Concurring. — Although I concur in the opinion, I write separately to identify the narrow context of the legal issue we address in part H.A as presented to the trial court by Michael Bollinger’s petition for mandate and the narrow confines of the trial court’s judgment in response to that petition which is a subject of this appeal.
I also point out the procedural due process discussion in part II.B fails to consider the significance of the fact that, in this case, the hearing officer whose findings of fact and recommendation were considered by the San Diego Civil Service Commission (Commission) in executive session, was himself a commissioner and was present when his fellow commissioners *579considered his findings and recommendation. In response to our letter inquiry, we were advised, “The full Commission routinely meets with the hearing officer to fully discuss the proposed report of the hearing officer and ratify the findings that are prepared prior to the meeting.” We were further advised that although more than three months transpired between the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on these complaints and charges and the ratification of the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation, Bollinger was first apprised of those findings and recommendation when served with a copy of the Commission’s ratification decision.
A.
Bollinger’s petition for mandamus sets forth one narrow issue: whether the ratification action taken by the full Commission in closed session following a public evidentiary hearing was null and void for failure to notify Bollinger in writing that he also had the right to have the Commission’s later ratification deliberations in open session. The issue was posed in light of the facts of this case. Here, Bollinger’s evidentiary proceedings were heard by a single member of the Commission who had been designated as a hearing officer. More than three months after its conclusion, Bollinger received oral notice of the Commission’s intent to meet in closed session to determine whether to ratify the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation. Bol-linger did not receive a copy of the hearing officer’s findings or his recommendation. In spite of the oral notice, Bollinger did not make a specific request to have the deliberative session open.
Relevant to this appeal, the trial court found that although Bollinger was orally informed the deliberations would be held in a closed session, he never made a request for a public session. Finding actual notice irrelevant, the trial court confined its decision solely to whether Government Code section 54957 requires the Commission to give Bollinger written notice of a right to have the ratification deliberations conducted in public. Therefore, the court below did not, nor do we, address the broader issue of whether, had Bollinger specifically requested that deliberative process to be open, the failure to accede to his request would be a Ralph M. Brown Act violation.
B.
Turning to the procedural due process discussion, I agree with the analysis as a stated general proposition. However, had the issue been framed in light *580of the facts of this case, we would have had to address it in a more meaningful context.
First, it is true that procedural due process is usually satisfied by the mere availability of an appellate remedy. However, in a practical sense, in cases such as this, appellate review is less than meaningful to one who is denied the right to present his case, to argue its merits, and to dissect factual findings for the edification of those faceless decision makers who are empowered to remove, demote or discipline. As the question is posed in our opinion, we only decide that constitutional procedural due process did not require, although we believe it preferable, to permit Bollinger to appear before the full Commission after first receiving the hearing officer’s recommended findings, for the purpose of enlightening the Commission members as to their validity and whether the evidence was fairly characterized in that report.
Be that as it may, there is an additional significant fact which we obtained from the parties upon our direct inquiry which sets this case apart from those cited. That is, the hearing officer Commission member whose findings and recommendation were ratified by the Commission was present in the closed session while his fellow Commission members engaged in the deliberations. Thus, Bollinger, who was not even apprised of the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation until after they were ratified, was excluded from the Commission’s “free and candid” discussion of his fate in the presence of the healing officer who was present to defend, encourage, enlighten and “freely and candidly” respond to any concerns expressed by his fellow Commission members. Whether the hearing officer did anything more than merely sit silently and impassively while his findings and recommendation were considered and ratified by the Commission, or in fact participated in some manner during the closed proceedings, is not shown in this record. However, the fact of his presence alone, in a position to defend his findings and recommendation while preventing Bollinger from even being aware of their nature let alone having the ability to argue their validity to the Commission, transcends the procedural unfairness considered in any of the numerous cases cited by the majority. However, whether a hearing officer/commissioner’s presence while his colleagues deliberate to ratify his findings in closed sessions, coupled with the failure to disclose the nature of those findings to the affected employee, denying him the opportunity to argue their validity before the commissioners meet in closed session with the hearing officer may deny the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California *581Constitution, although a significant concern, is an issue not raised in this appeal.1
Therefore, subject to the comments expressed herein, I concur.
During oral argument in a recent unpublished case, Kathan v. Civil Service Com. (Mar. 10, 1999) D028812, the city attorney advised that the commission had adopted an interim policy, pending a decision in this matter, for the commission to hold its deliberations on personnel matters arising out of complaints and charges in open session. We were told that conducting those deliberations openly had created no impediment to efficiency, appropriate disposition of those matters or candor.