concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority concerning the two issues presented by Sand Creek. However, I dissent to its resolution of the issue concerning prejudgment interest raised in the cross-appeal.
As the majority acknowledges, the Indiana rule permits the award of prejudgment interest where the damages are liquidated, including instances where they may be determined by mere mathematical computation.
• The damages were not liquidated in the present case. Instead, since the price was not specified in the contract found to exist, damages were the reasonable value of the services rendered. They were not ascertainable by mere computation. See, e.g., Travelers Indemnity Company v. Armstrong (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349, 365-66; Wilson v. Jenga Corp. (1986) Ind.App. 490 N.E.2d 375, 377. Neither the fact that CSO asserted by letter what it thought the value of the services to be, nor the fact that at the trial the parties were able to agree to a stipulation of reasonable value, alters in the slightest the unliquidated nature of the claim. Therefore the court correctly denied the claim for prejudgment interest.
*877I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.