The dispositive issue in this case is the declaration that the straightforward and unambiguous language of § 167.131, RSMo 2000,1 applies as written. Plaintiffs are parents and children who reside in the City of St. Louis transitional school district2 but attend schools in the Clayton school district pursuant to tuition agreements. After the transitional school district lost its state accreditation, the parents and children sued the Clayton school district, the board of education of the City *663of St. Louis and the transitional district of the City of St. Louis claiming the transitional school district was required to pay their tuition pursuant to § 167.131. The parents and children claim the plain language of § 167.131 requires unaccredited school districts to pay the tuition costs of its students who choose to attend an accredited school in an adjoining district.
The parents and the school districts both moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the school districts’ motion for summary judgment finding that § 167.131 was inapplicable to the transitional school district of the City of St. iLouis. The court of appeals issued an bpinion, but because of the general interest bnd importance of the issues in this case, it transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Rule 83.02.
I On appeal, the parents and children ar-ique that § 167.131 requires the transition-II school district to pay the children’s tu-lion costs for attending schools in the ■Slayton school district. This Court holds Biat § 167.131’s unambiguous mandatory Bmguage requires unaccredited school dis-Bicts to pay the tuition of its students who ■loose to attend an accredited school in an Bijoining district.3
I Facts
I Jane Turner, Susan Bruker, Gina Breit-Hifeld and William Drendel and their chil-H'en live within the boundaries of the tran-Hional school district of the City of St. ■mis. The parents’ children currently at-Hid schools in the Clayton school district Brsuant to personal tuition agreements Bfcween the parents and Clayton.
Hln June 2007, after the parents had en-H'ed into tuition agreements for the 2007-2008 school year, the transitional school district lost its accreditation. In response, one of the parents sent a letter to the Clayton school board asking it to charge the transitional school district for her children’s tuition pursuant to § 167.131 rather than charge her pursuant to the tuition agreement. The Clayton school district declined to seek payment from the transitional district.
The parents filed suit against the transitional school district, the Clayton school district and the board of education for the City of St. Louis, seeking a declaratory judgment that because the transitional school district lost accreditation, it was required to pay the children’s tuition for attending schools in the Clayton district. The parents’ amended petition also asserted a claim for restitution for tuition already paid.
The Clayton school district and the transitional school district filed separate motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The transitional school district argued § 167.131 does not apply to the City of St. Louis transitional school district, claiming that SB 781, passed in 1998, exclusively governs student transfers in the district. Clayton’s motion essentially restated the transitional school district’s motion. Clayton’s motion further argued that the “Safe Schools Act” gives school districts discretion to admit nonresident students from unaccredited districts under § 167.131 and that because Clayton refused to accept the children pursuant to that statute, their claims were foreclosed. Thereafter, the parents filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the claims in their petition. The circuit court, without stating a specific basis, *664granted the school districts’ motions for summary judgment.
Standard of Review
Whether summary judgment was proper is a question of law. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). This Court’s review of a grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo; therefore, the trial court’s order may be affirmed in this Court on an entirely different basis than that posited at trial, and this Court will affirm the grant of summary judgment under any appropriate theory. Id. at 376, 387-88; Comp & Soft, Inc. v. AT & T, 252 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Mo.App.2008). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered and affords that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. ITT Commercial Fin., 854 S.W.2d at 376. For summary judgment to be entered in its favor, the movant has the burden of proving that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 381.
Analysis
Section 167.131, a straightforward and unambiguous statute, was specifically written to apply to the factual scenario of this case. Section 167.131 plainly states that the boards of unaccredited schools “shall pay the tuition of and provide transportation ... for each pupil resident therein who attends an accredited school in another district of the same or an adjoining county” and, furthermore, that “each pupil shall be free to attend the public school of his or her choice.” Section 167.131.1, .2. It is clear that § 167.131 applies to the transitional school district, that it requires the Clayton school district to admit the students and that it mandates the transitional school district pay the students’ tuition. Once admitted, a student must comply with all disciplinary and academic standards in order to remain enrolled.
Section 167.131 is Applicable to the Transitional School District
The parents first claim that the circuit court erred in granting the transitional school district’s motion for summary judgment because a plain reading of § 167.131 demonstrates that it applies to the transitional school district. They further assert that the plain and unambiguous language of § 167.131 mandates payment of their children’s tuition under the circumstances presented in this case. This Court agrees.
Section 167.131 provides that a school district that loses accreditation with the state board of education must pay tuition for any resident pupil who attends an ac- I credited school in another district in the same or an adjoining county and sets the amount of tuition to be paid by the sending | school. Section 167.131 states:
1. The board of education of each dis-1 trict in this state that does not maintain | an accredited school pursuant to the authority of the state board of education to I classify schools as established in sectionl 161.092, RSMo, shall pay the tuition ofl ... each pupil resident therein who at-i tends an accredited school in another! district of the same or an adjoining county.
2. The rate of tuition to be charged bjl the district attended and paid by the sending district is the per pupil cost ol maintaining the district’s grade level grouping which includes the school atl tended. The cost of maintaining a gradf level grouping shall be determined b| the board of education of the district Per pupil cost of the grade level grout ing shall be determined by dividing tbl *665cost of maintaining the grade level grouping by the average daily pupil attendance .... Subject to the limitations of this section, each pupil shall be free to attend the public school of his or her choice.
(emphasis added).
In the present case, it is uncontested that the St. Louis public school district lost its accreditation with the state board of education. Additionally, it is uncontested that the parents and their children reside in the City of St. Louis, but the children attend accredited schools in a school district in an adjoining county. Considering only the plain and ordinary language of § 167.131.1, the uncontested facts show that § 167.131 applies to the transitional [school district under the circumstances present in this case.
The transitional school district challenges this plain reading of § 167.131 by [arguing that § 167.131 was intended to [apply only to situations in which an indi[vidual school in a district loses accreditation — not to deal with a district-wide loss fcf accreditation. The transitional school llistrict argues that the legislative history |)f § 167.131 supports its position and that this Court should examine that history to llivine the legislature’s true intent.
I The seminal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and to lonsider the words used in their plain and Irdinary meaning. State ex rel. Unnertall v. Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Mo. banc 2009). There is nothing in the B.nguage of § 167.131 indicating that the Hatute was not intended to apply to situa-Bons like the present, where a school dis-lict suffers a district-wide loss of accredi-Htion. Under § 167.131, a school district H obligated to pay the tuition of its stu-Hnts who attend an accredited school if He district “does not maintain an accredited school.” The fact that the entire St. Louis public school district lost its accreditation in 2007 necessarily means that it no longer maintains any accredited schools. Therefore, the plain language of § 167.131 encompasses the present situation. Because the plain and ordinary language of § 167.131 does not limit its application as urged by the transitional school district, there is no need to analyze the legislative history of the statute in an attempt to determine the legislative intent.
The transitional school district further argues that § 167.131 should not apply in the present case because the district maintains individual schools that are accredited by a private accreditation group. The fact that certain schools in the City of St. Louis may be accredited by a private organization is of no consequence. Section 167.131.1 speaks only of districts that do not maintain accredited schools “pursuant ■ to the authority of the state board of education to classify schools.” Accordingly, under § 167.131, the only relevant issue is whether the state board of education has classified the district or one of its schools as unaccredited. As noted above, it is undisputed that the St. Louis public school district lost its accreditation with the state board of education in 2007. Therefore, because the transitional school district does not maintain any schools accredited by the state department of education, it is unaccredited for purposes of § 167.131.
Section 167.131 is not in Conflict with SB 781
The parents next claim the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on grounds that § 167.131 was preempted by provisions in SB 781 and, therefore, that the transitional school district was not required to pay the students’ tuition. The parents assert that the provisions at issue in SB 781 do not preempt *666the application of § 167.131 to the transitional school district • because no conflicts exist between those provisions. In response, the school districts argue that the provisions in SB 781 apply specifically to the City of St. Louis and conflict with the generally applicable provisions of § 167.131 and, therefore, SB 781 should take precedence over § 167.131. Specifically, the school districts argue that § 162.1060, governing the publicly funded transfer of students out of the City of St. Louis, and § 162.1100, specifying how the city district will be governed in the event it loses accreditation, conflict with § 167.131.4
At the outset, it is noted that the school districts do not assert that SB 781 contains language expressly excluding the transitional school district from the application of § 167.131. The school districts’ argument that SB 781 should operate to exclude the application of § 167.131 to the transitional school district is not based on any textual conflict that exists between the two laws. Instead, the school districts’ argument is based on the fact that applying § 167.131 to the city district makes it more difficult to accomplish some of the statutory reforms mandated by SB 781.5
The school districts first argue that § 162.1060, as contained in SB 781, is in tension with § 167.131. Section 162.1060 created the “urban voluntary school transfer program” to transfer students between the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County to promote the desegregation of the city’s schools. Section 162.1060.1. Under the 1999 federal desegregation order, to which § 162.1060 is subject, eligible black students residing in the City of St. Louis are transferred to participating school districts in the county, while certain white students residing in predominately white school districts in the county are transferred to magnet schools in the city.
The districts identify two principal tensions that exist between § 162.1060 and § 167.131. First, the districts point out that the funding mechanisms are different in that § 167.131 requires the unaccredited school district to pay the child’s costs of attending another school, while transfers under § 162.1060 are funded by the corporation that oversees the urban voluntary school transfer program. Section 162.1060.3(2). The districts argue that applying § 167.131 to the City of St. Louis would siphon resources away from the city’s schools and thereby undermine one of the purposes of SB 781, which was to provide additional resources to the city district.6 Second, the districts argue that applying § 167.131 to the City of St. Louis will destabilize the urban voluntary school transfer program. They argue the transfer program will be destabilized because participating St. Louis County school dis*667tricts would be likely to discontinue participation in the program to accommodate the increasing number of city students choosing to transfer to county schools under § 167.181. As a result, the districts argue that the remedial purpose of § 162.1060— to desegregate the city’s schools — would be undermined.
The school districts also argue that § 162.1100, as contained in SB 781, conflicts with § 167.131. That provision directs how the St. Louis public school district is governed in the event that it loses state accreditation. Under § 162.1100.2(2), the governor is required to appoint a chief executive, who assumes all of the powers and duties of a general superintendent. After appointment of the chief executive, control of the district is taken away from the existing school board and is vested in a special administrative board. Section 162.1100.3. The special administrative board and the chief executive are responsible for taking broad actions aimed at restoring the city school district to accredited status. Section 162.1100.4(l)-(5). The districts argue that applying § 167.131 to the City of St. Louis would cause an exodus of students from St. Louis city schools to St. Louis County schools. In turn, the districts argue that the decreased enrollment in city schools would cause a large reduction in the city district’s state funding, thereby undermining the ability of the special administrative board to meet its statutory obligation of restoring the city district to accredited status.7
Despite their predictions about the effect of decreased funding on the St. Louis public school district, the school districts have failed to show that the legislature, by its enactment of SB 781, intended to exclude the city district from the application of § 167.131. As noted earlier, there is nothing in the language of SB 781 expressly exempting the transitional school district from the application of § 167.131, nor are there any textual inconsistencies that exist between the statutes that preclude the provisions of SB 781 and § 167.131 from operating concurrently. The school districts essentially ask this Court to find that SB 781 effectuated an implied partial repeal of § 167.131.
However, repeals by implication are disfavored. StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar, 208 S.W.3d 895, 905 n. 14 (Mo. banc 2006). “If by any fair interpretation both statutes may stand, there is no repeal by implication and both statutes must be given their effect.” Silcox v. Silcox, 6 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Mo. banc 1999). When two provisions are not irreconcilably inconsistent, both must stand even if “some tension” exists between them. StopAquila.org, 208 S.W.3d at 905. At most, SB 781 and § 167.131 are in tension with one another in that applying § 167.131 to the transitional school district makes the implementation of SB 781 more difficult. That alone is an insufficient basis for finding that the legislature intended to impliedly repeal the application of § 167.131 to the City of St. Louis.
This Court enforces statutes as they are written, not as they might have been written. City of Wellston v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 203 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Mo. banc 2006). It is presumed that the General Assembly legislates with knowledge of existing laws. State ex rel. Broadway-Washington Assocs., Ltd. v. Manners, 186 *668S.W.3d 272, 275 (Mo. banc 2006). Consequently, the Court must assume that the legislature was aware of § 167.131 when it enacted SB 781. If the legislature had intended to exclude the application of § 167.131 to the transitional school district when it enacted SB 781, it easily could have added such an exception.8 It did not.
Accordingly, the Court cannot supply what the legislature has omitted from controlling statutes. State ex rel. Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas v. Rooney, 402 S.W.2d 354, 362 (Mo. banc 1966); Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Mo. banc 2001) (“courts cannot transcend the limits of their constitutional powers and engage in judicial legislation supplying omissions and remedying defects in matters delegated to a coordinate branch of our tripartite government”). Moreover, it is not within the Court’s province to “question the wisdom, social desirability, or economic policy underlying a statute as these are matters for the legislature’s determination.” Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence County, Miller, 636 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo. banc 1982). The Court must enforce the law as it is written, which in the present case means that SB 781 applies concurrently with § 167.131.
Clayton School District is Required to Admit Students Pursuant to § 167.131
Clayton school district additionally argues that admission of students pursuant to § 167.131 is discretionary despite the mandatory language of the statute. Clayton school district asserts that § 167.020 gives a school district discretion whether to admit students under § 167.131.
This argument is based on language in § 167.020 that a student must obtain a waiver of the residency requirement. Section 167.020 is a general statute and makes no mention of § 167.131. The school district argues that they must be read in pari materia and harmonized.
The school district and the dissent would have this Court harmonize the statutes by making “shall” in § 167.131 a “may.” That was an option for the legislature. This Court determines the proper declaration is to recognize that § 167.131 was enacted to cover the factual scenario of this case and § 167.020 is a general statute. The doctrine of in pari materia recognizes that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read together, but where one statute deals with the subject in general terms and the other deals in a specific way, to the extent they conflict, the specific statute prevails over the general statute. Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of America, Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 673 n. 2 (Mo. banc 2009).
[T]he rules of statutory interpretation are not intended to be applied haphazardly or indiscriminately to achieve a desired result. Instead, the canons of statutory interpretation are considerations made in a genuine effort to determine what the legislature intended. This Court’s primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.
Id. at 672.
In this case, this Court need not look to § 167.020 because there is no *669need to refer to other similar statutes where a statute’s own language is clear. Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis, Inc. v. City of Wildwood, 107 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Mo. banc 2003). Or, in other words, this Court does not apply the canons of interpretation or seek aides to interpret a statute when a statute is easily read and understood.9 See, e.g., Ins. Co. of State of PA v. Dir. of Revenue and Dir. of Ins., 269 S.W.3d 32, 34 n. 5 (Mo. banc 2008) (There is no need to resort to statutory interpretation when a statute is unambiguous.); Hyde Park Housing P’ship v. Dir. of Revenue, 850 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 1993) (“Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction.”); Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Exp., 819 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1991) (internal citations omitted) (“There is no room for construction where words are plain and admit to but one meaning ... [wjhere no ambiguity exists, there is no need to resort lo rules of construction.”).
I The plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 167.131.2 that “each pupil lhall be free to attend the public school of lis or her choice” gives a student the Ihoice of an accredited school to attend, so Img as that school is in another district in Ihe same or an adjoining county, and re-luires the chosen school to accept the lupil. This interpretation is confirmed by lie fact that § 167.131.2 was amended to Innove the discretion previously given to lie student’s chosen school. The prior lirsion of § 167.131.2 provided “but no ■:hool shall be required to admit any pull.” Section 167.131.2, RSMo 1986. The Bgislature removed this language specifi-Blly taking away any discretion of the Bceiving school to deny admission under the circumstances of this case. See Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Mo. banc 2003) (“[w]hen the legislature amends a statute, that amendment is presumed to change the existing law.”). Therefore, § 167.131.2 does not give an accredited school chosen by a student discretion to deny admission to that student.
The dissent comes to the wrong conclusion because it starts with a false premise. Rather than analyzing the statute enacted by the legislature to specifically govern the particular situation when a school loses its accreditation, the dissent falsely assumes that a later enacted general statute governs over a previously enacted specific statute. In doing so, the dissent, with a particular result in mind, restates the issue assuming § 167.020 controls the issue of whether the Clayton school district has discretion to admit students from unaccredited schools seeking admission pursuant to § 167.131.
Children’s Admissions Were Under Tuition Agreements
The parents argue that the tuition agreements should be terminated for lack of consideration and contend that they have a right to restitution because they are now paying tuition for an education their children should have received for free under § 167.131. The contracts did not fail for lack of consideration, and the parents are not entitled to restitution.
The parents obtained the admission of their children to the Clayton school district pursuant to § 167.151.1 by entering into personal tuition agreements in which the parents agreed to pay their children’s ta-*670ition. Under the terms of those agreements, the Clayton school district was only obligated to allow the children to attend so long as the parents paid the children’s tuition. By arguing that the Clayton school district is now required to seek payment from the transitional school district and that the parents are entitled to restitution for tuition previously paid to the Clayton school district, the parents are attempting to bind the district beyond the terms of their tuition agreements.
An unambiguous contract must be enforced according to its terms. Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005). In the present case, the parents contractually obligated themselves to pay the children’s tuition in return for the Clayton school district’s promise to allow the students to enroll during the time period governed by the agreements. There was no contingency in the agreement that provided the parents were no longer required to pay the children’s tuition if the St. Louis public school district lost accreditation. Therefore, the Clayton school district is not obligated to seek payment from the transitional school district for the school years governed by the tuition agreements.
Further, there has been no failure of consideration. “[Consideration must be measured at the time the parties enter into their contract and [] the diminished value of the economic benefit conferred, or even a complete lack of value, does not result in a failure of consideration.” Weinstein v. KLT Telecom, Inc., 225 S.W.3d 413, 415-16 (Mo. banc 2007); see also Union Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas City Transit Co., 401 S.W.2d 528, 536 (Mo.App.1966) (citations omitted) (“If the promisor gets what he bargains for there is no failure of consideration, although what he receives becomes less valuable or of no value at all”). Here, the parents received the benefit of their bargain — the education of their children by the Clayton school district — and, therefore, cannot claim lack of consideration.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded.
PRICE, C.J., TEITELMAN, WOLFF and FISCHER, JJ., concur. BRECKENRIDGE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed. RUSSELL and STITH, JJ., concur in opinion of BRECKENRIDGE, J.. Unless otherwise noted, all references to § 167.131 and § 167.1060 are to RSMo 2000. All other statutory references are to RSMo Supp.2009.
. With the St. Louis public school district's loss of accreditation in 2007, the special administrative board of the transitional school district is the governing body of the St. Louis public school district. For the purpose of simplicity, this respondent will simply be referred to as the transitional school district.
. However, the parents are required to pay ^Biition for the school year covered by the ^Bontracts with Clayton school district, and the parents are not entitled to restitution for the amounts paid.
. Sections 162.1060 and 162.1100 were both, provisions contained in SB 781 and went into effect after the St. Louis desegregation case was settled.
. The policy considerations and mandates regarding public schools and public school funding are particularly well-suited for the state legislature and not the courts. For that reason, this Court will adhere to the express language of the statutes and not make an assumption that the legislature did not intend § 167.131 to apply to the St. Louis City school district. It could have easily done so when it enacted the legislation to enforce the desegregation of the St. Louis city schools.
. The school districts ignore the fact that a reduction in district resources inevitably results even when a transfer occurs pursuant to I the urban voluntary transfer program be-l cause, under § 162.1060.3(2), the state andl federal aid that otherwise would be paid to al student's district of residence is paid to thel transfer corporation, which in turn transferal the funds to the school district the studentl attends. I
. There is no factual information contained in this record to support this speculative claim, and this Court refuses to go outside the record below to decide this case. Neither will this Court speculate that a sufficient number of city students would choose any particular new district to make their attendance impossible. The dissent seeks to support this claim by taking judicial notice of census information and thereafter makes assumptions of fact.
. In fact, there are two instances in § 162.1100 in which the legislature expressly exempted the transitional school district from the operation of other statutes. For example, the transitional school district is not subject to any certificate of tax abatement issued pursuant to §§ 99.700 to 99.715. Section 162.1100.5. Additionally, the district is not subject to the provisions of §§ 162.081, 163.021 or 163.023 with respect to any requirements to maintain a minimum value of operating levy. Id.
. For the same reason, this Court need not look to the Department of Elementary and |Secondary Education’s interpretation of 167.131 as the dissent does. Courts do not look to agency interpretations when a statute is unambiguous. Blue Springs Bowl v. Spradling, 551 S.W.2d 596, 599-600 (Mo. banc 1977). Moreover, the DESE interpretation cites no legal authority and has not been subjected to the rulemaking process.