felony ?
The court of appeals, relying on the legislative history of the penalty for a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. *4821973, held that a violation of this law constituted a felony and the village has not specifically challenged this determination in this court. In the oral argument before this court, the village’s counsel appeared to concede that the offenses for which Jessen was convicted were felonies, stating “We acknowledge that the [sic] felony was committed.” Our decision in State ex rel. McDonald v. Douglas County Circuit Court, 100 Wis.2d 569, 302 N.W.2d 462 (1981), dictates affirmance of the appellate court’s conclusion that a violation of sec. 946.12 (4), Stats. 1973, constitutes a felony.
In McDonald, this court held that a violation of a statute which does not specify the place of imprisonment, and is punishable by confinement for not more than one year is a felony. McDonald, supra, at 580. We reached this result upon an application of secs. 939.60 (definition of a felony)10 and 973.02 (place of confinement where none is specified)11 Stats., to the penalty provision at issue. We noted that an offense that fails to provide a place of confinement but which authorizes a prison sentence of one year is punishable with imprisonment in the state prisons, pursuant to sec. 973.02, Stats., and is, therefore, a “felony” as defined in sec. 939.60. Ibid.
*483In McDonald, supra, at 577-581, we re-examined State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis.2d 609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966), and its progeny, and held that it is no longer necessary to engage in the legislative history analysis set forth therein when dealing with the question of whether an offense punishable with confinement of not more than one year and which fails to proscribe the institution of confinement is a felony or misdemeanor. In reviewing secs. 939.60 and 973.02, Stats., and analyzing the case law applicable thereto, we determined that the legislature intended that crimes failing to prescribe the place of imprisonment and punishable with incarceration for no more than one year, or a year or more, should be classified as felonies under these statutes. The analysis of the felony versus misdemeanor conflict adopted in McDonald was espoused in a dissent to Gaynon authored by Chief Justice CUR-RIE who stated that the classification statutes (sec. 939.60 and sec. 973.02) and the penalty provision of the offense in question were clear and unambiguous and should be applied because the legislature must be presumed to have enacted the classification statutes with full knowledge of and with reference to existing law:
“ ‘The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. As said in 82 C. J.S., Statutes, p. 794, sec. 362 “All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it; . . . they are therefore to be construed in connection with and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, that is, they are to be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which they form a part. So the meaning and effect of statutes are to be determined in connection, not only with the common law, . . . and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes, . . .” ’ ” Id. at 625.
*484In arguing before the court of appeals, relying on Gaynon and its progeny, the village contended that a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973,12 was only a misdemeanor for it was punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than one year with no place of. imprisonment specified. This court rendered the McDonald decision some months after the date of oral argument in the appellate court. Thus, we hold that anyone convicted of a violation of sec. 946.12 (4), Stats. 1973, when read in conjunction with sec. 973.02, is punishable with confinement in the state prisons and, therefore, a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, constitutes a felony. McDonald, supra; sec. 939.60.
II. Effect of Sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., on Wis. Adm. Code LES §2,01 (1) (d).
•The village contends that the other issue in this case is whether the Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) is in conflict with ch. 125 of the Laws of 1977. Lyndon Station asserts that the aforementioned administrative rule (LES §2.01(1) (d)) conflicts with sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., as the administrative rule prohibits the employment of nonpardoned felons in the field of law enforcement and should be rendered invalid. Whereas sec. III.32(5) (h) prohibits employment and licensing discrimination on the basis of a conviction record unless the circumstances of the offense committed are substantially related to the duties and responsibilities attending the particular position to which the applicant aspires. See: sec. 111.32(5) (h)2, a. Thus, we are called upon to determine whether Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01 *485(1) (d) can be harmonized with sec. 111.32(5) (h), when dealing with the question of possible discrimination in the employment and licensing of a law enforcement officer previously convicted of a felony.
Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) provides :
“LES 2.01 Minimum qualifications for recruitment. (1) Before an individual may commence employment on a probationary, temporary, part-time, or full-time basis as a law enforcement officer, that individual must have met recruit qualifications established by the board. The minimum qualifications for recruitment shall be:
ii . . .
“(d) The applicant shall not have been convicted of any federal felony or of any offense which if committed in Wisconsin could be punished as a felony unless the applicant has been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon.”
This provision was adopted pursuant to the broad rule-making powers granted to the LESB by the legislature in sec. 165.85(1), (3) (a), (b)13 and (4) (c). Sec. 165.85 (4) (e) empowers the LESB to adopt rules specifying the minimum qualifications including character, educational and training standards which persons desiring employment as law enforcement officers must meet:
“(c) In addition to the requirements of par. (b),14 the board may, by rule, fix such other minimum qualifi*486cations for the employment of law enforcement officers as relate to the competence and reliability of persons to assume and discharge the responsibilities of law enforcement officers, and the board shall prescribe the means for presenting evidence of fulfillment of these requirements.”
Further, the legislature has granted the Enforcement Standards Board the power of certification, sec. 165.85 (3) (c), Stats.,15 and expressly mandated that no person shall receive a permanent appointment as a law enforcement officer in the absence of the LESB’s certification that such person is qualified to serve in that capacity, sec. 165.85(4) (b),16 and entrusted the LESB with the responsibility of ensuring that law enforcement officers in this state are minimally qualified in terms of professional character, education and training:
“ (1) Findings and Policy. The legislature finds that the administration of criminal justice is of state-wide concern, and that law enforcement work is of vital importance to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this state and is of such a nature as to require training, education and the establishment of standards of a proper professional character. It is in the public interest that such standards be established and that such training and education be made available to persons who *487seek to become law enforcement officers, persons who are serving as such officers in a temporary or probationary capacity and persons already in regular service.” Sec. 165.85(1), Stats.
Surely, an administrative rule prohibiting persons convicted of felonies from receiving appointments as law enforcement officers is designed to insure that only those who possess proper professional character, education and training are appointed to protect and promote the health, welfare and safety of the people of this state.
We turn how to a discussion of sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., effective November 1, 1977, which “prohibits discrimination in employment, membership or licensing on the basis of arrest or conviction record . . . [unless] . . . the subject of the conviction is substantially related to the ability of the person to perform the job or licensed activity.”17
Sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., provides in part:
“. . . It is discrimination because of arrest record or conviction record:18
“2. For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or employment agency to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any person, or to bar or terminate any person from employment, membership or licensing, or to discriminate against any person in promotion, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, membership or licensing, or otherwise to discriminate against any person because such person has an arrest record or a conviction record; provided, however, that it shall not be unlawf ul:
*488 ((
“b. For an employer or licensing agency to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any person who has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.”
The parties do not dispute that the LESB is considered a “licensing agency”19 within the purview of sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., as it has the exclusive power and responsibility in this state to certify persons as being qualified for employment as law enforcement officers. Next, we reach the question, Is Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) in conflict with the above-quoted statute?
According to Josam Mfg. Co. v. State Board of Health, 26 Wis.2d 587, 596, 183 N.W.2d 301 (1965), this administrative rule has the force and effect of law and the village in its briefs and arguments to this court does not contend otherwise:
“ ‘Rules, regulations, and general orders enacted by administrative agencies pursuant to the powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law, ...’ 2 Am. Jur. (2d), Administrative Law, p. 119, sec. 292.”
In Josam, this court further stated:
“In Thomson v. Racine (1943), 242 Wis. 591, 9 N.W. (2d) 91, it was held that commission orders are superior to. municipal ordinances, where the two conflict. Commission rules, established within the jurisdiction of a commission, have the effect of public law. The court said, at page 597: ‘. . . the legislative control, either directly or through its designated administrative body, is superior to any conflicting action of the legislative body of the municipality.’ ” Id. at 596.
*489The municipality (village), through its legislative body (board of trustees), has acted in violation of an administrative rule in hiring a law enforcement officer who has been denied certification by the LESB. Thus, the rule of Thomson v. Racine, 242 Wis. 591, 9 N.W.2d 91 (1943), quoted in Josam, is applicable here and the administrative rule having the force and effect of law is superior to any conflicting action of the village.
As a corollary to the rule that validly enacted administrative rules are given the effect of law, it is generally accepted that the rules and regulations of administrative agencies are subject to the same principles of construction as apply to the construction of statutes and, in this case, the applicable rule is that conflicts between statutes should be harmonized when possible:
“In order to carry out the intent of the framers of an administrative rule or regulation, the court should harmonize the various parts and provisions of such rule or regulation and give them effect, if possible, provided this may be done without violating constitutional and statutory provisions . . .
“An administrative rule should ordinarily be given that construction which will, if possible, sustain its validity, and, where alternative interpretations of an administrative rule or regulation are possible, the more reasonable of the two is to be chosen, . . 73 C.J.S. Public Adm. Bodies & Procedure, §105 at 426 (1951).
and:
“Perhaps the first rule of construction as to administrative rules and regulations is that rules made in the exercise of a power delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.
“The second rule is that generally the same rules of construction and interpretation govern the construction and interpretation of rules and regulations of administrative agencies as apply to statutes in the same field. . . .
*490“. . . An administrative construction of the agency’s own regulations is controlling in determining their meaning unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. ...” 2 Am. Jur.2d, Adm. Law §307 at 135-36 (1962).
Thus, according to the cardinal rule of statutory construction :
“. . . that conflicts between different statutes, by implication or otherwise, are not favored and will not be held to exist if they may otherwise be reasonably construed.” (citations omitted). Strong v. Milwaukee, 38 Wis.2d 564, 570, 157 N.W.2d 619 (1968).
and that:
“Construction of statutes should be done in a way which harmonizes the whole system of law of which they are a part, and any conflict should be reconciled if possible.” Muskego-Norway C.S.J.S.D. No. 9 v. W.E.R.B., 35 Wis.2d 540, 556, 151 N.W.2d 617 (1967). See also: Glinski v. Sheldon, 88 Wis.2d 509, 519, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979); Kramer v. Hayward, 57 Wis.2d 302, 311, 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973); State v. Duffy, 54 Wis.2d 61, 64, 194 N.W.2d 624 (1972).
the Law Enforcement Standard (Wis. Adm Code LES §2.01(1) (d), and sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., insofar as they seem inconsistent and relate to the same subject matter (conviction record as a ground for disqualification from employment or licensing) should be harmonized.
As noted, the legislature, with the enactment of sec. 165.85, Stats., has entrusted the LESB with the responsibility of establishing “minimum qualifications for the employment of law enforcement officers as relate to the competence and reliability of persons to assume and discharge the responsibilities of law enforcement officers.” Sec. 165.85(4) (c). The LESB in accordance with its delegated authority to establish minimum qualifications for persons seeking employment as law enforcement officers promulgated Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) *491prohibiting nonpardoned felons from serving as law enforcement officers. The legislature, when creating sec. 111.32(5) (h), in 1977, is presumed to have acted with full knowledge of this provision of the administrative code adopted in 1970. See: e.g., Kindy v. Hayes, 44 Wis.2d 301, 314, 171 N.W.2d 324 (1969) (holding that the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of the existing law, including an administrative rule that was involved in a prior decision). Indeed, the fact that the legislature, when enacting ch. 125, Laws of 1977, made the licensing criteria of a number of licensing and examining boards of both professional and trade groups subject to the provisions of sec. 111.32(5) (h), e.g., the examining board of architects and engineers, together with the barber and cosmetologists examining boards and the department of regulation and licensing of private detectives, investigators, watchmen and security guards, etc., is a strong indication that the legislature was cognizant that a felony conviction was, before the enactment of this legislation, a ground for denial or revocation of various licenses, including a Law Enforcement Standards Board certification.
Sec. 111.32(5) (h)2, b, expressly states that licensing (certification) discrimination on the basis of a conviction record does not violate this statute when the circumstances of the conviction “substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity:”
“... . [I] t shall not be unlawful:
“b. For an employer or licensing agency to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any person who has been convicted of any felony . . . the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.”
Thus, it is obvious that the statute, sec. 111.32(5) (h), modifies the administrative rule, LES §2.01(1) (d).
*492Jessen was convicted of misconduct in public office on 26 felony counts of falsifying uniform traffic citations. As a police officer for the village, Jessen would be charged with enforcing the traffic laws. See: secs. 61.31(2) Stats. Thus, under the facts of this case, it can hardly be said that the circumstances of the offense for which Jessen was convicted fail to meet the substantial relationship exception to the prohibition against employment and licensing discrimination on the basis of a conviction record set forth in sec. 111.32(5) (h) 2 b, Stats., as common sense dictates that a conviction of the felony of misconduct in public office for falsifying traffic tickets certainly bears a substantial relationship to the duties of a police officer who is called upon to issue traffic citations. Therefore, when reading sec. 111.32(5) (h), in conjunction with sec. 165.85(4) (c) (empowering the LESB to promulgate minimum competency and reliability qualifications for employment of law enforcement officers) and Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) when dealing with the certification and employment of a law enforcement officer, we hold that the circumstances of Jessen’s convictions for falsifying uniform traffic citations substantially relate to his duties as police chief for the village of Lyndon Station and thus is barred from holding a law enforcement position in Wisconsin. Further, we hold that Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d), as modified herein, and sec. 111.32 (5) (h), are not in conflict.
Public trust in the integrity of our law enforcement officials is essential to the preservation of the public peace and for the enforcement of laws and ordinances. This trust and confidence is shaken by casting even the slightest suspicion against the professional character and integrity of a police chief. If the state authorities through our court system have convicted someone of 26 *493felonies, it stands to reason that his effectiveness as a law enforcement officer will be greatly diminished. What impression would be given to an impartial jury when the police chief, as the prosecution’s primary witness in a serious criminal case, has to explain on cross-examination that he stands convicted of 26 felonies? We agree with the LESB that employment of a non-pardoned felon in a law enforcement capacity would only serve to undermine the public’s trust in its police officers as well as the ability of such persons to adequately perform the duties of officers of the law.
Mandamus
This court in Miller v. Smith, 100 Wis.2d 609, 621, 622, 302 N.W.2d 468 (1981), set forth the standard of review and the criteria governing the issuance of a writ of mandamus as follows:
“A writ of mandamus is a discretionary writ in that it lies within the sound discretion of the trial court to either grant or deny. The trial judge’s actions in either granting or denying the writ will be affirmed unless the trial judge abused his discretion. Morrissette v. DeZonia, 63 Wis.2d 429, 434, 217 N.W.2d 377 (1974); State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, supra n. 11 at 375-76. This court has set forth the following prerequisites for the issuance of the writ:
“ . . a clear legal right; the duty sought to be enforced is positive and plain; the applicant for the writ shows that he will be substantially damaged by nonperformance. of such duty; and there is no other adequate specific legal remedy for the threatened injury, and no laches on the part of such applicant, and no special reasons exist rendering a resort on his part to the remedy, under the circumstances, inequitable. . . .’ Burns v. City of Madison, 92 Wis.2d 232, 243, 248 N.W.2d 631 (1979) quoting from State ex rel. Johnson v. County Court, 41 Wis.2d 188, 192, 163 N.W.2d 6 (1968) and Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489, 493, 71 N.W. 880 (1897).”
*494It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to issue the writ when the noted prerequisites are present: (1) a clear legal right; (2) a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and (4) no other adequate remedy at law. Neu v. Voege, supra. Further, “ ‘ [m] andamus is the proper remedy to compel public officers to perform duties arising out of their office and presently due to be performed.’ ” (cite omitted) Walter Laev v. Karns, 40 Wis.2d 114, 118, 161 N.W.2d 227 (1968) and State ex rel. Portage Co. D. Dist. v. Newby, 169 Wis. 208, 213, 171 N.W. 953 (1919); provided, however, the duty to act must be clear and unequivocal. On the other hand, “It is an abuse of discretion to compel action through mandamus when the duty is not clear and unequivocal and requires the exercise of discretion.” (Cites omitted.) Burns, supra, at 239.
The village contends that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the writ of mandamus without making a specific finding that Jessen’s discharge would not be unjust or inequitable. It cites 52 Am. Jur.2d, Mandamus §40 (1970), for the proposition that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the writ of mandamus without specifically considering “the urgency of the situation, the equities of the parties, the efficacy or futility of the writ if issued, the public policy or interests that may be involved and the question whether, if issued, the writ will promote substantial justice or on the contrary cause injustice, hardship or oppression.” Id. at 365-66.
In answer to this claim, we note that compelling the removal of Jessen was urgent and promoted substantial justice as well as furthered public policy for, as previously stated, allowing one who stands convicted of the felony of misconduct in public office for falsifying traffic citations to serve in a law enforcement capacity seri*495ously undermines the public’s trust in its police officers as well as such person’s ability to adequately perform the duties and responsibilities of law enforcement officers.
Further, although a court, in exercising its discretion to grant or deny the writ, should consider all the facts and circumstances, including those referred to in 52 Am. Jur.2d, Mandamus, §40 (1970), we note that the section of Am. Jur. referenced by the village does temper the court’s reliance on the noted factors in exercising its discretion in the following language:
“However, discretion should not be so exercised as to defeat rights clearly recognized and supported by established principles of law. Thus, judicial discretion should not be exercised to withhold the writ of mandamus to enforce a clear right conferred by statute, where no other remedy is available to secure such right, for the law and the right are imperative upon the court. To deny the writ in such case would amount to judicial assumption of legislative prerogatives; it would tend to emasculate or annul legislation and savor of judicial government.
“It is held that if all of the requisites to issuance of the writ are shown to be present the granting of the writ is a matter of right, but, conversely, the granting of the writ may be an abuse of discretion if the relator does not show a right to the relief requested.” Id. at 366.
The rule alluded to in this provision of Am. Jur., namely, that it is an abuse of discretion to withhold the writ when it is sought to enforce a clear right conferred by statute and when other remedies are inadequate to secure that right was set forth by this court in State ex rel. Dempsey v. Wena A.F. Co., 173 Wis. 651, 654, 182 N.W. 354 (1921), where it held that when a party seeks to enforce a right conferred by statute:
“. . . courts cannot withhold the writ of mandamus to enforce that right without thwarting the legislative will. *496Judicial discretion should not be exercised to withhold the writ of mandamus to enforce a clear right conferred by statute when no other remedy is available to secure such right. To do so amounts to judicial assumption of legislative prerogative, emasculates or annuls legislative enactments, and savors of judicial government.”
This rule is applicable to properly enacted administrative rules as they have the force and effect of law. J.osam, sur-pra.
The legislature has authorized the Law Enforcement Standards Board to prescribe minimum qualifications which persons aspiring to employment as law enforcement officers must meet. Jessen stands convicted of felonies related to his employment and as such is ineligible to serve as a police officer in this state. Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d). The village hired him as its chief of police in 1974 despite being informed that such action would be violative of LES §2.01(1) (d), and further, made his employment in such capacity permanent notwithstanding the legislative mandate that “No person may be appointed as a law enforcement officer . . . unless the person . . . has been certified by the board [LESB] as being qualified to be a law enforcement officer.” Sec. 165.85(4) (b), Stats. Thus, the Law Enforcement Standards Board has demonstrated a clear legal right to have Jessen removed from his position as police chief and that the village of Lyndon Station had a clear and unequivocal duty to discharge him. The village’s duty to terminate Jessen’s employment as its chief of police was mandatory, Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) and sec. 165.85(4) (b), and the village has never claimed that there is some other legal remedy, aside from mandamus, to adequately enforce the LESB’s right. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court properly issued the writ of mandamus. Nue v. Voege, supra.
*497The village has also challenged Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) and the issuance of the writ of mandamus herein on the grounds that they have caused a denial of Jessen’s constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. We do not reach these issues as well as the question of whether Wis. Const, art. XIII, sec. 3, presents a bar to Jessen’s employment as police chief for Lyndon Station as our determinations that the enforcement of Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) where the circumstances of the crime substantially relate to the circumstances of Jessen’s employment as chief of police, and that the village employed Jessen in violation of the provisions of sec. 165.85(4) (b), Stats, (requiring LESB certification as a condition precedent to the hiring of a law enforcement officer on a permanent basis) are dis-positive.
Although we do not reach the question of whether Jessen was subject to removal from his position as police chief under the provisions of Wis. Const, art. XIII, sec. 3, we disavow the appellate court’s language and ruling that all felonies constitute “infamous crimes” within the parameters of this constitutional provision.
By the Court. — The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
The decision of the court of appeals is reported at 98 Wis.2d 229, 295 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1980).
The LESB was created for the purpose of certifying only qualified persons for employment in law enforcement positions and for establishing minimum educational and training standards for persons seeking employment as law enforcement officers as well as to establish minimum curriculum requirements for the training of law enforcement recruits or officers. See: sec. 165.85, Stats.
Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (Feb. 1981) provides in part:
“LES 2.01 Minimum qualifications for recruitment. (1) Before an individual may commence employment on a probationary, temporary, part-time, or full-time basis as a law enforcement officer, that individual must have met recruit qualifications established by the board. The minimum qualifications for recruitment shall be:
“(d) The applicant shall not have been convicted of any federal felony or of any offense which if committed in Wisconsin could be punished as a felony unless the applicant has been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon.”
This rule became effective on October 1, 1970. See: Wis. Adm. Register, Sept., 1970, No. 177. As originally adopted, it applied to all convicted felons regardless of whether they had received a pardon. The language exempting felons who have received absolute and unconditional pardons from the prohibitive scope of this rule was added in 1975 and became effective on February 1st of that year. See: Wis. Adm. Register, Jan., 1975, No. 229.
Sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1978, provides:
“Misconduct in public office. Any public officer or public employe who does any of the following may be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year or both:
“(4) In his capacity as such officer or employe, makes an entry in an account or record book or return, certificate, report or statement which in a material respect he intentionally falsifies;”
See: Jessen v. State, 95 Wis.2d 207, 209, 290 N.W.2d 685 (1980).
The Juneau county district attorney’s letter provided in part:
“July 30, 1972
“Mr. William Jessen
515 Division St.
Mauston, Wisconsin
“Dear Mr. Jessen:
“Tomorrow morning the executive committee of the Juneau County Board of Supervisors will he signing a criminal complaint charging you with one count of felony embezzlement* of $2,524.00 and 26 misdemeanor counts of misconduct in public office.
“Very truly yours,
/S/ RICHARD C. KELLEY
“Richard C. Kelley
“District Attorney”
The letter authored by the judge recited:
*478“September 12, 1972
“Mr. Everett Stark
Clerk of Courts
Juneau County Courthouse
Mauston, Wisconsin
“Re: State vs. William Jessen
Dear Mr. Stark:
“If there be no objection entered within eight days from this date from Mr. Richard Kelley representing the State of Wisconsin or Mr. William Skemp representing William Jessen, the misdemeanor charges in the complaint are ordered transferred with the felony charge to Circuit Court for arraignment and trial.
“Very truly yours,
/S/ THOMAS H. BARLAND
“Thomas H. Barland
“County Judge, Branch I”
It must be noted that the jury found Jessen not guilty of the felony embezzlement charge referred to in the letters and acquitted him of the same.
No person may receive a permanent appointment to a law enforcement position without certification from the LESB stating that he or she is qualified to serve as a law enforcement officer in this state. Sec. 165.85(4) (c), Stats. One who has been convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in this state is ineligible for employment as a police officer, pursuant to Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) and therefore cannot be certified as being qualified to serve in that capacity.
This letter provided in part:
“December 9,1974
“The Honorable John Adams
Mayor
Lyndon Station, Wisconsin 53944
“Dear Mayor:
“I have been requested by the administrator of the Division of Law Enforcement Services of the Wisconsin Department of Justice to write you in regard to the information received from you in reference to Mr. William G. Jessen. He has asked that I discuss two specific items contained in the application for enrollment for training and your accompanying letter dated November 27, 1974.
*479“You further state in your letter that Mr. Jessen stands convicted of 26 counts of misconduct in public office contrary to see. 946.12, Stats., which you state are misdemeanors. We respectfully advise that a violation of sec. 946.12, Stats., is a felony.
“Therefore it is the position of the Law Enforcement Standards Board that Mr. Jessen is ineligible for employment on a probationary, temporary, part-time, or full time basis as a law enforcement officer by virtue of the disqualification contained in Wisconsin Administrative Code, section LES 2.01(1) (d).
“Yours truly,
/S/ JAMES C. McKAY, JR.
“James C. McKay, Jr.
“Assistant Attorney General”
The court of appeals erroneously struck this letter from the record on motion of the village on the ground that it was not contained in the record when, in fact, it was and is in the record at page M-2 attached to a “request to admit” made on the village’s behalf. See: Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Lyndon Station Village, 98 Wis.2d 229, 233, 295 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1980).
Wis. Const, art. XIII, sec. 3 provides in part:
“Eligibility to office . . . [N]o person convicted of any infamous crime in any court within the United States . . . shall he eligible to any office of trust, profit or honor in this state.”
Sec. 939.60, Stats., provides:
“Felony and misdemeanor defined. A crime punishable by imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons is a felony. Every other crime is a misdemeanor.”
Sec. 973.02, Stats., provides:
“Place of imprisonment when none expressed. When a statute authorizes imprisonment for its violation hut does not prescribe the place of imprisonment, 1) a sentence of less than one year shall be to the county jail, 2) a sentence of more than one year shall be to the Wisconsin state prisons and the minimum under the indeterminate sentence law shall be one year, and 3) a sentence of one year may be to either the Wisconsin state prisons or the county jail. But in any proper case sentence and commitment may nevertheless be to the department or any house of correction or other institution as provided by law.”
A violation of this statute is presently designated as a Class E felony. Sec. 946.12, Stats.
These paragraphs of see. 165.85, Stats., provide:
“(3) POWERS. The board may:
“(a) Promulgate rules for the administration of this section including the authority to require the submission of reports and information pertaining to the administration of this section by law enforcement agencies in this state.
“(b) Establish minimum educational and training standards for admission to employment as a law enforcement officer: 1) in permanent positions, and 2) in temporary, probationary or part-time status.”
Sub. (4) (b) contains the statutory minimum requirements of a law enforcement training curriculum.
Sec. 165.85(3) (c), Stats., provides:
“(3) Powers. The board may:
“(e) Certify persons as being qualified under this section to be law enforcement officers.”
Sec. 165.85(4) (b), Stats., provides in part:
“(4) Required STANDARDS.
“(b) No person may be appointed as a law enforcement officer, except on a temporary or probationary basis, unless the person has satisfactorily completed a preparatory program of law enforcement training approved by the board and has been certified by the board as being qualified to be a law enforcement officer. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) There are two exceptions to the certification requirement, neither of which are applicable to Jessen. See: sec. 165.85(4) (a), Stats.
Analysis of the Legislative Reference Bureau regarding the 1977 Assembly Bill No. 219 which ultimately became ch. 125, Laws of 1977.
“Conviction record” is defined as including “. . . but is not limited to, information indicating that a person has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense, placed on probation, fined, imprisoned or paroled pursuant to any law enforcement or military authority.” Sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats.
See: Sec. 227.01(1), (3) and (4), Stats., defining “agency”, “license” and “licensing” for the purposes of administrative procedure and review.