dissenting:
I join in Justice Bilandic’s dissent. Like Justice Bilandic, I believe that a determination to hold a public hearing is an action of the Board. Pursuant to section 1A — 7 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1A — 7 (West 1996)), “5 votes are necessary for any action of the Board to become effective.” The majority holds that five members of the Board must find that a complaint is not filed on justifiable grounds in order for the Board to dismiss the complaint. However, the majority holds that the Board is not required to find that a complaint is filed on justifiable grounds in order to proceed to a hearing. Thus, one action of the Board, a determination that a complaint is not filed on justifiable grounds and must be dismissed, requires five votes to become effective, whereas another action of the Board, a determination that a complaint is filed on justifiable grounds and merits a public adjudicative hearing, does not require a vote. The majority’s holding ignores the plain language of section 1A — 7, which mandates five votes for any action of the Board to become effective. I believe that the majority is mistaken in its selective application of section 1A — 7.
I also believe that the legislative history supports Justice Bilandic’s position. As originally conceived, the Board consisted of four members appointed by the Governor. The speaker of the House of Representatives, the House Minority Leader, the President of the Senate and the Senate Minority Leader each designated two nominees to serve on the Board. The Governor chose one member from the nominees designated by each leader. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, par. 1A — 3. Three members of the Board were necessary to constitute a quorum and a majority of the members voting was necessary for any action of the Board to become effective. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, par. 1A — 7. Since the membership of the Board was divided equally between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, any action of the Board required the votes of two members of one party, plus the vote of one member of the opposite party.
In 1974, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 1568 as Public Act 78 — 1183.2 See Pub. Act 78 — 1183, eff. September 3, 1974. Public Act 78 — 1183 amended the Code, adding thereto article 9, “Disclosure of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures.” As introduced in the General Assembly, Senate Bill 1568 contained the following provision:
“Sec. 9 — 19. Any person who believes a violation of this Article has occurred may file a formal complaint with the Board, in a manner prescribed by the Board. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Board shall expeditiously make an investigation of the matter complained of.” 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 1568, 1974 Sess.
Various legislators proposed amendments to Senate Bill 1568. Senate amendment 9 reflected the concerns of members of the General Assembly that the Board might be used as a forum in which baseless complaints are filed against a candidate and/or a political committee associated with the candidate during the course of an election:
“Partee: ‘Amendment No. 9 is an amendment which Senator Roe has seen which is just an extension of the concept for what to do when a complaint is filed during a campaign. And, this amendment simply says that the Board shall neither accept nor publicize a complaint unless three members believe that a reasonable basis exists for making an initial determination if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the complaint can be verified. Now what we seek to do here is the same kind of thing they do in the Judicial Inquiry Board and many other of our statutory areas where complaints are filed. And, so that you can keep scurrilous complaints from being filed for the purpose of publicity, the three members of the Board must first make a determination that there is some reasonable basis for it. And, that fact is suppressed so that nobody files against you simply because he’s looking for a newspaper headline three or four days before the election. I think, I state the fact correctly when I say that there is acceptance of this amendment. Is that right Senator Roe?’ ” 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 6, 1974, at 205-06 (statement of Senator Partee).
Representative Shea proposed a similar amendment in the House. The following exchange then took place:
“Shea: ‘Bill, I’ll tell you what my problem is and perhaps when Returns is drawing another Amendment he can put this one in it and that it’s very easy to make accusations and it’s the accusation that hits the front page; it’s the accusation that makes the big dent and then when and [if] I prove or somebody proves that they’re right, you find it someplace back buried and the damage has been done. Now all I want to do is protect people. I want to say if somebody wants to make [an] accusation against [you] before we start publicizing it, before we make it public knowledge, let’s find out if there is, in fact, some basis to that complaint.’
Collins: ‘I couldn’t agree with you more as far as it goes, Jerry. However, I do think we’re opening our sel [yes] up for criticism that it is our desire right from the start to conduct things in secret and I just, I don’t think [it’s] a good idea. If we can achieve. . . If we can achieve what you desire and phrase it differently, I don’t know ah. . . maybe we could get together on this. ***’ ***
Shea: ‘*** All I want to do is insure that you’re not going to do to the Members of this House, to other political candidates, just open up another avenue to blast them and then don’t give them a chance to respond in kind.’ ” 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 11, 1974, at 37-38 (statements of Representatives Shea and Collins). Senate Bill 1568 was redrafted to address these
concerns. The version of Senate Bill 1568 adopted by the Legislature contains the following provisions.
“§ 9 — 20. Any person who believes a violation of this Article has occurred may file a verified complaint with the Board. ***
* * *
§ 9 — 21. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Board shall hold a closed preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the complaint appears to have been filed on justifiable grounds. Such closed preliminary hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable after affording reasonable notice, a copy of the complaint, and an opportunity to testify at such hearing to both the person making the complaint and the person against whom the complaint is directed.
^ ^ $
§ 9 — 26. ***
Willful filing of a false complaint under this Article shall constitute a Class B misdemeanor.” Pub. Act 78 — 1183, §§ 9 — 20, 9 — 21, 9 — 26, eff. September 3, 1974.
The redrafted version of Senate Bill 1568 made it more difficult to file a false complaint against a candidate. By requiring that a complaint be verified, and criminalizing the filing of a false complaint, the legislature sent a message that the filing of a false complaint would not be tolerated. By requiring that the Board hold a closed preliminary hearing on a complaint, the legislature sent a message that a false complaint would not be publicized by the Board. The Board would not be used as a forum to attack candidates during the course of an election.
A House debate on July 1, 1974, illustrates the concerns of the members of the General Assembly, and how the redrafted version of Senate Bill 1568 addressed those concerns. Representative Murphy gave a hypothetical regarding a letter that is sent via registered mail, return receipt requested, which does not contain a cash contribution as claimed by the sender:
“Murphy: ‘But how would you prove that that’s a false complaint, though, that’s what I’m saying?’
Collins: ‘Well, how, how [sic] would he prove this...’ Murphy: ‘Circumstantial evidence, he withdrew the money, he got a receipt that you accepted, the letter..... It’s a dangerous area, that’s all I’m saying.’
Collins: ‘Perhaps, of course the State Board of Elections would have a preliminary hearing in a closed session on something like this and long before it ever got near a court it would be heard and considered by the State Board of Elections.’ ” 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, July 1, 1974, at 45 (statements of Representatives Murphy and Collins).
In 1978, the General Assembly changed the membership of the Board from four members to eight members (10 ILCS 5/1A — 2 (West 1996)), changed the quorum requirement from three members to five members of the Board and inserted the requirement that five votes are necessary for any action of the Board to become effective (10 ILCS 5/1A — 7 (West 1996)). Section 9 — 18 (10 ILCS 5/9 — 18 (West 1996)) was amended in 1979 to change from three to five the number of votes required for the Board to issue a subpoena in the process of an investigation, inquiry or hearing.3 Thus, the amendment reflected the changes in the Board membership and voting require-merits. In the Senate debates Senator Rock described the changes that the amendment would effectuate:
“Rock: ‘Thank you, Mr. President. House Bill 1914 makes, I think, three or four important changes to the Election Code as we know it. *** [A]nd thirdly, it mandates or calls upon the State Board of Election to have hearings to require five members instead of three.’ ” 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 1, 1979, at 186-87 (statement of Senator Rock).
Senator Rock’s statement reflects the legislature’s belief that five votes are required in order for the Board to hold a public hearing and to issue subpoenas for such a hearing.
I believe the legislature intended that the Board hold a closed preliminary hearing, followed by a determination that the complaint has been filed on justifiable grounds prior to holding a public hearing. Requiring that the Board determine that the complaint has been filed on justifiable grounds is consonant with the concerns expressed by the members of the General Assembly. On the other hand, holding, as the majority does, that the Board is required to proceed to a public hearing on a complaint without a determination that the complaint is based on justifiable grounds completely ignores the concerns of the members of the General Assembly. As an example, a baseless complaint, filed against a candidate in an election year, may proceed to a public hearing simply because the Board, split along party lines, cannot garner the five votes required to dismiss the complaint. The effect of the majority’s holding is to defer, but not foreclose, a public airing of a baseless complaint.
In his special concurrence, Justice Rathje gives a hypothetical of a verified complaint filed against a Republican candidate which, under the majority’s holding, proceeds to a public hearing despite the opposition of Republican members of the Board. Justice Rathje believes that a public hearing is the correct outcome and “ensures that the public policies that inspired the Board are vindicated.” 188 Ill. 2d at 77. However, consider the case where the verified complaint is not based on justifiable grounds. The Republican members of the Board oppose the complaint, and justly so. The complaint proceeds to a public hearing at which baseless charges are leveled against the Republican candidate, severely damaging his campaign days before the election. I believe the members of the General Assembly did not intend that the Board become a forum in which complaints, not based on justifiable grounds, are “filed for the purpose of publicity.”
In arriving at its holding today, it seems that the majority has read section 9 — 21 of the Code in isolation. It is generally recognized that sections of a code are to be construed in reference to one another in order to give harmonious meaning to the act as a whole. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992); Matter v. Chicago Board of Education, 82 Ill. 2d 373, 389 (1980). Section 1A — 7 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/1A — 7 (West 1996)) requires five votes for any action of the Board to become effective. Additionally, the fact that five votes are required to issue subpoenas (10 ILCS 5/9 — 18 (West 1996)) is an indication that the Board must determine, by five affirmative votes, that a complaint is filed on justifiable grounds and merits a public adjudicative hearing.
There are further problems with the majority’s holding which I must highlight. First, the majority remands this cause for a public adjudicative hearing; however, the Board may find it impossible to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at such a hearing. In the present case four members of the Board voted to find that the complaints were filed on justifiable grounds and the Board should hold public adjudicative hearings. Three members of the Board voted to find that the complaints were not filed on justifiable grounds and should be dismissed. Will the Board find the five votes necessary to issue subpoenas? If it does not, will the Board be able to hold a meaningful adjudicative hearing?
Second, the majority’s holding deprives the Board of the discretion not to act on a complaint and is contrary to section 9 — 22 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/9 — 22 (West 1996)). Section 9 — 22 provides in part:
“Any party to a Board hearing, any person who files a complaint on which a hearing was denied or not acted upon within the time specified in Section 9 — 21 of this Act, and any party adversely affected by a judgment of the Board may obtain judicial review ***.” 10 ILCS 5/9 — 22 (West 1996).
Thus, section 9 — 22 affords administrative review to a person whose complaint is not acted upon or who is denied a hearing on a complaint. Since the majority requires that the Board hold a public adjudicative hearing on any complaint the Board fails to dismiss, the Board does not have the discretion to deny a public adjudicative hearing on a complaint. Consequently, the provision allowing administrative review of the denial of a hearing is superfluous. When a court engages in statutory construction, its sole task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998); Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). As noted above, sections of a code must be construed in reference to one another in order to give harmonious meaning to the act as a whole. Matter, 82 Ill. 2d at 389. The court should construe the statute, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Texaco, 182 Ill. 2d at 270. The majority’s ruling that the Board is required to hold public adjudicative hearings if it cannot determine that a complaint is not filed on justifiable grounds renders superfluous the provision for an appeal from a denial of a hearing.
Third, the majority opinion may be interpreted to say that the Board cannot dismiss a complaint on procedural grounds. The majority notes:
“At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing in the instant case, the Board failed to achieve a vote of five members to dismiss the complaints as not filed on justifiable grounds. For the reasons stated above, the complaints were then required to proceed to a public hearing. The Board thus lacked authority to enter its subsequent order dismissing the complaints without reaching their merits.” 188 Ill. 2d at 74-75.
Thus, the majority seems to foreclose the possibility that the Board might dismiss a complaint because the complaint is deficient, albeit filed on justifiable grounds.
The requirements for a complaint are found in section 9 — 20 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/9 — 20 (West 1996)). A complaint must be in writing, state the name of the candidate or chairman of the political committee against whom the complaint is directed, state the statutory provisions which are alleged to have been violated, state the time, place, and nature of the alleged offense, and be verified, dated and signed by the person filing the complaint. 10 ILCS 5/9 — 20 (West 1996). A complaint is procedurally deficient if it does not comply with section 9 — 20. The majority’s broad statement might be taken to mean the Board lacks authority to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with section 9 — 20.
In the instant case, the Illinois Republican Party filed a letter of complaint with the Board on November 4, 1996 (hereinafter, the November complaint). The November complaint was in writing, identified the United Democrats of Illinois and the Democratic Party of Illinois as the parties against whom it was directed, stated the statutory provisions which were allegedly violated, stated the time, place, and nature of the alleged offenses, and was verified, dated and signed by the executive director of the Illinois Republican Party. The Board did not take any action on the November complaint or vote to dismiss the November complaint as not filed on justifiable grounds. The Illinois Republican Party then filed the complaints at bar, using Form D-4 Complaint for Violation of the Campaign Disclosure Act, and attaching thereto the November complaint. The United Democrats of Illinois and the Democratic Party of Illinois argued before the Board that the Illinois Republican Party could not file the complaints at bar because the Illinois Republican Party had failed to appeal the denial of a hearing by the Board on the November complaint. The Illinois Republican Party then introduced a letter from the Board’s general counsel to show the Board did not consider the November complaint to be a proper complaint because it was not filed on the Board’s form D-4. In light of the majority’s holding, should the Board have held a closed preliminary hearing on the November complaint, followed by a public adjudicative hearing? In the absence of a vote to dismiss the November complaint as not filed on justifiable grounds, does not the majority require that the Board hold a public adjudicative hearing?
The majority states that “the only requirement in the statute is that the Board dismiss the complaint if it determines that the complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds” (emphasis in original) (188 Ill. 2d at 74), failing to recognize that a vote on whether a complaint is not filed on justifiable grounds is also a vote on whether the complaint is filed on justifiable grounds. Section 9 — 21 of the Code provides that “the Board shall hold a closed preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the complaint appears to have been filed on justifiable grounds.” 10 ILCS 5/9 — 21 (West 1996). I believe that the Board is required to find that a complaint is filed on justifiable grounds in order to proceed to a public adjudicative hearing. I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICES BILANDIC and McMORROW join in this dissent.
A bill identical to Senate Bill 1568 was introduced in the House as House Bill 2825. For purposes of this dissent, I will refer to both Senate Bill 1568 and House Bill 2825 as Senate Bill 1568.
As introduced in the General Assembly, Senate Bill 1568 authorized the Board to issue subpoenas “signed by the chairman or by a member designated by the Board.” 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 1568, 1974 Sess. The redrafted version of Senate Bill 1568 authorized the Board to issue subpoenas “by a vote of 3 members of the Board.” Pub. Act 78 — 1183, § 9 — 18, eff. September 3, 1974. Thus, the Board could issue a subpoena only if two members of one party and one member of the opposite party so voted.