dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority. The plaintiff in this case is an employee of the Town of North Providence whose job is to maintain the communications equipment for the fire department. Although he may be classified in the town’s employment scheme as a member of the fire department, the plaintiff is not a firefighter or first responder and, in my opinion, does not fall within the purview of the IOD statute. General Laws 1956 § 45-19-1 originally was enacted in 1944 by P.L.1944, ch. 1479. It has been amended at least nineteen times since then. Many of these amendments expanded the class of people included within the statute’s purview. None of the amendments embraced civilian personnel who perform maintenance functions.
At the time when § 45-19-1 was adopted, “police officers and firefighters had no effective right of action against their state or municipal employers because of sovereign immunity.” Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 260 (R.I.1996). The original act “required cities and towns to pay only police officers who were incapacitated during the performance of their duties their full salary for the duration of the incapacity.” Terrano v. State, Department of Corrections, 573 A.2d 1181, 1183 (R.I.1990). Firefighters, described as “firemen,” were added in 1952 by P.L. 1952, ch. 2915, § 1. Crash rescue crewmen were added in 1972 by P.L.1972, ch. 212, § 1, and fire marshals and deputy fire marshals were included in 1988 by P.L. 1988, ch. 329, § 1. Over the years, other classes of first responders and public safety personnel were included as beneficiaries of this compensation scheme.10
Significantly, and conclusively, in my opinion, when the General Assembly included firemen in 1952, the term “fireman” was defined to “mean and include any chief *247or other member of the fire department of any city or town, regularly employed at a fixed salary or wage.” P.L.1952, ch. 2915, § 1 (emphasis added). Despite all of the additions and variations to § 45-19-1 since its enactment, this definition of “fireman” (now “firefighter”) has remained largely unchanged. Every version of § 45-19-1 defined “fireman” as one who is regularly employed as a member of the fire department of a city or town. Although the majority holds that plaintiff — who is classified as a member of the fire department in the town’s personnel roster — falls within this definition based on what the majority perceives as the plain meaning of the statute, I disagree. I cannot conclude that the General Assembly intended to provide injured-on-duty benefits for maintenance personnel or that the definition of “firefighter” as contained in § 45-19-1 is so broad as to encompass employees of the fire department who are not firefighters.
It is my view that such a mechanical application of the IOD statute, so as to include within its provisions those who repair communications equipment, leads to an absurd result and is a departure from our settled case law with respect to this Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. When an interpretation of a statutory definition leads to an outcome that is contrary to the policy that underlies the act and achieves an absurd result, this Court simply declines to engage in mere semantics. Our function is to “look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act.” Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I.1999) (quoting Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I.1994)). In my opinion, the meaning of the phrase “member of the fire department or rescue personnel of any city, town, or fire district” means today what it meant in 1952 — a firefighter; a person whose job it is to fight fires; to run into burning buildings; a person who places his (or her) life in jeopardy to protect us and keep us safe.
This Court consistently has declared that the IOD statute was “intended to provide greater work-related-injury benefits to certain public employees whose jobs require them to serve the state or its municipalities, often in dangerous situations.” Labbadia v. State of Rhode Island, 513 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I.1986) (emphasis added). And it is only those “certain public employees,” as specifically enumerated by the Legislature, who are entitled to the generous compensation provided by the IOD statute. Terrano, 573 A.2d at 1184. We never have expanded the definition of those beneficiaries to include a class of employees who were not specifically enumerated in the IOD statute. See Angell v. Union Fire District of South Kingstown, 935 A.2d 943, 947 (R.I.2007) (declining to adopt a broad interpretation of the IOD statute to include volunteer firefighters); Terrano, 573 A.2d at 1184 (declaring that state marshals employed by the Department of Corrections were not included in the IOD statute in effect at the time of the plaintiffs injury and concluding, therefore, that the Legislature did not intend to expand the scope of § 45-19-1 to those employees charged with transporting inmates, or it would have done so by explicit amendment).
When confronted with a statute’s definitional terms, our task is clear — we do not engage in a mechanistic exercise. “It is true that definitions should usually be given their ordinary meaning and should usually be strictly construed.” Labbadia, 513 A.2d at 22. However, it equally is clear that “if a mechanical application of a statutory definition produces an absurd result or defeats legislative intent, this [Cjourt will look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act.” State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.I.1985) *248(emphasis added); see also Pelchat, 727 A.2d at 681; Kaya, 681 A.2d at 260; Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d at 1050; Qualitex, Inc. v. Coventry Realty Corp., 557 A.2d 850, 853 (R.I.1989); State v. Timms, 505 A.2d 1132, 1136 (R.I.1986). With respect to interpreting the definitional terms in a statute, we do not sacrifice common sense in favor of strict statutory construction when it would produce a result that clearly was not intended by the Legislature. See Delaurier, 488 A.2d at 695.
This Court is the final arbiter on issues of statutory interpretation, and our responsibility is to faithfully ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. “In so doing, we consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections.” Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I.1994) (citing Bailey v. American Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I.1992)); see also Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I.1987). We refuse to accord a literal application to a statutory definition when to do so “would produce an unintended result and is contrary to the policy and purpose underlying the act.” Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 129. As such, this Court must “look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act.” Id. (quoting Delaurier, 488 A.2d at 694).
Because the underlying purpose of the IOD statutory scheme is to provide greater compensation and remedial benefits — at taxpayers’ expense — to those who risk their lives in the performance of their duties to protect the citizenry, it is my belief that we should strictly adhere to the salutary purpose of the IOD statute and guard against unintended incursions into this benefit system. Statutory interpretation is not a perfunctory exercise. A mechanical application of the IOD statute that results in persons other than public safety personnel being included within its provisions serves no purpose and defeats the desired effect of the act. Consequently, I dissent.
. See P.L.1987, ch. 528, § 1 (“any person employed as a member of the fire department of the town of North Smithfield”); P.L.2001, ch. 77, § 6 ("any executive high sheriff, sheriff or deputy sheriff”); P.L.2002, ch. 65, § 2 ("member of the fugitive task force, or capítol police officer”); P.L.2007, ch. 329, § 1 ("permanent environmental police officer or criminal investigator of the department of environmental management”); P.L.2007, ch. 497, § 3 ("airport police officer”).