I respectfully dissent. The majority spends a great deal of time analyzing evidence presented at trial that might have led a fact finder to entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant was the perpetrator of the assault. Yet the existence of evidence that could have supported a reasonable doubt is of minimal relevance to the issues actually before us in this case. Severance is not required merely because the evidence is strong as to one count and could support a reasonable doubt as to the other. Instead, the determination of whether to sever counts is committed to the discretion of the trial court, which must balance a number of relevant factors. Unlike my colleagues, I would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s severance motion. I would also conclude that defendant was not denied due process by the joint trial of the indecent exposure and assault offenses. As there were no other prejudicial errors, I would affirm the judgment.
I. Factual Background
On September 30, 2004, about 4:00 p.m., Gina1 was walking into the mobilehome park where she lived. She saw a white Ford Probe next to her that was moving very slowly. The man driving the car said “[cjome here.” He spoke English. Gina approached the passenger window of the car and noticed that the man driving the car was naked from the waist down and was masturbating. Gina ran to the manager’s house, and the man parked in front of that house. Gina wrote down the license number of the man’s car. No one was home at the manager’s house, so Gina ran to the manager’s office. As she ran, she called out “Julio,” and the man drove off. Gina ran home and called the police. In October 2004, Gina identified a photograph of defendant in a photo lineup as the man she had seen masturbating in the Ford Probe. Defendant’s residence was 2.3 miles from the mobilehome park.
At 5:00 a.m. on December 30, 2004, Gloria parked her car in the parking lot of the shopping center where she worked at an outdoor table selling *413tamales in front of a market. The shopping center was 2.4 miles from the mobilehome park where Gina lived and about 4 miles from defendant’s residence. Although it was dark outside, the area was lit by street lights and lights in the parking lot. No one was around when Gloria began unloading her equipment from her car in front of the market. As Gloria was getting back into her car to reposition it, a man appeared at her car door. She asked if he could help her, and he grabbed her and pushed her into the car. Although the light in her car was not on, Gloria could see her assailant’s face due to the parking lot lights. Her assailant grabbed her hair and pulled it back. Gloria held onto the steering wheel so that her assailant would not be able to force her to lie down.
She asked him if he wanted money, and he said no. He told her to stop struggling and “allow myself to have it done . . . .” Gloria does not speak English, and her assailant spoke to her in “kind of broken half Spanish.” He said he had a gun and a knife. Gloria saw a small knife in his hand. She kept struggling, and her assailant “seemed to become even more aggressive.” He kept pulling her hair “really hard.” During their struggle, he cut her hand with his knife, although she did not notice it at the time. Gloria got a good look at his face, which was just six inches away from her face. Finally, Gloria was able to lift up her leg and push her assailant out of the car. She pushed “as hard as I could and I shot out the [passenger] door on the other side.” Gloria saw her assailant go toward the back of the bakery which was adjacent to the market.
Gloria ran to the bakery screaming for help. Armondo Romero, who worked at the bakery, came out of the bakery to help her. Gloria saw her assailant drive off from behind the bakery in a black “truck” similar to a Ford Bronco. She noticed that the vehicle was missing its back window. Romero also saw the vehicle, which he described as a dark-colored pickup truck. The police arrived in about 10 minutes.
Gloria described her assailant to the police as a five-foot nine-inch tall man who was thin and in his mid-20’s. He had dark brown hair and light skin, and she thought he might be “Mexican American” because of his broken Spanish. His hair was short and combed back, and he was wearing a black jacket. She told the police that his vehicle was a black Ford Bronco from around 1986, although she was not certain about the year.
A few days after the attack, Gloria saw a parked black Ford Bronco that was similar to the vehicle her assailant had been driving. She contacted the police, but it was determined that this Bronco was not involved in the attack.
*414A week after the attack, Gloria met with a police sketch artist who produced a sketch of her assailant from her description. Gloria felt that this sketch was “pretty close” to depicting her assailant.
A couple of weeks after the attack, Gloria was inside a building at a carwash when she saw defendant sitting in his truck in a nearby parking lot. Gloria was certain that defendant was the man who had assaulted her. Gloria tried unsuccessfully to telephone the police. Defendant kept moving his truck around from one parking space to another. Eventually he drove into another parking lot across the street, and Gloria followed him on foot. When the truck turned around and headed toward her, she ducked into a store and was able to write down the truck’s license plate number as it passed the store. The truck was missing its rear window. After noting the license plate number, Gloria called the police again, and she and her brother followed the truck a few blocks to a house, where the truck parked. Defendant got out of the truck and went into his residence. Gloria and her brother remained in their car, a few houses away, awaiting the arrival of the police.
The police arrived and brought defendant out of the house. Gloria identified defendant as her assailant. He was wearing the same black jacket that he had been wearing when he assaulted her. Defendant’s truck was a 1981 Chevy Blazer. Ford Broncos and Chevy Blazers were “somewhat similar” in the 198'0’s. The sketch of Gloria’s assailant was similar to a photograph of defendant taken in 2002. Defendant was a 28-year-old White man who was five feet 10 inches tall and weighed 180 pounds. He was the registered owner of both the white Ford Probe that bore the license plate number recorded by Gina, and the black 1981 Chevy Blazer that Gloria had trailed from the carwash to defendant’s home. A small retractable knife was found in defendant’s home.
II. Procedural Background
Defendant was charged by information with assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220), assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1). It was further alleged that defendant had personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of the assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)).
At trial, Gloria made an in-court identification of defendant, and the jury had an opportunity to observe defendant’s appearance, including his face and his body. The defense presented expert testimony on “human perception and human memory” to challenge the accuracy of Gloria’s identification of defendant as her assailant. A friend of defendant’s testified at trial that *415defendant is one of the top-ranked Americans in Brazilian jujitsu, a martial art in which leverage is utilized for self-defense and “ground fighting.”
After about a day of deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts and found the personal use allegation true. Defendant, who was free on bail, failed to appear for sentencing, and he was charged with failure to appear while released on bail (Pen. Code, § 1320.5). He pleaded guilty to that count and was sentenced to a total of five years eight months in prison for all of his convictions.2 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
HI. Discussion
A. Joint Trial of Indecent Exposure and Assault Counts
1. Background
The indecent exposure count was consolidated with the other counts in advance of the preliminary examination. Defendant moved in limine to sever the indecent exposure count from the other counts. His motion implicitly conceded that the assault with intent to commit rape count and the indecent exposure count were “of the same class of crimes.” He claimed that severance should be ordered because a joint trial would substantially prejudice him. Defendant argued that the indecent exposure evidence was not cross-admissible, and a joint trial would pair a weak case (the assault) with a strong case (the indecent exposure) to his prejudice.
The defense submitted an expert’s affidavit in support of its contention that the commission of the indecent exposure offense was not probative as to propensity to commit a sex offense. The expert opined that “[exhibitionist behavior alone cannot be considered indicative of or a precursor to an individual committing an act of rape. ... A small proportion of exhibitionists are known to commit acts of rape.” The underlying data cited by the expert in his affidavit indicated that about a quarter of exhibitionists commit rape and about a quarter of rapists have a history of exhibitionism.
At the hearing on the in limine motion, defendant’s trial counsel argued that the indecent exposure evidence was not cross-admissible, and that the indecent exposure case was a strong case involving “minimal conduct” that would be joined with the weaker, more inflammatory assault case. Defendant’s trial counsel relied on the expert’s affidavit to support her claim that evidence of the indecent exposure was not probative as to the assault. She *416argued that “it’s prejudicial to join the two counts.” The prosecutor argued that evidence of the indecent exposure was cross-admissible under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 1108. The court denied the severance motion on the ground that defendant would not be unduly prejudiced by a joint trial.
In his opening argument to the jury, the prosecutor told the jury that it could “consider the facts behind what happened to [Gina] in deciding the offenses in Counts One and Two, the assault cases.” “We don’t have DNA but we do have the fact he committed this 314 [indecent exposure].” “The modus operandi was absolutely the same, ladies and gentlemen. He sought out a woman that was alone while he was using his car.”
Defendant’s trial counsel conceded in closing argument that defendant was guilty of the indecent exposure count. Defendant’s trial counsel argued that the indecent exposure offense was so different from the assault that it did nothing to support a finding that defendant had committed the assault.
The prosecutor argued in his closing argument that the indecent exposure offense was circumstantial evidence that could be considered on the assault counts. “And it’s important to remember when you’re deciding the evidence you can consider ¿1 of the facts. [|] You need to decide each count separately, but you can consider all of the facts, with all of the counts. When deciding each count, you’re not limited—you don’t have to say, we can only consider what [Gloria] says. You need to consider everything.”
2. Consolidation
Defendant’s initial contention is that the indecent exposure count should never have been consolidated with the assault with intent to commit rape count in the first place, because the two counts were not “of the same class of crimes or offenses” within the meaning of Penal Code section 954.3 -
“An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts . . . ; provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its *417discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 954, italics added.) The phrase of “ ‘ “ ‘the same class of crimes’ ” ’ ” means “ ‘ “offenses possessing common characteristics or attributes.” ’ ” (People v. Kemp (1961) 55 Cal.2d 458, 476 [11 Cal.Rptr. 361, 359 P.2d 913].) Appellate courts exercise independent review in resolving whether the offenses are “ ‘of the same class’ ” within the meaning of Penal Code section 954. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].)
A person commits indecent exposure when he or she willfully and lewdly exposes his or her private parts in a public place. (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1.) The exposure must be “sexually motivated.” (In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 366 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807].) The prohibition against indecent exposure is contained in title 9 of part 1 of the Penal Code, which contains “Crimes Against the Person Involving Sexual Assault, and Crimes Against Public Decency.” A person commits an assault with intent to commit rape when he or she assaults another with the intent to commit rape. (Pen. Code, § 220.) The prohibition against assault with intent to commit rape is contained in title 8 of part 1 of the Penal Code, which contains “Crimes Against the Person.” There are many types of rape, but rape generally refers to an act of sexual intercourse that is accomplished against another’s will by force. (Pen. Code, § 261.) Like the prohibition against indecent exposure, the prohibition against rape is contained in title 9 of part 1 of the Penal Code.
In People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1] (Maury), the California Supreme Court found that murder and rape were “ ‘of the same class of crimes’ ” because they were both “assaultive crimes against the person” and therefore were properly joined under Penal Code section 954. {Maury, at p. 395.) Maury is instructive. The prohibition against murder, like the prohibition against assault with intent to commit rape, is contained in title 8 of part 1 of the Penal Code. The prohibition against rape, like the prohibition against indecent exposure, is contained in title 9. Murder and rape have in common that they are assaultive acts against a person; assault with intent to commit rape and indecent exposure have in common that they are sexually motivated acts. Murder and rape are of a class of assaultive crimes on persons; assault with intent to commit rape and indecent exposure are of a class of sexually motivated crimes. Assault with intent to commit rape and indecent exposure are “of the same class of crimes” within the meaning of Penal Code section 954 because these two crimes possess a common characteristic—sexual motivation.
Defendant argues that two offenses are not of the “same class” unless they are “genetically” similar and share a “common element of substantial importance.” Offenses must share a “ ‘common element of substantial importance’ ” to qualify for joinder as “ ‘connected together in their commission’ ” *418under Penal Code section 954. (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [117 Cal.Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752].) However, offenses may alternatively qualify for joinder if they are “of the same class of crimes.” If the “common element of substantial importance” requirement applied to the “same class of crimes,” the “same class of crimes” language in Penal Code section 954 would be surplusage.
Moreover, indecent exposure and assault with intent to commit rape do share a “common element of substantial importance.” The quintessential element of assault with intent to commit rape is the sexual motivation for the assault—the intent to commit rape. The quintessential element of indecent exposure is the sexual motivation for the exposure—the lewd intent. Hence, these two offenses do share a common element of substantial importance—a sexually motivated act.4 The consolidation of the indecent exposure count with the assault with intent to commit rape count did not violate Penal Code section 954.
3. Denial of Severance Motion
Defendant asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to sever the indecent exposure count from the assault counts.
“The prosecution is entitled to join offenses under the circumstances specified in section 954. The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried. [Citations.] When the offenses are [properly] joined for trial the defendant’s guilt of all the offenses is at issue and the problem of confusing the jury with collateral matters does not arise. The other-crimes evidence does not relate to [an] offense for which the defendant may have escaped punishment. That the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible may be considered as a factor suggesting possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations that are not present when evidence of uncharged offenses is offered must be weighed in ruling on a severance motion. The burden is on the defendant therefore to persuade the court that these countervailing considerations are outweighed by a substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 938-939 [251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996].)
“Not only is the burden allocated differently in cases involving properly joined charges as compared with cases involving the introduction of uncharged misconduct, but the nature of the abuse of discretion standard—and *419the ensuing method utilized to analyze prejudice, undertaken to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in a specific case—also are significantly different from what is employed in determining whether a trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence of uncharged misconduct.” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 774 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 188, 200 P.3d 816] (Soper).)
“To demonstrate that a denial of severance was reversible error, defendant must ‘ “clearly establish that there [was] a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 510 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 245, 150 P.3d 1224].) “A trial court’s denial of a motion for severance of charged offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion if the ‘ “trial court’s ruling ‘ “falls outside the bounds of reason.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] In making that assessment, we consider the record before the trial court when it made its ruling. [Citation.] ‘The factors to be considered are these: (1) the cross-admissibility of the evidence in separate trials; (2) whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.’ [Citations.] ‘The state’s interest in joinder gives the court broader discretion in ruling on a motion for severance than it has in ruling on admissibility of evidence.’ ” (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220-1221 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 185 P.3d 708] (Alcala).)
Defendant claims that the admission of evidence of the indecent exposure offense at a joint trial posed a substantial danger of prejudice to him with respect to his identity defense to the assault counts. Consideration of the relevant factors does not support his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise.
Cross-admissibility is the key factor. “If the evidence in each case is shown to be cross-admissible in the others, ordinarily any inference of prejudice from joinder of charges is dispelled.” (People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1222 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) The prosecutor argued below that evidence of the indecent exposure would have been admissible under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 1108 at a separate trial of the assault counts.5 Evidence of an uncharged crime is admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) “when relevant to prove some *420fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .).” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Evidence Code section 1108 permits the admission of evidence of an uncharged sexual offense to prove disposition in a sex offense prosecution. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).)
Defendant claims, and the majority accepts, that there was no dispute at trial about the intent for his assault on Gloria. On this basis, they maintain that the admission of evidence of the indecent exposure offense under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) at a separate trial on the assault counts would have been prohibited as cumulative and unnecessary. I disagree. The severance motion was ruled on in limine, and the prosecution remained under the burden of proving that the perpetrator of the assault intended to commit rape. In light of the absence of any evidence that Gloria’s assailant touched, or attempted to touch, her private parts, attempted to remove her clothing, or unequivocally expressed any sexual intent, the trial court could have concluded that evidence of defendant’s sexual intent, in the form of his indecent exposure offense, was probative on the specific intent element of the assault count.
“The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent.” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757] (Ewoldt).) “In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]’ ” (Ewoldt, at p. 402.) The indecent exposure offense was “sufficiently similar” to the assault offense to support the inference that defendant probably harbored the same intent on both occasions. The fact that, just three months before the assault, defendant approached a female stranger who was alone, summoned her to his car window, and lewdly exposed his private parts to her tended to show that, when defendant approached the car window of another lone female stranger, he harbored a similar lewd intent. Consequently, evidence of the indecent exposure offense would have been admissible in a separate trial of the assault count under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
Defendant and the majority also contend that evidence of the indecent exposure offense would not have been admissible under Evidence Code section 1108 in a separate trial of the assault counts to prove that defendant was disposed to commit rape. They assert that the defense produced evidence at the in limine hearing that exhibitionists are not likely to commit rape, and the prosecution failed to produce evidence that exhibitionists are likely to commit rape. In their view, the indecent exposure evidence was therefore not relevant to show a disposition to commit rape. I disagree.
*421It is simply not true, as the majority asserts, that the jury lacked a rational basis for drawing a relevant inference in the absence of expert testimony that it was more likely than not that an exhibitionist, in the abstract, would commit rape.6 The trial court was not obligated to credit the defense expert’s declaration, and it could also reasonably conclude that the jury would not face the abstract question addressed by the expert. Here, the question of fact that would be placed before the jury at trial was whether a man who summoned a lone female stranger to his car window to view his exposed erect penis was likely to commit other sexually motivated offenses against lone female strangers. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that these specific facts provided a rational basis for drawing such an inference. On this basis, the court could have concluded that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1108.
Defendant maintains that the trial court could not have concluded that the indecent exposure would have been admissible in a separate trial of the assault counts because the admissibility of the indecent exposure evidence depended upon an Evidence Code section 352 analysis.7 Not so. “[Ajlthough in the context of evidence of uncharged offenses offered at trial, a court conducts an assessment concerning prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 [citation], by contrast, in the context of properly joined offenses, ‘a party seeking severance must make a stronger showing of potential prejudice than would be necessary to exclude other-crimes evidence in a severed trial’ [citation]. In the context of properly joined offenses, we assess potential prejudice not under Evidence Code section 352, but instead in the context of the traditional four factors outlined above: cross-admissibility of charges; tendency of the charges to inflame the jury; the bolstering of a weak case; and the conversion of noncapital charges into a capital case.” (Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1222, fn. 11.) The trial court was not required to conduct an Evidence Code section 352 analysis in considering the cross-admissibility of the indecent exposure evidence.
Defendant implicitly concedes that, where there is cross-admissibility, the other factors need not be considered. However, the majority devotes considerable attention to these other factors. I can find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the remaining factors did not preclude the joint trial of these counts.
*422While the indecent exposure case was strong, the assault case was not as weak as the majority contends. The majority’s analysis of the alleged weakness of the assault count is premised on the validity of defendant’s various challenges in the trial court to the reliability of Gloria’s identification of him and his vehicle. Yet the defense case was fully presented to the jury and rejected by it. Gloria’s descriptions of her assailant and his vehicle immediately after the assault were consistent with defendant and his vehicle. The sketch produced from her description was, as the prosecution argued and the defense conceded at trial, quite similar to a photograph of defendant, and Gloria identified the black jacket defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest as the black jacket worn by her assailant. The indecent exposure case was significantly stronger than the assault case due to the license plate number linking defendant’s vehicle to the offense, but the discrepancy was not nearly so vast as the majority opinion claims.
Finally, the indecent exposure count was hardly inflammatory in comparison to the assault counts. The assault counts involved very violent conduct, the use of a knife, and the infliction of a knife wound on Gloria, while the indecent exposure count was committed without any physical contact between defendant and Gina.
These factors provide no support for a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. The majority disregards the fact that our review of the trial court’s ruling is highly deferential. The sole factor favoring severance was the imbalance in the strength of the evidence between the two counts. “A mere imbalance in the evidence, however, will not indicate a risk of prejudicial ‘spillover effect,’ militating against the benefits of joinder and warranting severance of properly joined charges. [Citation.] Furthermore, the benefits of joinder are not outweighed—and severance is not required—merely because properly joined charges might make it more difficult for a defendant to avoid conviction compared with his or her chances were the charges to be separately tried.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 781.) Here, the indecent exposure offense was cross-admissible and was not inflammatory, and the benefits of joinder were substantial.
“[T]he benefits to the state, in the form of conservation of judicial resources and public funds . . . often weigh strongly against severance of properly joined charges.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774, citation omitted.) “[A]s a general matter, a single trial of properly joined charges promotes important systemic economies. Whenever properly joined charges are severed, the burden on the public court system of processing the charges is substantially increased. Even assuming that some level of economy might be preserved by (when possible) appointing or assigning the same counsel, investigators, and paralegals to prosecute and defend each charge separately, *423merely segmenting the proceedings typically will result in inefficiency. For example, each of the numerous procedural steps attendant to any criminal proceeding—such as discovery, pretrial motions, as well as trial sessions themselves—would proceed on discrete tracks. Additionally, when two previously joined matters advance to separate trials, approximately twice as many prospective jurors would need to be summoned and subjected to the selection process.
“Further amplifying these and related trial-level inefficiencies resulting from separate trials is the appeal of right afforded to all convicted criminal defendants. Separate appellate records would be compiled by the clerk’s offices of the respective trial courts. Even assuming the same appellate counsel could be appointed or assigned to represent the parties, once again merely segmenting the proceedings generally will cause inefficiency. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal, through its own clerk’s office, would be required to manage and process discrete appeals, and provide an opportunity for separate oral arguments. Individual written decisions would be drafted, considered, and filed. Subsequently, separate petitions for rehearing could be filed in the Court of Appeal, followed by individual petitions for review in [the California Supreme] court. T[he California Supreme] court, in turn, would need to process, analyze, and dispose of each. Thereafter, separate collateral reviews at the three levels of the federal court system—reprising versions of many of the procedures outlined above—could ensue.
“Although our courts work diligently to ensure due process in all proceedings, their resources are limited. California’s trial courts in particular face ever-increasing civil and criminal dockets without any guarantee of corresponding, additional funds for court services—judges, judicial staff, and clerk’s office personnel—to meet the demand. Today, no less than in the past, the opportunity for joinder and its attendant efficiencies provided by section 954 is integral to the operation of our public court system. Manifestly, severance of properly joined charges denies the state the substantial benefits of efficiency and conservation of resources otherwise afforded by section 954.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 782.)
Hence, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the imbalance in the evidence did not pose such a high danger of undue prejudice as to require the severance of these counts. Thus, I would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s severance motion.
4. Due Process
Defendant also urges that the joint trial of the indecent exposure and assault counts resulted in such gross unfairness that he was denied due *424process. “Even if a trial court’s severance or joinder ruling is correct at the time it was made, a reviewing court must reverse the judgment if the ‘defendant shows that joinder actually resulted in “gross unfairness” amounting to a denial of due process.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 162 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) Defendant claims that he was unfairly prejudiced by the lack of a limiting instruction restricting the jury’s use of the indecent exposure in determining his guilt on the assault counts, and by the prosecutor’s improper reliance on the indecent exposure in closing argument.
a. Lack of Limiting Instruction
Defendant claims that he was unduly prejudiced because the trial court failed to sua sponte give the jury a limiting instruction on the uses to which the jury could put evidence of the indecent exposure in determining defendant’s guilt on tiie assault counts. “The trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction on cross-admissible evidence in a trial of multiple crimes.” (Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 394.) Even if there is an exception to this rule where the joined offense was “ ‘a dominant part of the evidence against the accused [on the other offenses], and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose’ ” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 854 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135]), such an exception would not apply here.
The indecent exposure evidence was more than minimally relevant because it showed both defendant’s sexual intent toward lone female strangers and his propensity to commit sexually motivated acts against them. And it was not a “dominant part of the evidence” against defendant on the assault counts. The assault counts were primarily premised on Gloria’s testimony. The prosecutor simply relied on the indecent exposure evidence to corroborate Gloria. In his closing argument, the prosecutor explained; “I’m not bootstrapping and I’m not asking you to convict Mr. Earle of Counts one and two [the assault counts] because he’s guilty of count three [the indecent exposure count], absolutely not, and it would be wrong to do that.” “The purpose of count three and the reason I’m arguing it is not to say, oh, well, he did that so he’s therefore, definitely guilty of counts one and two. [f] It’s to say and explain, and hopefully clarify for you, that when [Gloria] says, ‘that’s the guy.’ You understand and realize that it’s not a mistake, that it’s not a coincidence, because under the defense theory, it’s a mistaken identity.” Because the indecent exposure evidence had significant relevance on intent and propensity as to the assault count, the trial court was not obligated to give a limiting instruction sua sponte.
Nor was it unreasonable for defendant’s trial counsel to fail to request a limiting instruction. A limiting instruction would have highlighted the fact *425that the indecent exposure evidence was admissible to show defendant’s propensity for committing sexually motivated crimes. “A reasonable attorney may have tactically concluded that the risk of a limiting instruction . . . outweighed the questionable benefits such instruction would provide.” (Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 394.)
Since a limiting instruction could have done defendant more harm than good, its absence did not unduly prejudice him or deny him a fair trial.
b. Prosecutorial Argument
Defendant also asserts that the joint trial of the indecent exposure count and the assault count enabled the prosecutor to use derogatory epithets, and make improper comments about defendant’s motive and modus operandi, in his argument to the jury.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury: “Statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence.” And the court told the jury: “Each count charges a distinct crime. You must decide each count separately. The defendant may be found not guilty or guilty of any or all of the crimes charged.” The prosecutor thereafter argued to the jury: “Probably the most powerful evidence, we don’t have any DNA, Ladies and Gentlemen. But what we do have is powerful powerful corroboration. And that is the defendant’s indecent exposure three months prior to the assault.” After noting that the defense had not challenged Gina’s testimony that defendant was the man who had exposed himself to her, the prosecutor asserted: “This man is a predator. He’s building up. He’s starting small. He exposes himself, [f] Is it really a stretch to think that his next step, three months later, because he gets so agitated, for whatever reason, whatever his state of mind, is he decides to commit a sexual assault.” At this point, defendant’s trial counsel objected: “Objection, your honor. There’s no evidence as to this argument.” The court responded: “The jury has already been admonished that evidence is to be decided from the testimony of witnesses. You have some latitude with respect to argument. [][] They can give it whatever weight they want.”
The prosecutor subsequently argued that defendant had the means, motive, and opportunity to commit the assault on Gloria. “ ‘Motive’ we know the defendant is a sexual deviant because he masterbated [sic] in front of [Gina]. There’s no question he’s sexually deviant. What kind of person is going to call a woman up to his car. She walks up to him. He’s got no pants on and he’s masterbating [szc], This is a scary guy.” At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s opening argument, he again said that defendant had committed the indecent exposure and “[h]e is a predator.” “His behavior in indecent exposure establishes he’s a predator. His behavior when he assaulted [Gloria] establishes he’s a predator.”
*426Defendant claims that he was unduly prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper argument, based solely on the indecent exposure, that defendant was a “predator,” “a sexual deviant,” and “a scary guy.” While these epithets carried a certain power, it is only undue prejudice that must be avoided, “not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) “A prosecutor is given wide latitude during closing argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it is a fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn therefrom. ‘ “A prosecutor may ‘vigorously argue his case and is not limited to “Chesterfieldian politeness” ’ [citation], and he may ‘use appropriate epithets ....’” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 244 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 106 P.3d 895] (Harrison).)
An act is “predatory” if it “exploits] others for personal gain or profit.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diet. (10th ed. 1993) p. 917 (Webster’s).) Defendant’s indecent exposure exploited Gina for defendant’s sexual enjoyment and therefore it was a predatory act. A sexual “deviant” is a person who engages in sexual behavior that departs “significantly from the behavioral norms” of society. (Webster’s, at p. 317.) Clearly, a man who summons a lone female stranger to his car to expose his genitals and his masturbatory activity is a person who is engaging in sexual behavior that significantly departs from our societal norms. Gina’s testimony also provided substantial support for the prosecutor’s assertion that defendant was “a scary guy.” After being exposed to defendant’s indecency, Gina immediately ran away screaming for help, and she kept running until defendant left the area. A reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that she did so because she found defendant to be “a scary guy.”
It follows that the prosecutor’s references to defendant as a predator, a sexual deviant, and a scary guy were appropriate epithets, because they were reasonable deductions from the evidence. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that these were appropriate epithets to describe a person who, in broad daylight, summoned a lone, unsuspecting female stranger to his car so that he could lewdly display to her that he was naked from the waist down and was masturbating.
More importantly, the prosecutor’s opportunity to use such epithets in argument cannot be attributed to the joint trial of the indecent exposure and assault counts. The prosecutor could have properly utilized the same epithets based solely on the assault counts. A man who uses a knife to force his way into the car of a lone female stranger in order to perpetrate a sexually motivated attack on her is reasonably characterized as a predator, a sexual deviant, and “a scary guy.”
*427Defendant also contends that the joint trial of the indecent exposure and assault counts permitted him to be unduly prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper argument that the indecent exposure offense showed that defendant had a “motive” to commit the assault and that the indecent exposure and assault offenses had a common modus operandi. “When the issue ‘focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (Harrison, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 244.)
Defendant views the prosecutor’s comments through a narrow lens that tightly focuses on the legal meaning of “motive” and “modus operandi.” However, it is not reasonably likely that the jury attached anything other than their common meaning to these terms. In common parlance, “motive” refers to “something (as a need or desire) that causes a person to act.” (Webster’s, supra, at p. 759.) The jury would have understood the prosecutor’s comment about motive to refer to defendant’s desire for sexual stimulation. The evidence supported the inference that defendant’s base desire for sexual stimulation motivated both the indecent exposure and the assault. The common meaning of “modus operandi” is “a method of procedure.” (Webster’s, at p. 748.) The jury would have understood the prosecutor’s use of the term “modus operandi” to refer to the fact that both the indecent exposure and the assault involved defendant arriving in a vehicle, approaching a female stranger who was alone, seeking nonconsensual sexual stimulation, and then escaping in his vehicle after the female fled and screamed for help. Notwithstanding some notable distinctions between the two events, these similarities could well have suggested to a rational fact finder that defendant utilized a common “method of procedure” on both occasions. While the joint trial of the indecent exposure and assault counts allowed the prosecutor to make such an argument, the cross-admissibility of the indecent exposure evidence would have permitted such an argument even in separate trials.
Defendant has failed to establish that the joint trial of the indecent exposure and assault counts deprived him of a fair trial.
B. Other Contentions
1. Comments on Failure to Produce Alibi Evidence
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to present alibi evidence.
*428a. Background
The court instructed the jury: “A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. You must not draw any inference from the fact the defendant does not testify. Further, you must neither discuss this matter nor permit it to enter into your deliberations in any way.” “No lack of testimony on the defendant’s part will make up for a failure of proof by the People so as to support a finding against him on any essential elements.”
As part of his argument about defendant’s “opportunity” to commit the assault on Gloria, the prosecutor argued that defendant had had the opportunity to call any witnesses he wished to call. “Ladies and gentlemen, did we hear an alibi? Did they present any evidence that he didn’t have the opportunity to commit these crimes? We didn’t hear from any of his friends except the [one] friend, and all he said was he’s good in jujitsu. [][] No friends gave him an alibi. No family gave him an alibi, his girlfriend didn’t come to testify that she was with him. He lives with his mom and his brother. They didn’t come and testify where he was on the night, the morning. There’s no internet record to show he was surfing the internet at any particular time. No gasoline or credit card purchase was presented to show he was in a different area, [f] There’s no evidence presented he was in a competition, maybe he was out of state, maybe he was in a different country. He’s such a great grappler, maybe he’s going to competition. There’s absolutely no evidence of an alibi, ladies and gentlemen. [][] Now, what does that tell you? It doesn’t prove that he’s guilty. What it shows, ladies and gentlemen, is that he had the opportunity, because I assure you, if he had an alibi, if they had some corroborating evidence to establish that he wasn’t there or didn’t have the opportunity to commit this crime, you would have heard that evidence. Since you didn’t hear it, you can infer that he did have the opportunity to commit this crime, because there was no evidence that he was someone [sz'c] else or that he was doing something with someone else or that he was in a different location.”
Defendant’s trial counsel addressed these comments at the beginning of her closing argument. “[The prosecutor] has flipped the presumption of innocence on its ear. Why didn’t Mr. Earle present any evidence? Why didn’t he have an alibi? []Q First of all, it was 5:00 o’clock in the morning, but that’s not the point. The point is that he doesn’t have to present anything. ... [][]... [][] The fact, when you look at this case, you must start with the presumption of innocence. And you can’t flip it on it’s [sz'c] ear to say, why didn’t Mr. Earle call anyone to say where he was at 5:00 in the morning. That is completely inappropriate and you must start with the presumption of innocence.” At this point, the prosecutor objected “to the characterization, that that was inappropriate.” The court sustained the objection “as to the argument as to that word, *429but you may continue.” Defendant’s trial counsel continued her argument. “The law requires a presumption of innocence. It does not require the defendant to prove anything.”
The prosecutor addressed this issue in his closing argument. “Defense said, well, mentioned something about . . . this alibi and suggested I made an improper argument and saying, why didn’t they bring in alibi evidence, [ft] Well, the defendant absolutely has the right not to present evidence. He doesn’t have to present evidence at all. In fact, he can just rely on the state of the evidence and not present any evidence and say, you know what, the people haven’t met their burden, [ft] And in fact when I made that argument about the alibi, how they didn’t present evidence of an alibi, he’s certainly not required to do it. And if the defense had not presented any evidence at all and just said, hey, you know what, Mr. Baker hasn’t proved his case, I wouldn’t have made that argument, [ft] But the defense decided to put on evidence. Decided to present a defense. They decided to attack the credibility of my witnesses and my victims, [ft] What better way to attack the credibility of these witnesses and victims than if he had just presented an alibi, but he didn’t. He doesn’t have to, but he has the constitutional right to do so. [ft] Now, does that in and of itself prove that he’s guilty? [ft] No. [ft] Should you convict him because he didn’t present evidence of an alibi? [ft] Absolutely not. [ft] And that would be completely wrong. If you went back there and said, hey, you know what, he didn’t present evidence of an alibi so therefore he’s guilty. No. Absolutely not. [ft] But it’s a fact to consider in the totality of the circumstances. It shows that he had an opportunity to commit this crime. We know he had the means. We know he had the motive.”
The prosecutor continued to argue this theme. “You cannot speculate as to possible facts. The defense says, well, they’re saying we should have presented an alibi. And it’s not fair, maybe three, four months after you’ve got to come in and present an alibi or figure out where you were, [ft] Well, Mr. Earle was arrested just a little over two weeks after this crime occurred. On top of that, the defense said, maybe my guy was alone, was sleeping at home by himself, well, there’s no evidence of that. There’s no evidence presented like that at all. You can’t consider it. You can’t consider comments of counsel and you can’t consider it unless you heard it on the witness stand or you see it in the exhibits.”
b. Analysis
Defendant argues that these comments violated the rule that a prosecutor “may not comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify in his or her own behalf.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259] (Bradford).) A prosecutor violates this rule “if he or she *430argues to the jury that certain testimony or evidence is uncontradicted, if such contradiction or denial could be provided only by the defendant, who therefore would be required to take the witness stand.” (Bradford, at p. 1339.) No violation occurs if the prosecutor’s “comments [are] based upon the state of the evidence or upon the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call anticipated witnesses.” (Ibid.)
Defendant’s argument is premised on his claim that only he could have provided himself with an alibi for the time of the attack on Gloria because it occurred at 5:00 a.m. Yet the prosecutor’s comments themselves highlighted the many other types of evidence that defendant could have produced to support an alibi defense. As the prosecutor pointed out, defendant could have produced a witness other than himself who was aware of his whereabouts at that time, such as a family member or a girlfriend. Or, as the prosecutor also noted, he could have produced documentary evidence that he was in another location at the time of the attack on Gloria. Since such evidence could have come from someone other than defendant, and the prosecutor made this clear, the prosecutor’s comments cannot be interpreted as improper comments on defendant’s failure to testify rather than proper comments on the defense’s failure to produce material evidence.
2. Cross-examination of Eyewitness Identification Expert
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly cross-examining the defense eyewitness identification expert.
a. Background
The prosecution moved in limine to limit the scope of the testimony of the defense’s eyewitness identification expert. This motion sought exclusion under Evidence Code section 352 of “any opinions or testimony by the doctor that relate specifically to the facts of this case,” including any “opinion as to the accuracy of the victim’s identification” and testimony “about specific facts of this case and how it might have affected the victim’s identification.” Defendant’s trial counsel stated at the in limine hearing that she did not intend to elicit such testimony. The court noted that no such testimony was going to be elicited, and it did not explicitly rule on the prosecution’s motion.
Geoffrey Loftus thereafter testified for the defense as an expert on “human perception and human memory.” He testified on direct examination that people “can report memories . . . with a great deal of confidence but memories that are just dead wrong in many important respects.” Loftus said that “the large majority” of those who have been wrongly convicted of crimes *431have been convicted on the basis of faulty eyewitness identification testimony. He identified four factors that could render a memory inaccurate. First, the environment at the time of the event, such as a lack of sufficient lighting, may preclude a clear assessment of the details. Events perceived at night under dim illumination may produce memories that lack color and fine detail. Second, the eyewitness may be stressed or otherwise debilitated at the time of the event. For instance, the eyewitness may not pay attention to other details when his or her attention is focused on a weapon. Third, the time between the event and the recollection of the memory may cause the witness to forget things or to reconstruct the memory based on information acquired after the event. Finally, the procedures used to elicit the recollection of the memory may be suggestive and cause distortion of the memory.
After Loftus’s extensive testimony on direct examination, the prosecutor began his cross-examination by asking Loftus to “clarify” that he had “no opinion” about whether defendant had committed the alleged crimes. Loftus confirmed as much. The prosecutor also asked Loftus whether he had visited the crime scene or tested the lighting levels there. Loftus confirmed that he had not. The prosecutor later had Loftus confirm that he had not been present during the trial or heard the evidence or seen the exhibits that had been introduced at trial.
Defendant’s trial counsel noted in her closing argument that Loftus “wasn’t here to decide if the I.D. was accurate. That’s your job. [f] What he was here to do was to provide tools to you so that you can evaluate how to determine the accuracy and the credibility of that identification, that’s what he was here to do, to educate, and that’s what he did.”
b. Analysis
Defendant contends on appeal that the prosecutor “committed misconduct by obtaining an in limine ruling restricting the direct examination of [Loftus], and then improperly exploiting this ruling on cross-examination.” This contention lacks merit. The prosecutor did not obtain an in limine ruling restricting Loftus’s testimony. Defendant’s trial counsel stated at the in limine hearing that she did not intend to offer the type of testimony that the prosecutor sought to bar. Hence, a ruling on the prosecutor’s motion was unnecessary. Since the defense never intended to elicit such testimony, there was nothing for the prosecutor to “improperly exploit[].” The prosecutor’s brief inquiry asking Loftus to confirm that he was not commenting on the particular facts of this case was entirely properly and was not misconduct.
*432IV. Conclusion
I would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s severance motion, no denial of due process, and no other prejudicial errors. Accordingly, other than requiring the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to correctly describe the Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) conviction as “Assault with a deadly weapon” rather than “Indecent exposure,” I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 24, 2009, S172442. Chin, J., and Corrigan, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
To avoid confusion, I adopt the majority opinion’s naming convention. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 380, fn. 1.)
There is an error on the abstract of judgment. The Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) conviction is erroneously described as the crime of “Indecent exposure.”
Defendant did not make this contention below, and the Attorney General contends that it was forfeited. However, defendant claims that his trial counsel was prejudicially deficient in failing to raise this contention below. I would resolve his contention on the merits so that it would not be necessary to consider whether defendant’s trial counsel was deficient in failing to raise this claim below.
I would reject defendant’s characterization of the similarity as merely “sexual misconduct.” The similarity is far more specific. The two offenses have very similar intent elements.
“[C]omplete (or so-called two-way) cross-admissibility is not required. In other words, it may be sufficient, for example, if evidence underlying charge ‘B’ is admissible in the trial of charge ‘A’—even though evidence underlying charge ‘A’ may not be similarly admissible in the trial of charge ‘B.’ ” (Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221.)
The defense expert’s declaration did establish that it was more likely that an exhibitionist, as opposed to a nonexhibitionist, would commit rape.
Defendant contends that the trial court’s ruling was deficient because the court did not explicitly mention cross-admissibility. There is no requirement that a trial court ruling on a severance motion detail its reasoning. The critical question in ruling on a severance motion is whether the defendant has shown a substantial danger of prejudice. The trial court explicitly stated that defendant would not be prejudiced by a joint trial. No further explanation was required.