In Re Marriage of Thurmond

JUSTICE THOMAS,

dissenting:

While I concur in the majority’s holding that it was an abuse of discretion to award petitioner nonminor child support on the basis that Alex was disabled, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring respondent to pay 70% of Alex’s educational expenses.

The determination of education expenses is within the trial court’s discretion. In re Marriage of Zukausky, 244 Ill. App. 3d 614, 623 (1993). A trial court abuses its discretion only when no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Puls, 268 Ill. App. 3d 882, 889 (1994). In determining the amount of an award for college education expenses, a trial court is to consider the financial resources of both parents, the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved, and the financial resources of the child. 750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 1996). As the majority opinion notes, it is clear that the trial court did consider all of the foregoing factors in entering its judgment. Because the trial court properly considered these factors, I believe that the trial court acted within its discretion.

In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, I find it significant that any problems in determining respondent’s financial resources were the result of respondent’s continued failure to comply with the trial court’s order that he produce his 1994, 1995, and 1996 income tax returns, his 1996 W-2 forms, and his most recent paycheck stub. The trial court stated that, in rendering its decision, it took the financial ability of both parties into account to the extent it had been furnished with information concerning their financial abilities. The court also stated that it looked at respondent’s net monthly income and considered information as to some additional, albeit minimal, income that respondent received for side jobs.

While it is true that a court should not order a party to pay more for educational expenses than he or she can afford (In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 552 (1986)), I find no evidence in the record that the trial court’s order would have such an effect. Respondent’s April 7, 1997, financial affidavit shows a weekly gross income of $942.31, with total deductions of $550.39, leaving take-home pay of $391.92. Included within the total deductions, however, was $150 in maintenance for petitioner, which the trial court discontinued, and $136 in child support for Alex. Using respondent’s financial affidavit, and even including the child support for Alex that we find was improperly awarded, respondent’s monthly shortfall is less than $200. Given the fact that some of respondent’s monthly expenses included payments toward credit card debt, which can be reduced, the fact that respondent does receive additional income from side jobs, and the fact that respondent receives rent deductions for work done to the home he rents, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. Consequently, I would affirm the trial court’s order that respondent pay 70% of Alex’s college expenses.