dissenting:
I join in Justice Rakowski’s dissent. I write separately only to stress the importance of our opinion. This decision, as pointed out, will have strong ramifications important to all involved in workers’ compensation, especially pro se claimants.
By this decision, the Commission will be permitted to ignore its responsibility mandatorily required by section 16 of the Act and section 7040.10 of the Administrative Code. We are introducing a new stumbling block, and as suggested by the dissent, transferring the statutory responsibility from the Commission to the parties.
Further support for the Commission’s order denying the motion to dismiss is found in the trial court’s finding that the section 19(b) time structures were inapplicable because of the parties’ stipulation forgoing any objection based upon the reporter’s failure to “complete or finish a transcript within the time fixed by law.”
The majority refers to Gould. In Gould, the supreme court, in discussing the obligations with respect to report of proceedings, made the statement:
“The requirement that the report should be filed within fifty days of the date of the award was left in the statute and governs as to all cases except where the failure to file the report of the proceedings has been caused by the failure of the reporter to furnish such report, and not the neglect of the party seeking the review.” Gould, 311 Ill. at 477-78.
We are reweighing the evidence presented to the Commission. The disposition discusses the diligence issue on the part of the appellant. There was a timely request for review and transcript. The Commission had the responsibility to furnish the transcript. The court reporter was an employee of the Commission per section 16 of the Act.
The Commission in a specific order denied the motion to dismiss. Its order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence or an abuse of discretion. Our decision will be adding a new requirement by judicial edict.
One other matter needs to be addressed. The majority states that “The timely filing of such statement of facts or transcript is a prerequisite to the Commission’s obtaining jurisdiction” (306 Ill. App. 3d at 1075), and in the next paragraph, “Contreras does not argue that the Commission lacked jurisdiction ***” (306 Ill. App. 3d at 1076). Can we ignore a question of jurisdiction even if not argued by the parties? The answer is no. Apparently the effect of this decision is that there is no issue pertaining to jurisdiction.