dissenting. 23 V.S.A. § 1202 providing for a chemical test applies to any person who operates, attempts to operate or is in actual physical control of any vehicle in this state. By so doing he is deemed to have given his consent to the tests enumerated in the statute for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content in his blood, breath, urine or saliva. Upon the issuance of an operator’s license to the plaintiff by the commissioner of motor vehicles, plaintiff became bound by the provisions of the foregoing statute. He accepted the provisions of the statute as a prerequisite to being granted a license to become a motor vehicle operator.
Then follows 23 V.S.A. § 1205 providing for a summary hearing if a person is charged with a “violation of the vehicle laws” and upon arraignment enters a plea of not guilty. The court on hearing then takes evidence relating to the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that the respondent was operating, attempting to operate or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.
It is to be noted that Section 1205 is not limited to persons initially charged with operating, etc., a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, but applies to those in “violation of the vehicle laws.”
A summary hearing on the reasonableness of refusal to take an intoxication test, and the possibility of resultant loss of an operator’s license for six months is not a criminal proceeding. It is in the nature of an administrative proceeding and is the determination of a civil matter, involving only the question of whether the respondent should or should not be continued in his privilege as a licensed driver for a period of six months. State v. Dellveneri, 128 Vt. 85, 88, 258 A.2d 834 (1969); State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 50, 285 A.2d 776 (1971).
*44The summary hearing is separate and apart from any subsequent prosecution, or the results thereof, whether it be for operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201, or by otherwise violating the vehicle laws.
A suspension of six months under the provisions of Section 1205 neither enhances or lessens the statutory penalty in the criminal case if found guilty.
In the case of United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Federal Kidnapping Act mandated an increased penalty of a person who pleaded not guilty and following a trial was found guilty. The Act was held to be unconstitutional. This is not the case under consideration. The six months suspension under the statute is not intended to be in any manner reflected, favorably, or unfavorably, in the final disposition of the criminal case.
In my judgment, the statutes under consideration are unambiguous and enacted by the Legislature under the state’s general police power for the protection of the public. I see no constitutional infirmity therein. Plaintiff chose not to take the test rather, than hazard its result. He made his own bed and should be required to lie in it.
The fact that an entry of nolle prosequi was made in the lower court charging the plaintiff with a violation of 23 Y.S.A. § 1201, and later charged with a violation of the motor vehicle law occurring at the same time and place as set forth in the previous charge, to which violation a plea of guilty was entered, does not absolve him from the provisions of § 1202 nor the consequences by way of a six months suspension under § 1205.
It is my view that the order of the lower court should be affirmed.