dissenting:
Unlike the majority, I believe that this case presents a straightforward question of statutory construction. After examining the plain language of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute, the comments of the drafters, and the relevant precedent, I believe that the lower courts correctly held that application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate in the matter before us. I therefore dissent.
Indiana has enacted a statutory scheme that sets forth procedures to be followed when out-of-state law enforcement officers, who are in “fresh pursuit” of a suspect, arrest that person in Indiana. Ind. Code Ann. §§35 — 33—3—1 through 35 — 33—3—5 (Michie 1998). As a prefatory note, this statutory scheme abrogated the common law principles relating to extraterritorial arrests. At common law, a limited exception developed to the general rule confining the authority of an officer to a geographic area which allowed an officer who is in “fresh pursuit” of a suspected felon to make a legally binding arrest in a territorial jurisdiction other than the one in which he has been appointed to act. People v. Clark, 46 Ill. App. 3d 240, 242 (1977). The “critical elements” that characterized a “fresh pursuit” under common law were its “continuity and immediacy,” and the term “fresh pursuit” connoted “something more than mere casual following.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest §72, at 720 (2001), see also N. Lopuszynski, Father Constitution, Tell the Police to Stay on Their Own Side: Can Extra-jurisdictional Arrests Made in Direct Violation of State Law Ever Cross the Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness” Line?, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1347, 1358-59 (Spring 2004) (the focus is upon the “immediacy and continuousness of the pursuit”). Given that the Indiana legislature has enacted specific legislation to deal with extraterritorial fresh pursuit arrests within its borders, the question presented is two-fold: What does the Indiana statute require and what happens when those requirements are not met? Accordingly, the analysis begins with an examination of the language of the statute.
In construing the meaning of a statute, the court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000)), the best indicator being the statute’s language (Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001)). The statutory language must be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning (In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002)), and, where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction (In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d 306, 313 (2005)). We will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002). Moreover, this court is bound to give meaning and effect to all the provisions of a statute, and the court must construe a statute so that no word, clause or sentence, to the extent that it is possible to do so, is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Huskey v. Board of Managers of Condominiums of Edelweiss, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d 292, 295 (1998); Walker v. Alton Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 91 Ill. App. 3d 310 (1980). In construing a statute, we presume that the enacting body did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001). In addition, we view all provisions of an enactment as a whole. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). Accordingly, words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504.
Section 35 — 33—3—1 of Indiana’s statute bestows limited authority upon the police officer of another state to arrest an individual in Indiana, and specifically sets forth the circumstances under which a non-Indiana officer may enter that state and make an arrest:
“Any member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within [Indiana] in such fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.” Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—1 (Michie 1998).
The plain language of section 35 — 33—3—1 reveals that the Indiana statute provides authority to an out-of-state law enforcement officer to make an arrest in Indiana, so long as that officer enters Indiana in “fresh pursuit” of that suspect. The statute defines “fresh pursuit” in three ways: as it was “defined by the common law,” as “the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or who reasonably is suspected of having committed a felony,” or “the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony, though no felony actually has been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed.” Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—5 (Michie 1998). The statute further instructs that “[fjresh pursuit shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.”2 Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—5 (Michie 1998).
Thus, the Indiana law carves out a limited, statutory-exception to the common law general rule that a police officer acting within his official capacity cannot make a warrantless arrest outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction from which his authority is derived. See, e.g., Kindred v. Stitt, 51 Ill. 401, 409 (1869) (at common law, municipal peace officers had no authority to make a warrantless arrest outside of the political entity in which they held office); 2 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure §3.5, at 203 (3d ed. 2007), citing People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992). In other words, the authority of an out-of-state officer to make an extraterritorial arrest in Indiana is gained only through the grace of Indiana through operation of its statute.
The Indiana statute additionally departs from common law by setting forth with specificity not only the steps that must be taken by an out-of-state police officer after he makes an arrest within Indiana, but also those which must subsequently be taken by the Indiana court. Section 35 — 33—3—2 provides:
“If an arrest is made in [Indiana] by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of [Indiana]. If the judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall discharge the person arrested.” Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—2 (Michie 1998).
Thus, the Indiana legislature conditioned an out-of-state officer’s authority to make an extraterritorial arrest in Indiana upon the officer’s compliance with the dictate that the officer “shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was made.” (Emphasis added.) Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—2 (Michie 1998). The use of the word “shall” generally indicates a mandatory requirement. See, e.g., Village of Winfield v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 64 (1997). The Indiana statute in no uncertain terms requires the out-of-state officer to take the arrestee before an Indiana judge as soon as possible after the arrest. Once that person is brought before the judge, the statute further requires the judge to conduct a hearing “for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest.” Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—2 (Michie 1998). The statute then specifies two subsequent options, based upon the outcome of the judicial hearing. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, the judge is required to “commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of [Indiana].” Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—2 (Michie 1998). If, however, the judge determines that the extraterritorial arrest was unlawful, the statute requires that the judge “shall discharge the person arrested.” Ind. Code Ann. §35— 33 — 3—2 (Michie 1998).
Under the plain language of the Indiana statute, the question of whether the officer has made the arrest in fresh pursuit is only the threshold inquiry. The arrest is dependent upon the subjective belief of the arresting officer that there is probable cause that the person committed a criminal offense. The officer’s subjective belief is then tested when the facts and circumstances of the encounter are presented to an objective, neutral magistrate. It is only when this magistrate determines that the arrest is lawful that the extraterritorial arrest is deemed complete. This “presentment requirement” is a statutory procedure that did not exist at common law. The requirement advances several important interests. It promotes comity and ensures that the sovereignty of the state entered into by outside officers is preserved; it protects the rights of a person who has been subject to an extraterritorial arrest; and it encourages future compliance with the statutory provisions. Thus, the presentment requirement is an important component of a statutory scheme designed to balance the interests of law enforcement with the rights of the arrestee. It is only by giving meaning to all provisions of the fresh pursuit statute that this balance can be achieved. This interpretation of Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute ensures that no provision is rendered superfluous.
My reading of the Indiana statute is supported by an examination of the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit of Criminals Across State Lines (Uniform Act), from which the Indiana statute was derived.3 The Uniform Act was drafted in the mid-1980s by the Interstate Commission on Crime, with the purpose to “prevent criminals from utilizing state lines to handicap police in their apprehension.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978). In order to advance this goal, the Uniform Act addressed the realities faced by law enforcement officers engaging in the fresh pursuit of suspects across state lines:
“In the foreign state, the pursuing officer from the State where the crime is committed is, in general, no longer an officer. This *** is remedied in a simple manner by this act. Thereunder, the moment an officer in fresh pursuit of a criminal crosses a state line, the state he enters will authorize him to catch and arrest such criminal within its bounds. The statute grants this right only when the officer is in fresh pursuit of a criminal, that is, pursuit without unreasonable delay, by a member of a duly organized peace unit, and only in cases of felonies or supposed felonies occurring outside the boundaries of the state adopting the act. It is thus based upon the little-known common-law doctrine of fresh pursuit, from which the statute has derived its name.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978).
The drafters of the Uniform Act thus believed that the Act would be of benefit to police officers, because although it was “declaratory of the common law,” it also clearly informed the officers “of their right to cross a state boundary and make an arrest in fresh pursuit.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978).
The Uniform Act, however, was also intended to be of similar benefit to the person arrested under its provisions. The drafters noted that the Act “protects the rights of the person taken into custody, by providing that he shall without unnecessary delay be given a hearing before a magistrate, and requires his extradition if the arrest was lawful.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 150 (1978). In other words, in the Uniform Act “[sjimple provisions are made to safeguard the rights of the arrested person and to provide for his return to the state where he committed the crime.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978). Thus, it is apparent that the drafters of the Uniform Act intended to delicately balance the competing interests of law enforcement in allowing extraterritorial arrests with the rights of the state in which the arrest occurred and the rights of the person taken into custody. Accordingly, based upon a straightforward interpretation of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute, it is my conclusion that because the Chicago officers failed to comply with that statute’s provisions, defendant’s extraterritorial arrest was made without statutory authorization.
The majority, however, not only fails to construe Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute, but also fails to answer the question of whether defendant’s arrest was unauthorized due to the Chicago officers’ noncompliance with the Indiana statute. Instead, the majority skips over this necessary analysis and concludes that the exclusionary rule is not an appropriate remedy for the officers’ noncompliance with the fresh pursuit statute. The majority’s treatment of the issue renders the presentment provisions of the Indiana statute superfluous and a nullity. It is only when the Indiana statutory scheme is properly understood that the importance of the need for the application of the exclusionary rule for its violation becomes apparent.
Like the majority and the special concurrence, I acknowledge that the Indiana statute on fresh pursuit is silent as to the remedy for its violation. However, this question has been addressed by courts in other jurisdictions. Some courts have been unwilling to invoke the exclusionary rule as a remedy to an unlawful extraterritorial arrest. See, e.g., State v. Dentler, 742 N.W2d 84 (Iowa 2007); State v. Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 468, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1984). Other courts, however, have found that the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy to apply. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 380 A.2d 598 (D.C. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Savage, 430 Mass. 341, 719 N.E.2d 473 (1999); Commonwealth v. Sadvari, 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2d 393 (2000). The leading case adopting this latter position is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Sadvari, which I find to be persuasive.
In Sadvari, two Pennsylvania state troopers, while on patrol near the Pennsylvania-Delaware border, observed a vehicle driven by the defendant, a Delaware resident, which was speeding. The troopers pursued the vehicle and, shortly after crossing into Delaware, they activated their emergency lights and stopped the defendant approximately four-tenths of a mile inside the State of Delaware. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 590, 752 A.2d at 394. Subsequently, the defendant was asked to perform field sobriety tests, which he failed. He was then arrested for drunk driving by the Pennsylvania officers and was transported to a Pennsylvania hospital where blood samples were drawn for chemical testing. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d at 394.
Prior to trial, Sadvari moved to suppress evidence related to the traffic stop as the product of an unlawful arrest. According to the defendant, his arrest was unlawful because it was not conducted in accordance with Delaware’s fresh pursuit statute. The trial court found that the Pennsylvania officers had probable cause to stop Sadvari and that the Delaware statute granted them authority to enter Delaware while in fresh pursuit and conduct an arrest. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d at 395. While the trial court agreed that, under the relevant provisions of the Delaware statute, the defendant should have been taken before a Delaware judge, it viewed this requirement simply as an extradition provision and denied Sadvari’s suppression motion. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 593, 752 A.2d at 396. The Pennsylvania appellate court affirmed. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 593, 752 A.2d at 396.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. That court first noted that, as is the case with the Indiana statute in the instant appeal, the Delaware statute also derived from the Uniform Act on the Fresh Pursuit of Criminals Across State Lines. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. The court held that the trial court’s conclusion that the Delaware statute did not require a justice of the peace to determine whether the arresting officer complied with the Delaware statute was in error. The Delaware statute — as does the Indiana statute in the case before us — plainly required the justice of the peace to “determine the lawfulness of the arrest,” and the court observed that there was no authority for a uniformed Pennsylvania trooper in a marked police cruiser to effectuate an extraterritorial arrest in Delaware other than the Delaware fresh pursuit statute. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. Accordingly, to comply with the mandate of the statute to evaluate the lawfulness of an arrest, a Delaware tribunal was required to assess the arresting officers’ compliance with the statute. However, because the officers did not comply with the condition imposed upon their authority under the Delaware statute — which required them to bring Sadvari before a Delaware justice of the peace — the court found the arrest to be illegal. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398.
The Sadvari court then considered the appropriate remedy for the statutory violation and concluded that suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful arrest was warranted. The court conceded that not every violation of a statute or rule requires suppression. On the one hand, the court observed that it could be argued that the Delaware statute merely duplicated the framework provided by Pennsylvania law and its procedural rules for safeguarding a defendant’s constitutional rights; therefore, in individual cases a remedy as exacting as suppression should not be deemed necessary. The court found, however, that the Delaware statute, with its directive that an out-of-state officer present the arrestee to a Delaware judicial tribunal for review of the lawfulness of an arrest conducted in Delaware, “functions as more than merely an extradition statute, and that a contrary interpretation would render empty the mandate of the Delaware law.” Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398-99. The court noted that under its prior state jurisprudence, the exclusionary rule had previously been employed to ensure the orderly administration of justice where a police officer acted without authority, even in cases in which constitutional rights were not at the forefront. In this instance, the court determined that application of the exclusionary rule served several different and important interests: “as a demonstration of comity to vindicate Delaware’s sovereignty in light of Pennsylvania’s incursion upon this important state interest,” as a means “to encourage future compliance with Delaware’s procedures,” and also to “safeguard the individual right to be free of unlawful seizures.” Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 399.
As stated, I find the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reasoning and holding in Sadvari to be persuasive. Its analysis most closely mirrors the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act and is true to the language of the statute by giving each provision meaning. The Sadvari decision also highlights the several important interests that are affected by operation of the fresh pursuit statute: a demonstration of comity to vindicate the sovereignty of the state that has experienced the incursion of out-of-state officers; encouragement of future compliance with the provisions of the statute; and the protection of a defendant’s rights to due process and to be free from unlawful seizures. It is my view that Sadvari appropriately balances these important interests against the similarly important interest in furthering legitimate law enforcement objectives in allowing extraterritorial arrests, and arrives at the correct result.
However, although Sadvari is factually analogous to the matter before us, and is relied upon by defendant in his arguments to this court and by the appellate court in its opinion below, neither the majority nor the special concurrence discuss why Sadvari is not persuasive. Instead, the majority states that it finds the analysis in Dentler “particularly instructive” (229 Ill. 2d at 518), and the special concurrence joins in this assessment. I note, however, that Dentler is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar, and that this factual difference played a significant role in that court’s analysis as to whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. In Dentler, Iowa police officers pursued the defendant into Missouri, but, while in pursuit, also notified the Missouri authorities and requested their assistance in apprehending the suspect. Two Missouri law enforcement officers came to the scene of the arrest and engaged in a discussion with the Iowa officers as to which jurisdiction would retain the defendant. According to the court’s opinion, “The Missouri deputies advised [the Iowa officers], ‘Well you can keep [defendant].’ ” Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 86. In addition, the court noted that it was undisputed that Dentler was thereafter promptly taken before an Iowa judge. In holding that the exclusionary rule was not an appropriate remedy under the facts presented, the Dentler court noted that “it [was] undisputed that the Missouri officers on the scene acquiesced to the action. While such acquiescence by state law enforcement officials may not give rise to waiver or estoppel as a matter of law, it is a factor that militates against the need for application of the exclusionary rule.” Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 89. The facts in Dentler are inapposite to those at bar. In the matter before us, the Chicago officers made no contact with Indiana law enforcement officials during the arrest of defendant on Indiana soil. In addition, I note that rather than taking defendant before an Indiana magistrate, as required under the provisions of the statute, the Chicago officers instead transported defendant back across the state line to Illinois, and then took him to his mother’s residence on Burley Avenue. The officers thereupon conducted — according to their testimony — a “consent” search of the home in conjunction with their narcotics investigation of defendant. It was only after the officers conducted a systematic search of these premises and discovered additional evidence to be used in their prosecution of defendant that they transported defendant to the police station and he was brought before an Illinois magistrate. Accordingly, I find Dentler to be unpersuasive for a number of reasons: it is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar, and it does not speak to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act, from which the statute at issue in that case was derived.
Further, and perhaps more importantly, support for my position is found in our own, well-settled, state jurisprudence. Almost 30 years ago, our appellate court in People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447 (1979), addressed a situation factually similar to the matter now before us. In Jacobs, Illinois police officers in fresh pursuit of the defendant arrested him inside the State of Iowa for his alleged commission of robbery and murder. As in the present matter, the Illinois police officers failed to comply with the presentment provisions of Iowa’s fresh pursuit law. Jacobs held that the extraterritorial arrest of defendant was illegal because the Illinois officers “had no authority to arrest him in the State of Iowa except for that authority granted to them by the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of the State of Iowa.” Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449. The court held the arrest to be illegal, and the defendant’s statements were suppressed as the fruits of an illegal arrest. The court reasoned:
“The defendant was indeed illegally arrested since the Illinois police officers had no authority to arrest him in the State of Iowa except for that authority granted to them by the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of the State of Iowa. [Citations.] ***
***
*** [The statute] mandates that an out-of-State police officer, after effecting an arrest, shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the county in which the arrest was made, who shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor. [Citation.]
None of the mandates set forth in the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of Iowa were complied with by the arresting officers from Illinois. They were both blithely and summarily ignored and the defendant immediately upon his return to Illinois was subjected to intensive interrogation.” Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449-50.
I find the reasoning in Jacobs to be persuasive and note that this case has been law in this state for nearly three decades. I also observe that the failure of the officers in Jacobs to bring the defendant before an Iowa magistrate immediately following his arrest allowed the Illinois officers to return the defendant to Illinois and to conduct an immediate and lengthy interrogation in which they were able to gather additional evidence against the defendant prior to taking him before an Illinois judge. This factual scenario mirrors that in the matter at bar, where the officers returned defendant to Illinois and, rather than taking him before an Illinois judge, first took a detour to the home of defendant’s mother and engaged in a “consent” search of those premises in an effort to gather additional evidence against defendant prior to taking him before an Illinois judge.
I further note that the fact that it has been nearly three decades since our courts have been presented with an issue similar to that in Jacobs underscores that the reasoning and holding in that case offered a workable and effective procedure to be followed by officers making an extraterritorial, fresh pursuit arrest. To be blunt, to date, interstate extraterritorial arrests have not been a problem in Illinois. Clearly, then, Jacobs has been well understood by law enforcement officers, who have been cognizant of the state boundaries of their authority and of the consequences of attempting to exercise that authority outside the Illinois state line without complying with a sister state’s statutory provisions. One thus could argue that society has already benefitted (see 229 Ill. 2d at 522-23) in Illinois from the uniform, 30-year application of the exclusionary rule to cases such as this. The court does not explain how its result today provides additional societal benefit.
I note that, although factually not directly on point, this court in People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1 (2002), upheld the suppression of evidence obtained by police during the course of an unlawful, extraterritorial arrest. In Carrera, Chicago police officers arrested the defendant in Franklin Park, Illinois, relying upon an Illinois statute that permitted intrastate extraterritorial arrests but which was, subsequent to the defendant’s arrest, held to be unconstitutional on the basis that it was part of a public act that was passed in violation of the single-subject rule. In holding that defendant’s suppression motion had been properly granted, this court first looked to its prior decision in People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992), wherein the court suppressed evidence obtained during the course of an extraterritorial arrest. Carrera then held that the statute upon which the police relied to effect the arrest was void ab initio due to its inclusion in a public act that was found to violate the single-subject rule, and, therefore, the police had no statutory authority to arrest the defendant. This court concluded that “Illinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.” Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11.
In support of its holding that defendant’s arrest should not be quashed nor the evidence against him suppressed, the majority engages in a quick and summary disposal of defendant’s reliance upon Jacobs, Lahr, and Carrera. The majority states that the “cases defendant cites do not settle this case as a matter of law” (emphasis added) (229 Ill. 2d at 515), but then attempts to factually distinguish the cases from that at bar. With respect to Carrera the opinion states:
“In Carrera, the defendant was arrested by police officers utilizing a statute that was later declared void ah initio. [Citation.] Accordingly, this court held that the defendant’s arrest was unlawful.” 229 Ill. 2d at 515.
This is the sum and substance of the majority’s factual distinction of Carrera from the matter at bar. I believe that this is a distinction which fails. The fact that the statute at issue in Carrera was void ab initio was not what animated this court to hold that “Illinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.” Rather, this court relied on its prior decision in Lahr, which had already established this proposition. In addition, it was the fact that the officers were acting without legal authority — just as alleged in the case at bar — that controlled the result in Carrera.
In sum, courts of this state have long used the exclusionary rule to protect the rights of defendants outside of the constitutional context. To hold as the majority does today renders the provisions of Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute a nullity. The majority fails to adhere to the familiar tenets of statutory construction: it fails to afford plain meaning to the language of the Indiana statute; it fails to adhere to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act; it fails to afford appropriate recognition to the principles of comity to vindicate Indiana’s sovereignty; it fails to safeguard the protections intended to be afforded to defendants by the statute; and it fails to follow our own precedent. In rendering the provisions of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute superfluous, the majority leaves the distinct impression that Illinois law enforcement officers may freely disregard statutory limits on their jurisdiction with no adverse consequences. In light of the fact that Illinois has enacted a similar fresh pursuit statute, I question whether out-of-state officers who make an extraterritorial arrest on our own soil would feel compelled to comply with the provisions of the Illinois statute after today’s decision. More importantly, would an Indiana court feel compelled to follow the dictates of the Illinois General Assembly, when this court so freely ignores the will of the Indiana legislature?
For all the foregoing reasons, I cannot join the opinion of the majority.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
I note that in the circuit court, defendant raised in his motion to vacate the denial of his motion to suppress the argument that, based upon the testimony of Officer Luce, “prior to the defendant’s arrest at the [Indiana] toll booth the police officers rejected multiple convenient opportunities to arrest the defendant” while he was still in Illinois, and that the “officers themselves chose both the time and place to arrest defendant.” The circuit court, however, did not have occasion to address defendant’s contention that the officers were not engaged in “fresh pursuit” of him in its factual findings, as the State conceded in the trial court that the arrest took place in Indiana and the Chicago officers did not follow the mandates of the Indiana statute. Having prevailed on the suppression motion in the circuit court, defendant has not pursued this argument on appeal. Although I do not express an opinion as to the merits of defendant’s argument with respect to whether the Chicago officers were actually in “fresh pursuit” of him at the time the arrest was made, I do note that a review of Officer Luce’s testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that the officers may have had ample opportunity to stop defendant in Illinois, including when defendant parked for a minute at the side of the road near the Burley Avenue address and also after he made what Luce described as an “illegal” U-turn in that same area. It would have been interesting to see how the Indiana court would have ruled on this argument, had the officers complied with the statute and the Indiana court had the opportunity to hear the case.
I note that Illinois also has a “fresh pursuit” statute which is derived from the Uniform Act and which, like Indiana’s statute, allows an out-of-state law enforcement officer who is in fresh pursuit of a suspect to arrest that person in Illinois as long as the officer “without unnecessary delay takes[s] the person arrested before the circuit court of the county in which the arrest was made” so that the court can “conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest.” 725 ILCS 5/107 — 4 (West 2006).