delivered the opinion of the court:
In August 2004, defendant, Mildred L. Laugharn, filed a petition under section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2— 1401 (West 2004)), seeking to set aside her November 1996 first-degree-murder conviction (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(a)(1) (West 1996)). In September 2004, the trial court sua sponte dismissed defendant’s petition as untimely filed.
Defendant appealed, arguing only that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of her section 2 — 1401 petition was error. Specifically, she contended that the trial court lacked authority to take that action. This court disagreed and affirmed. People v. Laugharn, No. 4 — 04— 0846 (August 1, 2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
On September 26, 2007, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal but directed this court to vacate our judgment and to reconsider it in light of People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). People v. Laugharn, 225 Ill. 2d 656, 873 N.E.2d 936 (2007) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal). In accordance with the supreme court’s directions, we vacate our earlier judgment and reconsider it in light of Vincent to determine whether a different result is warranted.
In Vincent, the supreme court wrote that “[t]he question raised in this case was whether a trial court may dispose of a properly served section 2 — 1401 petition without benefit of responsive pleadings and without giving the petitioner notice of the impending ruling and the opportunity to address the court prior to the ruling.” Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 5, 871 N.E.2d at 21. The supreme court ultimately held that a trial court possesses the authority to dispose of a properly served section 2 — 1401 petition sua sponte without a responsive pleading. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13, 871 N.E.2d at 26. The supreme court further held that when a trial court “enters either a judgment on the pleadings or a dismissal in a section 2 — 1401 proceeding, that order will be reviewed, on appeal, de novo.” Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 18, 871 N.E.2d at 28. See People v. Ryburn, 378 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976-78 (2008) (in which this court recently discussed the supreme court’s decision in Vincent at some length).
After reconsidering our earlier judgment in light of Vincent to determine whether a different result is warranted, we again conclude that the trial court correctly ruled against defendant sua sponte, dismissing her petition with prejudice. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.