I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, but consider the issue presented to be more difficult. And, in my view, the difficulty highlights the need for legislative clarification.
*1120Numerous other enhancement and recidivist statutes explicitly provide that they apply to felony convictions in other jurisdictions if the elements of the offense would constitute a felony under California law. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 667, subd. (a)(1) [referring to a person previously convicted of a “serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony”], 667, subd. (d)(2) [“A prior conviction of a particular felony shall include a conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that includes all of the elements of the particular felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7”], 667.5, subd. (f) [“A prior conviction of a particular felony shall include a conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense which includes all of the elements of the particular felony as defined under California law”], 1170.12, subd. (b)(2) [“A prior conviction of a particular felony shall include a conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that includes all of the elements of the particular felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7”], 1203, subd. (e)(4) [referring to “[a]ny person who has been previously convicted twice in this state of a felony or in any other place of a public offense which, if committed in this state, would have been punishable as a felony”]; Health & Saf. Code, § 11370, subd. (c) [referring to “[a]ny previous conviction ... of an offense under the laws of another state or of the United States which, if committed in this state, would have been punishable as such an offense”].) Section 12022.1, however, contains no comparable reference to offenses occurring in other jurisdictions.
The majority opinion correctly points out that “the language used in [these] statutes ... is not the language of inclusion but rather expresses a legislative limitation or restriction on the use of out-of-state convictions,” and that in the absence of any such limitation a reference to prior felony convictions has been held to include a prior conviction that is a felony under the laws of the convicting jurisdiction. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1116; see also People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038-1039 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].) This reasoning logically supports the conclusion that the unqualified reference in section 12022.1, subdivision (a)(1) to “a felony offense for which a person has been released from custody on bail” includes a felony for which the defendant was on bail in another jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the atypical absence of explicit language to the effect that the provision applies to persons on bail in foreign proceedings raises the question of whether in enacting section 12022.1 the Legislature was considering out-of-state bail. If the offense for which a defendant was on bail in another jurisdiction did not constitute a felony in California, is it so clear that section 12022.1 could be used to enhance the defendant’s sentence? Subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 12022.1 both contain the suggestion that the statute was not enacted with *1121out-of-state primary offenses in mind. Under subdivision (c), if the secondary conviction occurs while proceedings on the primary offense are still pending, the enhancement allegation “shall be pleaded ... in the information or indictment of the primary offense.” Under subdivision (d), if the defendant is sentenced on the secondary offense prior to conviction on the primary offense, the imposition of the enhancement shall be stayed pending imposition of the sentence for the primary offense and “[t]he stay shall be lifted by the court hearing the primary offense at the time of sentencing for that offense and shall be recorded in the abstract of judgment.” Certainly our Legislature recognizes that it has the authority to issue such directives only with respect to proceedings in California courts. The fact that the statute purports to issue directives that are beyond the power of the Legislature if the statute is construed to apply to primary offenses occurring in other jurisdictions, is an indication that the Legislature was not considering offenders on bail in other jurisdictions when it enacted section 12022.1.
Despite these indications of a more restrictive legislative intent, the contrary indications to which the majority opinion refers are in my judgment more persuasive. The statute does make unqualified reference to “a felony offense.” There is no suggestion in the legislative history that the Legislature intended to treat offenders on bail in other states less sternly than those committing new offenses while on bail in California. No plausible reason has been suggested why the Legislature might wish to draw such a distinction. Thus, it seems much more likely that the Legislature simply overlooked potential qualifications in the application of the statute to persons on bail for primary out-of-state offenses than that the Legislature did not intend section 12022.1 to apply to such persons at all. Moreover, the more expansive interpretation of the statute is consistent with the public policy evidenced by the very enhancement provisions cited above of applying such provisions to offenses occurring in other jurisdictions. Indeed, section 668 expresses this policy broadly, and without limitation, with respect to “all statutes that provide for an enhancement or a term of imprisonment based on a prior conviction or a prior prison term.”2 Although section 12022.1 bases the enhancement not on the fact of a prior conviction but on the offender’s status on bail when committing the subsequent offense, the policy evidenced by section 668 and the other enhancement provisions is equally applicable in the present context.
*1122Although I join in the court’s interpretation of section 12022.1,1 would urge that consideration be given to amending the statute to eliminate the potential for uncertainty. In this case defendant’s primary offense unquestionably is a felony under the laws of both states. When that is not so, the uncertainty will assume greater significance.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 18, 2005, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 10, 2005. Werdegar, J., did not participate therein.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Section 668 reads: “Every person who has been convicted in any other state, government, country, or jurisdiction of an offense for which, if committed within this state, that person could have been punished under the laws of this state by imprisonment in the state prison, is punishable for any subsequent crime committed within this state in the manner prescribed by law and to the same extent as if that prior conviction had taken place in a court of this state. The application of this section includes, but is not limited to, all statutes that provide for an enhancement or a term of imprisonment based on a prior conviction or a prior prison term.”