concurring and dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of Postive’s tort claim. It is clear that Guthmann did not specifically address Postive’s tort theory “akin to malicious prosecution” in his motion for summary judgment. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to rule on the claim on summary judgment. McConnell v. Southside, 858 S.W.2d 387, 341 (Tex.1993). What Guthmann should have done was to have filed special exceptions urging that Postive did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. Summary judgment is not a substitute for special exceptions. See In the Interest of B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13-14 (Tex.1994).
While it may be true that, as the majority opines, “we think the legislative intent is clear, from the plain language of section 207.007 of the Labor Code, that Postive should not be allowed to circumvent the statute under some new tort theory ‘akin to malicious prosecution,’ ” neither the trial court nor we have the question before us in a proper procedural posture. Therefore, I would sustain Postive’s first and second points of error and reverse and remand the entire case.