Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of United Methodist Church

Sullivan, J.,

concurring in result only. I agree that Ocean Grove’s attempted restrictions on the Sunday delivery of newspapers infringe on the freedom of the press and that the “ordinances” in question, even if otherwise lawful, are invalid for that reason. However, I am unable to subscribe to the majority’s sympathetic holding that “the government of this community presents no threat whatsoever to the constitutional and salutary principle of government abstention from sponsorship or support of religion.”

Camp meeting associations exist for the purpose of providing religious bodies or societies with camp meeting grounds or places for religious services. The statute in question, N. J. S. A. 40 :97 — 1 et seq., and other ancillary laws, confer on a Camp Meeting Association the power, within the limits of lands owned or controlled, to enact ordinances and impose penalties for violation thereof, to establish municipal courts (N. J. S. A. 40:97-4), to have licensing and regulatory power (N. J. S. A. 40:95-1 et seq.), to plan for sewerage and drainage facilities and impose assessments for such improvements, which assessments become liens on the lauds affected, N. J. S. A. 40 :96-1 et seq. Its peace officers not only have the power, on camp grounds, to enforce association rules and regulations for the preservation of quiet and good order, but also can arrest for the commission of any crime in all respects. N. J. S. A. 40:99-1.

Camp meeting associations also are constituted fire districts, the duly elected commissioners of which are empowered to issue bonds to finance the acquisition of lands, buildings and equipment for fire fighting purposes. The amount of money needed for fire appropriations or to pay bonds in the district is certified to the appropriate tax assessor for collection as taxes. (N. J. S. A. 40 :101-1 et seq.) *271In short, these statutes purport to confer broad governmental powers on camp meeting associations.

That such legislation runs afoul of the establishment-of-religion clause of the First Amendment is clear to me. The trial judge held that it violated all three of the tests enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971) in that the legislation had a religious rather than a secular purpose, its principal or primary effect was to advance religion and it fostered an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the main, it is the excessive governmental entanglement with religion that convinces me of the legislation’s unconstitutionality. Broad governmental powers such as are here involved, can be vested in and exercised only by lawfully constituted governmental bodies, not in or by religious organizations. I would, therefore, invalidate the legislation on this ground. To the extent that Percello v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Asso., 2 N. J. Misc. 124 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff’d o. b., 100 N. J. L. 407 (E. & A. 1924) holds otherwise, I would overrule it.

The majority opinion seems to concede that the statutory scheme does result in some “entanglement” of government with religion but that this is not fatal unless the entanglement is “excessive.” I find the entanglement to be just that and the legislation a plain violation of the doctrine of separation of church and state. That the governmental powers granted Ocean Grove have been exercised in a benign way does not cure the constitutional infirmity.

A striking down of the present statutory scheme would not necessarily mean that Ocean Grove and the way of life it represents must'come to an end. Geographically it is a part of Neptune Township which presently exercises limited governmental powers over the camp meeting grounds. That Township, in assuming full jurisdiction over the Ocean Grove area, could properly give recognition to Ocean Grove’s unique physical characteristics and its historical site status. I would think that much of the secular customs, traditions *272and practices which endear the Ocean Grove way of life to so many conld be preserved.

I, therefore, concur in the result reached by the majority, but would bottom it on the broader ground heretofore discussed.