concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that in mass disaster eases the setting up of mobile law offices in close proximity to victims immediately following a disaster is a form of targeted solicitation that violates Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 7.3(b)(1). I also agree that to conduct a legal seminar in the sleeping area of an emergency shelter a day after a massive explosion constitutes direct contact with prospective victims of a mass disaster in violation of RPC 7.3(b)(1). Because the Court had not previously made these propositions clear, I do not believe that a public reprimand for the attorneys involved in that conduct is the appropriate discipline in the circumstances of this case.
I
Looking at the matter in hindsight, the Court holds that In re Anis, 126 N.J. 448, 599 A.2d 1265, cert. denied sub nom. Anis v. New Jersey Committee on Attorney Advertising, 504 U.S. 956, 112 S.Ct. 2303, 119 L. Ed.2d 225 (1992), clearly established that the conduct engaged in by Kenneth S. Oleckna and TEAMLAW violated the provisions of RPC 7.3(b)(1). One is reminded of Lewis Carroll’s familiar aphorism from Through the Looking Glass that “a word ... means just what I choose it to mean— neither more nor less,” when the Court says that the principles of *378law applied to these attorneys were clearly established before the conduct. If it was so clearly established, the Court should please explain how it can be that one of our most respected ethical bodies, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), the very body charged with imposition of discipline on attorneys, believed that application of the rules to this case would not be fair given the lack of prior decisional law on the matter. If the respected members of the DRB could not perceive that the law was clearly settled, it strikes me as unfair for the Court to conclude that the law was so clearly settled that the lawyers should be disciplined.
To begin, Anis did not deal with the conduct with which we deal here. Anis dealt with targeted, direct-mail solicitation — a letter that directly invaded the privacy of the home of the grieving victims of the Lockerbie disaster of 1988. On that homeward-bound holiday flight, American passengers, many of whom were college students, were the victims of international terrorism. At the time of the Anis decision, the law was unsettled. We believed that the United States Supreme Court would uphold a proscription of such an intrusion upon the privacy and dignity of individuals. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court did uphold restraints on targeted, direct-mail solicitation of accident victims. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L. Ed.2d 541 (1995). I might remind the majority that the question is so close that the issue was resolved only by a five to four decision of the Supreme Court. Our own Committee on Attorney Advertising initially refused to implement a rule banning direct solicitation of mass disaster victims. The current rule, which was drafted by our Court, did not take effect until May 5, 1997, some five years after we decided Anis.
In his concurring opinion in Anis, Justice Handler carefully outlined the narrow circumstances in which a court could limit the First Amendment rights of attorneys to communicate with prospective clients. He emphasized that “the standards that must govern our advertising restrictions should ... focus on the harmful and invasive aspects of such commercial speech, and not on any *379articulation of restrictions in terms of ‘decency.’ ” Anis, supra, 126 N.J. at 467, 599 A.2d 1265 (Handler, J., concurring). He therefore recommended that we refer the matter to “our Committee on Attorney Advertising to consider guidelines explaining the conditions governing written advertisements directed by attorneys to vulnerable members of the public. Such a rule should identify and define the circumstances under which professional solicitations will unduly infringe on personal privacy or will increase personal suffering.” Ibid, (emphasis added). That definition never occurred.
At the time of the Edison pipeline blast, the Court had not yet adopted the amendment to RPC 7.3(b) that specifically banned unsolicited, direct contact with a prospective client within thirty days after a mass disaster. All that was in place was the generalized Anis proscription. As noted, our own Committee on Attorney Advertising had for many years resisted adopting a specific blackout rule pursuant to our suggestion in Anis. It was not until July 1, 1997, after the facts of this case took place and after the decision in Florida Bar, that the Court finally adopted a thirty-day blackout rule.
It is therefore disingenuous for the Court to say that the issues were clearly settled when the Edison pipeline fire occurred.
II
Although Raymond Eisdorfer’s conduct is of a different dimension, I believe that a reprimand is not the appropriate discipline in his case. Prior to this case, the law was not clear whether the prior version of RPC 7.3(b)(1) prohibited discussion with prospective clients at a disaster site when the prior attorney was invited onto the site by a prospective client.
We have regularly held that clarifications of the law of professional responsibility should be applied prospectively. See In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982) (concluding that notions of elementary fairness required prospective application of our interpretation of DR 7-107(d), dealing with criticism of judges because *380it was first time we had addressed question); see also In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 660, 449 A.2d 505 (1982) (finding appropriate prospective application of first-time announcement of test concerning restriction on attorney associated with prosecution or defense from commenting on guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant or on evidence or merits of case because we were “engaged ... not in the enforcement of criminal laws but in the shaping of disciplinary rules, the purpose of which is to protect the public and to edify and improve the legal profession, rather than to punish”).
Ill
The conclusion that the attorneys Oleckna and TEAMLAW and Eisdorfer should not be disciplined because this is our first clarification of Amis and RPC 7.3(b)(1) is supported by longstanding notions of fairness. It is simply not right and fair to discipline these attorneys. The Court’s decision will undoubtedly be supported by many members of the bar. In fact, some of the initial complaints concerning the attorneys’ conduct came from members of the bar. But our responsibility is not to satisfy the bar. Rather it is to ensure that all lawyers are clearly informed in advance of the rules that apply when there is a collision between the First Amendment and principles of professional responsibility. The whole idea behind the RPCs and the Disciplinary Rules before them was to replace the vague, aspirational, “fraternal admonitions” contained in the Canons of Professional Ethics with a clear set of standards. Note, Uniform Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct: A Flawed Proposal, 111 Harv. L.Rev. 2063, 2064-65 (1998). Attorneys who push the First Amendment envelope should not be the scapegoats for institutional shortcomings. The confusion that has surrounded the issues in this field is exemplified by the history of the earlier recommendations of the Committee on Attorney Advertising and the recommendations in this very case by the Disciplinary Review Board.
*381Although our pronouncement in Anis clearly delineated the standard to be applied to targeted direct-mail solicitation in mass-disaster cases, the many questions raised by the conduct of these attorneys were left unclear. If the DRB did not believe the RPCs were sufficiently clear to impose discipline, we should clear up the confusion. We should not pretend that the subject was perfectly clear before today’s decision.
STEIN, Justice, joins this opinion.
For reprimand-Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN-5.
Concur in part; dissent in part-justices O’HERN and STEIN-2.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that the law firm of RAYICH, KOSTER, TOBIN, OLECKNA, REITMAN & GREENSTEIN of RAH-WAY, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1); and it is further
ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as a law firm practicing law in this State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH S. OLECKNA, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that KENNETH S. OLECKNA of RAHWAY, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1972, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1); and it is further
*382ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES E. MEADEN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW. ORDER
It is ORDERED that CHARLES E. MEADEN of ENGLE-WOOD, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1982, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1) and 7.3(b)(4); and it is further
ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
IN THE MATTER OF RAYMOND EISDORFER, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that RAYMOND EISDORFER of ELIZABETH, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1988, is hereby reprimanded for violating RPC 7.3(b)(1); and it is further
ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.