concurring:
It is evident that what divides the en banc majority and the dissent in this case, in considerable part, is the difference in outcome between this application for admission and the application of the lead petitioner in In re Manville: in that case, a person who acknowledged past conduct amounting to felony murder * was admitted to the bar; in this case, a person whose conduct, whatever else it might have been, was not nearly so heinous is denied admission. Had I been on the court at the time of Manville, I likely would have joined Judge Terry’s dissent in holding that a prior conviction of certain serious crimes (certainly including the conduct of Man-ville) raises a presumption of bad moral character that must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence — “a degree of per*675suasion much higher than ‘mere preponderance of the evidence,’ ” District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175, 179 (D.C.1979) (en banc) (citation omitted) — to justify admission to the bar. I also probably would have voted to deny Manville’s application. In this case, however, no one has asked us to reconsider any aspect of Man-ville; moreover, there would be little point in doing so since, as Judge Belson points out, supra at 673 note 8, D.C.App.R. 46(e) has since been amended to adopt the clear and convincing evidence standard. Thus, although I would give less weight than the court does to the distinctions between this case and Manville, I otherwise join entirely Judge Belson’s persuasive explanation of why we cannot in good conscience disturb the Committee on Admissions’ conclusion that Demos had not made the requisite showing of good moral character, even under the lesser standard applicable to him of a preponderance of the evidence.
See In re Manville, 494 A.2d 1289, 1298 (D.C.1985) (Nebeker, J.) (statement of reasons for calling for sua sponte rehearing en banc).