concurring.
¶ 27 I write to concur in the only holding reached by my colleagues — that the trial court’s order for treatment is void for failure to comply strictly with the commitment statutes. Because the opinion’s discussion of what a complete physical examination entails is not necessary to our decision, and because this issue was neither raised in the trial court nor adequately developed on appeal, I would not engage in the lengthy interpretation of the statute undertaken by my colleagues.
¶ 28 In their opinion, my colleagues conclude that Dr. Krasevic’s evaluation of appellant, conducted remotely and in reliance on an evaluation previously performed by a nurse practitioner, failed to comply strictly with the statutory requirements. I agree with this conclusion which, in itself, disposes of the matter before us. Having decided that Krasevic’s examination fell short of the statutory requirements because his observations were limited to appellant’s mental disorder rather than to his overall health, we need go no further in explaining what more the statute might require. To do so is to engage in unnecessary dicta. See Creach v. Angulo, 186 Ariz. 548, 551-52, 925 P.2d 689, 692-93 (App. 1996) (“A court’s statement on a question not necessarily involved in the case before it is dictum.”); see also McCluskey v. Indus. Comm’n, 80 Ariz. 255, 258, 296 P.2d 443, 445 (1956) (“It would be dicta for us to make any pronouncement on matters unnecessary to a determination of the instant review.”).
¶ 29 Furthermore, engaging in a discussion of extraneous matters is particularly ill-advised due to the meager record before us. Appellant made no argument to the trial court relating to the necessary scope of the physical exam, but instead argued only that Krasevic had conducted his examination remotely. After the state had presented its case below, appellant’s counsel moved for a directed verdict based on AR.S. § 36-539(B), stating, “Petitioner must present the testimony of two physicians who performed examinations in the evaluation of the patient.” Counsel then referred to the definition of examination contained within A.R.S. § 36-501(14), and argued that “one of the doctors was not even present with [appellant] in the room, so it is not possible that he actually conducted a physical examination.” The trial court rejected that argument. At the close of the evidence, appellant again argued that the state had not met its burden, citing the requirement that the evaluation include a physical examination. Specifically, counsel stated: “That examination ... requires a physical examination and that was not conducted by Dr. Krasevic.”
¶ 30 On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding the state had met its burden because Krasevic had never been in the same room as appellant and therefore could not have conducted a physical examination. Appellant also asserts for the first time on appeal that “neither doctor performed the required complete physical exam*508ination.” Generally, when a party fails to raise an issue before the trial court, the issue is waived on appeal. Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, ¶ 16, 213 P.3d 353, 357 (App.2009). And, although it is true that when extraordinary circumstances exist, we may address matters raised for the first time on appeal,13 Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300, 878 P.2d 657, 658 (1994), the appellant also failed to develop the argument adequately on appeal. See Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. 13(a)(6); Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, n. 2, 154 P.3d 391, 393-94 n. 2 (App.2007) (failure to develop and support argument waives issue on appeal). Likewise, although the state cites In re MH 2008-000-38, 220 Ariz. 277, 205 P.3d 1124 (App.2009), in support of its argument that an examination “like one would expect during one[’]s annual physical examination” is unnecessary under the statute, it fails to develop any argument about the scope of the physical examination.
¶31 My colleagues have undertaken the task of determining the scope of a complete physical examination in the context of a psychiatric evaluation for commitment, even though the issue was not raised below or developed adequately on appeal, relying on their “own perusal of psychiatric literature.” 14 Given the parties’ failure to support their arguments with any evidentiary material, this is an exercise in which I will not, and respectfully suggest my colleagues should not, engage. Therefore, although I concur in the judgment, I write separately because I cannot agree with substantial portions of my colleagues’ opinion.
. "Given the liberty interests at stake,” an involuntary treatment case can "present! ] one of 'the extraordinary circumstances’ in which an error not presented to the trial court may be presented to an appellate court in the first instance.” in re MH 2006-000023, 214 Ariz. 246, ¶ 11, 150 P.3d 1267, 1270 (App.2007) (vacating involuntary treatment order because patient not provided timely notice as required by A.R.S. § 36-536, and statute specifically prohibited waiver of such notice). However, in this case, appellant's failure to raise this issue below not only denied the trial court and opposing counsel " 'the opportunity to correct any asserted defects,’ ” id. ¶ 8, quoting Trantor, 179 Ariz. at 300, 878 P.2d at 658, but leaves this court without an adequate record upon which to base any decision concerning the scope of a complete physical examination. And, unlike the situation presented in MH 2006-000023, no statute that specifically bars waiver is implicated here.
. Neither my colleagues, nor the treatises upon which they rely, address whether a physical examination in the commitment context is necessarily different from physical examinations in other contexts.