SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING
Mr. JUSTICE CAMPBELLdelivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs-appellants, Byron M. Getzoff, Ladder Products Insurance Agency, Inc., and Product Liability Insurance Company and defendants, Frank Paris and Paris, O’Day & Reed, Inc., have filed respective petitions for rehearing. We shall consider each petition separately.
Plaintiffs-appellants’ petition urges this court to modify our opinion so that on remand it will not be construed as barring plaintiffs from seeking an accounting for commissions produced after September 16, 1976, on accounts secured by plaintiffs’ efforts prior to that date. In our original opinion, we observed that, despite allegations to the contrary in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the plaintiffs could not seek an accounting for the period from July 1, 1965, through July 1, 1973. We reached that conclusion because plaintiffs admitted at the trial that there was no violation of the oral agreement between the parties prior to July 1, 1973, when Crum and Forster Insurance Company assumed the position of insurer for the ALI insurance program. We concluded, however, that an accounting could be sought from July 1,1973, through September 16, 1976, to determine the total amount of commissions received by the defendants from the ALI account. The opinion was silent upon the availability of an accounting for the period subsequent to September 16, 1976. To eliminate any misunderstanding, we now note that on remand the trial court is not barred, if the evidence warrants, from determining that an accounting is necessary for that time period subsequent to July 1, 1973.
Our conclusion that the accounting was limited to the 1973-1976 period was premised on the language in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint which sought an accounting “from July 1, 1965 to date” and on the fact that the trial court obtained jurisdiction over the distribution of the commissions due under the parties’ oral agreement when the suit was filed. The plaintiffs’ amended complaint sought in pertinent part:
<<« o o (i) That defendants be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of the Court all gross commissions received from insurance carriers in the future pending the accounting hereof.”
During the course of the litigation the trial court issued a variety of orders regarding the collection of premiums and the disbursement of commissions including the order of November 19, 1976, sequestering payments of commissions. These orders brought the issue of the proper distribution of the commissions due under the agreement directly under the control and jurisdiction of the trial court. Had the gross commissions been deposited with the court pursuant to that order, then an accounting of the commissions received on the ALI account would have been unnecessary as the court would have distributed the commissions in the proportions which it determined to be required from its interpretation of the parties’ oral agreement. From our examination of the record and the order of November 29,1976, it is apparent, however, that the parties and not the court had custody and control of the net premiums collected on the ALI account. In the light of this fact, we believe that an accounting may be sought for the period subsequent to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the parties.
Defendants-appellees set forth several contentions upon which they base their petition for a rehearing of this appeal. The defendants’ first contention is that our opinion erroneously allows the plaintiffs to retain the *46,794.92 award granted them by the trial court. Next, defendants assert that this court should not have ordered a new trial of the present matter, but rather, should have directed the original trial judge to clarify or reconsider his judgment and most particularly the award to plaintiffs in light of this court’s ruling. Finally, the defendants contend that this court has overlooked certain findings by the trial court which demonstrate that the dismissal of the amended complaint was justified and that the plaintiffs should have made restitution to the defendants of the amount of the award.
It was the purport of our opinion to restore the parties to the positions which they held prior to the judgment by the trial court. We took this position because we found it impossible to rationalize the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with its *46,794.92 award to plaintiffs. While the defendants initially allege that, under our decision, the plaintiffs are allowed to retain the trial court’s award, it is clear from their petition that defendants clearly understand that, by reversing the judgment of the circuit, court and remanding this case for a new trial, we have reversed the circuit court’s order of May 23, 1977, including the *46,794.92 award. We do not agree with the defendants that it was necessary for this court to order restitution by plaintiffs. Our opinion made no effort to deal with the award, but rather, left the matter open to the trial court to assume jurisdiction over any and all further action in this matter. Consequently, the trial court may modify or alter any interlocutory order, if erroneous, and may enter any order or judgment consistent with the evidence as may be warranted in its final determination of this cause, including a restitution order. Towns v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 113, 382 N.E.2d 1217.
We turn next to the defendants’ suggestion that this court should have disposed of this case by remanding it to the circuit court of Cook County with instructions for that court to reassign the case to the original circuit court judge who tried the case. We decline to accept the defendant’s suggestion and, therefore, find it unnecessary to comment on the final contentions raised by the defendants in their petition.
The petition for rehearing is accordingly denied.
GOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.