OPINION BY
Judge COHN JUBELIRER.The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court) sustaining the appeal of Shawn M. Meter (Licensee) from a recall of his driver’s license for incompetency pursuant to Sections 1519(a) and 1519(c) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1519(a) and 1519(c).
On July 25, 2010, Licensee was involved in an automobile collision resulting in the death of his passenger. Licensee was flown by helicopter to the Altoona Regional Hospital trauma unit for treatment of his injuries. At some point during Licensee’s treatment, a physician’s assistant (P.A.) completed a medical report asserting that alcohol and drug or substance abuse affected Licensee’s ability, from a medical standpoint, to safely operate a motor vehicle.1 Based upon the medical report, the Department recalled Licensee’s driver’s license and notified Licensee of the recall in a letter stating the following:
This is an official Notice of the Recall of your Driving Privilege as authorized by Section 1519(c) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. Penn DOT has received medical information indicating you have a Substance Use condition, which prevents you from safely operating a motor vehicle.
As of 08/13/2010, you may no longer drive. Your driving privilege is hereby recalled until you have demonstrated your condition meets PennDOT’s minimum medical standards.
This action will remain in effect until PennDOT receives medical information indicating that your condition has improved, and you are able to safely operate a motor vehicle.
If you feel our records are incorrect, you may have your health care provider submit updated information detailing your medical condition.
You have the right to appeal to the Court of Common Pleas (Civil Division) within thirty (30) days of the mail date of this notice.
*903(Notice of Recall of Driving Privilege, August 13, 2010 (Recall Notice) at 1, R.R. at 7a.) (Emphasis added).2
Pursuant to Section 1550 of the Vehicle Code,3 Licensee appealed his license recall to the trial court on September 10, 2010. The trial court granted Licensee’s request for supersedeas of the recall of his license on September 24, 20104 and, on December 10, 2010, a de novo hearing took place before the trial court. At the hearing, the trial court accepted into evidence the Department’s packet of certified documents that included the medical report, the Recall Notice, and a certified copy of Licensee’s driving record. (Department’s Ex. 1.) Counsel for Licensee objected to the content of the medical report, but acknowledged that the Department was permitted to submit the report for the fact that it was received by them. (Hr’g Tr. at 9, R.R. at 20a.) The trial court stated that the Department could not prove that Licensee had a substance problem by means of the medical report and further stated that the Department is not required to prove that Licensee had a substance abuse problem but, rather, only must prove that the Department received the medical report to establish its prima facie case. (Hr’g Tr. at 11, R.R. at 22a.) In rebuttal to the medical report and his driving record, Licensee presented his mother as a witness, who testified as follows:
Q. Since the accident, have you seen your son consume any alcohol?
A. No, Sir, I have not.
Q. Was your son prescribed any medicines after the accident?
A. Yes.
Q. Other than those prescription medicines, have you seen him consume any illicit substances?
A. No.
(Hr’g Tr. at 21-22, R.R. at 32a-33a.) Licensee’s mother also testified that “[h]e drove fine with me in the car,” had driven her to a doctor’s appointment and to the mall, and drove her husband to Pittsburgh. (Hr’g Tr. at 22, R.R. at 33a.) Licensee did not testify and he did not submit any medical report from any health care provider.
By Order dated January 10, 2011, the trial court sustained Licensee’s appeal. The Department filed a Notice of Appeal on January 21, 2011. In response, the trial court ordered the Department to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.1925(b), and, thereafter, filed its Opinion in Response to Matters Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.1925(a).
In granting Licensee’s license recall appeal, the trial court found that the Department failed to satisfy its burden of proving that Licensee was medically *904incompetent to drive. The trial court reasoned that, although Licensee’s driving record would be “highly relevant to a license revocation due to driving infractions,” it was irrelevant to Licensee’s alleged medical condition, stating that driving records do not constitute evidence of a licensee’s health. (Trial Court Op. at 3.) The trial court further found that the Department’s “only relevant evidence in this case was the [medical report], which was filled out by a trauma unit physician’s assistant who treated [Licensee] one time during a medical emergency” who “had, at best, an incomplete picture regarding [Licensee’s] use of alcohol.” (Trial Court Op. at 3 — 4.) The trial court determined that the medical report was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, but found the value of the report was low and, therefore, “only a relatively small amount of evidence was necessary to rebut this scant evidence of medical incompetence.” (Trial Court Op. at 4.) The trial court concluded that this case was analogous to Byler v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 883 A.2d 724, 729 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) (concluding that lay witness testimony was competent evidence sufficient to rebut the Department’s prima facie case of medical incompetence), especially here, where the Department’s evidence of medical incompetency was so limited, and Licensee’s mother’s testimony was similar to the lay testimony offered in Byler. (Trial Court Op. at 5.) The Department now appeals to this Court.5
On appeal, the Department argues that: (1) Licensee’s mother’s testimony did not constitute substantial evidence sufficient to rebut the Department’s prima facie case of Licensee’s medical incompetency; (2) even if this Court concludes that Licensee’s mother’s testimony was sufficient to rebut the prima facie case, the Department nonetheless met its burden of proving Licensee’s continued medical incompetence with evidence of an unsafe driving history and arrest records for controlled substance violations; and (3) the statutory appeal provided by Section 1519(c) of the Vehicle Code does not permit a licensee to avoid the Department’s requirement to submit a substance use form from a medical provider under Section 1519(a).
The Department first argues the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined that the Department did not meet its burden of proving Licensee’s medical incompetency to drive a motor vehicle. The Department maintains that Licensee’s failure to testify entitled the Department to an inference or a presumption that Licensee remained medically incompetent to drive, pursuant to Satler v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 670 A.2d 1205, 1207 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that the failure to call an available witness who is within one party’s control and has knowledge pertaining to a material issue may, if not explained, raise an inference or presumption that the absent witness’ testimony would have been adverse to that party”). The Department further asserts that Licensee’s sole evidence was his mother’s testimony, which was incompetent6 to rebut on the issue of medical competence.
*905Section 1518(b) of the Vehicle Code provides that health care providers shall report to the Department, in writing, the full name, date of birth, and address of every person over 15 years of age diagnosed as having any specified disorder or disability within ten days. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1518(b). The Department’s regulation at 67 Pa.Code § 83.5 (relating to disqualifying medical conditions other than epilepsy) provides, in relevant part:
(b) Disqualification on provider’s recommendation. A person who has any of the following conditions will not be qualified to drive if, in the opinion of the provider, the condition is likely to impair the ability to control and safely operate a motor vehicle:
(7). Use of any drug or substance, including alcohol, known to impair skill or functions, regardless whether the drug or substance is medically prescribed.
67 Pa.Code § 83.5(b)(7). Section 1519(b) provides for the confidentiality of reports received by the Department pursuant to Section 1519(a), and further provides that such reports “shall be admitted in proceedings under section 1550 (relating to judicial review).” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1519(b). Section 1519(c) of the Vehicle Code directs the Department to recall the driving privilege of any person deemed incompetent and specifically provides as follows:
Recall or suspension of operating privilege. — The department shall recall the operating privilege of any person whose incompetency has been established under the provisions of this chapter. The recall shall be for an indefinite period until satisfactory evidence is presented to the department in accordance with regulations to establish that such person is competent to drive a motor vehicle. The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any person who refuses or fails to comply with the requirements of this section until that person does comply and that person’s competency to drive is established. Any person aggrieved by recall or suspension of the operating privilege may appeal in the manner provided in section 1550. The judicial review shall be limited to whether the person is competent to drive in accordance with the provisions of the regulations promulgated under section 1517 (relating to Medical Advisory Board).
75 Pa.C.S. § 1519(c). (Emphasis added.) The Department can meet its initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of medical incompetency by introducing the medical report that was submitted to the Department by a health care provider. Ploof v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 235, 590 A.2d 1318, 1320 (1991). Once the Department establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the licensee to establish that he was competent to drive on the date of the recall or has since become competent to drive. McKelvy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 814 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). “The burden of persuasion never leaves [the Department], but the medical report itself is sufficient to meet and overcome [the *906Department’s] initial burden to establish a prima facie case.” Reynolds v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 694 A.2d 361, 864 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). Thus, here, the Department established its prima facie case under Section 1519(c) when it presented the medical report to the trial court. Licensee, in reliance upon Byler, then attempted to meet his burden by producing his mother’s testimony that, since the accident, she had not seen her son consume alcohol or any illicit substances, that he drove her to a doctor’s appointment and to the mall, and drove her husband to Pittsburgh. (Hr’g Tr. at 22, R.R. at 33a.)
In Byler, the licensee’s family physician had submitted a letter to the Department stating that his 79-year old patient was an alcoholic with significant cerebellar degeneration, and should not be driving a car. Byler, 883 A.2d at 725. The Department then recalled the licensee’s driver’s license and the licensee appealed. Id. At the hearing, both the licensee and his neighbor testified regarding the licensee’s consumption of alcohol and his driving record. Id. at 725-26. The licensee testified that he had not had a moving violation in 58 years as a licensed driver and was involved in only two accidents forty years prior that were caused by other drivers. Id. at 725. He further testified that he led a sedentary life, spending most of his time at home, had reduced his drinking over the past three or four years, drinks only two drinks between 4:00 p.m. and the time he retires to bed, never drinks outside the home, and never drinks and drives. Id. His 83-year old neighbor also testified that she saw the licensee every day, that twice each week the licensee drove her to the grocery store or ran other errands for her, and that she had never seen him drive after drinking. Id. at 726. The neighbor further stated that licensee never visited bars or drank outside of his home. The trial court found both the licensee and his neighbor credible that the licensee was a safe driver, did not drink and drive, and concluded that “[t]here was no evidence of behavioral manifestations of impairment in the operation of a motor vehicle.” Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed, noting that the licensee emphasized his “safe driving record.” Id. at 727. Also significant to this Court was the fact that the licensee’s testimony, which was corroborated by his neighbor, “pertained to the underlying facts regarding [licensee’s] lifestyle and the frequency and amount of his drinking, and [licensee and neighbor] were competent to testify to such common facts.” Id. at 729. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, there was credited evidence of the licensee’s safe driving, and the frequency and amount of the licensee’s drinking, which was sufficient to rebut the Department’s prima facie case.
The present case is distinguishable from Byler for three reasons: (1) whereas Byler had a fifty-eight year driving record with no moving violations or alcohol-related accidents, Licensee’s brief driving record contains two recent accidents, one being the July 25, 2010 fatal accident, (Department’s Ex. 1, R.R. at 54a), and the other being a 2007 accident resulting in injury, (Department’s Ex. 1, R.R. at 53a), a 2009 charge for underage DUI, and multiple speeding violations in low speed areas; (2) whereas the licensee in Byler testified about his “lifestyle and the frequency and amount of his drinking,” which was corroborated by his neighbor, Byler, 883 A.2d at 729, here, Licensee’s mother was the sole witness; and (3) Licensee’s mother stated that she had not seen Licensee consume alcohol and drive, notably not that he had not done so. Therefore, we conclude that Licensee’s mother’s testimony was insufficient and incompetent to rebut the Department’s prima facie case.
*907Next, the Department argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found Licensee’s driving record irrelevant and, therefore, failed to consider whether this evidence could have overcome Licensee’s evidence. The Department contends that even if Licensee’s mother’s testimony had rebutted the prima facie case, the Department nonetheless met its burden by submitting evidence of Licensee’s driving records. The Department’s evidence consisted of the following certified documents: Licensee’s driving record, the medical report, the Department’s Recall Notice, and a substance use form to be completed by Licensee’s health care provider. (Department’s Ex. 1, R.R.' at 46a-55a.) Licensee’s driving record consisted of: (1) a July 25, 2010 accident involving the fatality of Licensee’s passenger; (2) a July 9, 2009 arrest as a minor for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance with an accelerated rehabilitative disposition; (3) two speeding violations in low speed areas; and (4) an October 30, 2007 automobile accident resulting in injury. The trial court determined that Licensee’s driving record was “irrelevant to [Licensee’s] alleged medical condition because driving records cannot constitute evidence of a driver’s health,” and “are irrelevant to medical competency.” (Trial Court Op. at 3, 5 n. 2.).
In reviewing this issue, we first take note that Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Pa. R.E. 401. Whether evidence is relevant or not “is to be determined by the court in the light of reason, experience, scientific principles and the other testimony offered in the case.” Pa. R.E. 401, Comment. The issue here is whether Licensee’s use of drugs or alcohol is a condition that prevents him from safely operating a motor vehicle. Licensee, who was 21 years old when he had the fatal accident which resulted in the medical report being submitted to the Department, also had an underage DUI,7 another previous accident involving injury, and two speeding violations. While driving records will not always be relevant to the existence of a medical condition, such records can be relevant where the medical condition involves drug and alcohol abuse. Based on the medical report indicating that Licensee had an alcohol or substance use condition which prevented him from safely operating a motor vehicle and Licensee’s certified driving record, we conclude, in the light of experience and reason, that such a driving record would tend to make the existence of Licensee’s alcohol or substance use condition more probable than it would be without the evidence. Pa. R.E. 401. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that such evidence is never relevant and, in this case, it is relevant.
Accordingly, we reverse the Order of the trial court and direct that the recall of Licensee’s driving privilege be reinstated.8
ORDER
NOW, January 10, 2012, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre *908County in the above-captioned matter is hereby REVERSED and the recall of the driving privilege of Shawn M. Meter is hereby reinstated.
. According to Licensee, "The physician assistant had never met the [Licensee] previously and completed the form based on the sole fact that the [Licensee] was in an accident and had alcohol in his system.” (Licensee’s Br. at 2.)
. The Department asserts that enclosed with the Recall Notice of August 13, 2010, was a Substance Use Form to be completed by Licensee’s health care provider and that this form was again provided to Licensee on or about October 19, 2010, but that Licensee did not return this form to the Department. (Department’s Br. at 5-6.)
. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1550. Section 1550(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) General rule. — Any person who has been denied a driver’s license, whose driver’s license has been canceled or whose operating privilege has been recalled, suspended, revoked or disqualified by the department shall have the right to appeal to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure).
75 Pa.C.S. § 1550(a).
.The Department admits that, at the time of the supersedeas hearing, it did not know that a fatality had been involved in Licensee’s accident of July 25, 2010 "or [it] would have brought that up at the time.” (Hr’g Tr. at 7-8, R.R. at 18a-19a.)
. In reviewing a de novo appeal to the trial court, our scope of review is limited to whether constitutional rights were violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Sklar v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 764 A.2d 632 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999).
. The Department argues that:
The terms[] "substantial evidence” and "competent evidence” are used interchangeably[ ] apparently without any difference in meaning. See, e.g., Petrocsko v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of *905Driver Licensing, 745 A.2d 714, 716 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) ("substantial evidence”); citing Brown v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 738 A.2d 71, 72 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) ("substantial evidence”); citing Gombar v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 678 A.2d 843, 847 n. 7 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) ... ("competent evidence”). See also Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Holsten, 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 615 A.2d 113, 114 (1992) ("substantial, competent evidence”).
(Department’s Br. at 17-18 n. 6.)
. We note that according to the Licensee’s driving history, he had received a 90-day suspension for the DUI and his driver’s license was reinstated within weeks of the fatal accident.
. Because of our disposition of this case, we do not reach the Department’s final argument that the statutory appeal provided by Section 1519(c) of the Vehicle Code does not permit a licensee to avoid the Department’s requirement to submit a substance use form from a medical provider under Section 1519(a).