I respectfully dissent. Sanctions were imposed against the wife in this dissolution proceeding in spite of the fact there is no evidence in the record that she personally engaged in any conduct that would subject her to sanctions. The conduct for which the sanctions were imposed was that of the wife’s attorney, and there is also no evidence that the wife was aware of, let alone that she authorized, ratified or otherwise condoned, the conduct of her attorney that gave rise to the sanctions. The husband recognized this, since he did not seek sanctions based on the wife’s conduct but grounded his *1112sanction motion on the conduct of the wife’s attorney. To sanction a party to litigation under these circumstances is to impose liability without fault, and I am not certain this is what the Legislature intended.
One of the statute’s stated purposes is to “encourag[e] cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (Civ. Code, § 4370.6, subd. (a), italics added.) It is difficult to understand how attorneys can be encouraged to cooperate if they cannot, as the majority opinion implies, be personally sanctioned for their conduct which may fall outside the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. A problem in imposing liability without fault for conduct that amounts to procedural malfeasance is that the attorney, not the client, controls the conduct of the litigation. “The attorney’s apparent authority covers all the ordinary procedural steps in the prosecution of a legal proceeding, such as pleadings, remedies, trial, etc., and his actions in these matters will bind the client.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Attorneys, § 192, p. 220.) “The attorney is relatively free from control by the client in ordinary procedural matters” for two basic reasons: “(a) He is an independent contractor, pursuing a highly skilled independent calling, and is therefore not subject to control over the details of his performance. [Citations.] [U] (b) He is an officer of the court, with a duty to follow the traditions and ethics of his profession even if this calls for overriding objections of his client.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op. cit. supra, § 193, p. 221.)
Although we expect attorneys to understand the settlement and cooperative litigation process, how is the client expected to know what procedural steps or legal maneuvers “further or frustrate the policy of the law?” I cannot affirm personal sanctions against the client for conduct of her attorney of which she was not only unaware but over which she had no control.
I do not read Civil Code section 4370.6, subdivision (c) as limiting sanctions to the innocent party and protecting the offending attorney. It also protects subsequent spouses from personal liability for sanctions in postdissolution proceedings. If the sanctionable conduct is committed solely by the attorney, but sanctions are imposed only against the client, the client has a right of indemnity against the attorney. Since the client can obtain indemnity from the attorney, I doubt that the Legislature envisioned a separate legal proceeding to resolve a matter that can be handled in a simple motion hearing. The fact is that the statute is inartfully phrased. For example, it provides that “. . . the court may base an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law . . . .” (Italics added.) Does this mean that if *1113one party’s conduct is deemed to have better “further[ed] ... the policy of the law,” that party is entitled to sanctions against the other? I think not, any more than it authorizes the court to impose sanctions against a party who “furthers ... the policy of the law.”
I would reverse for lack of substantial evidence of any wrongdoing by the client to support the sanction award.