(concurring). At the very foundation of our adversary system reposes the basic tenet that one attorney may not represent two clients having conflicting interests at the same legal or judicial proceeding. My colleagues in the majority have interpreted this fundamental concept as they have viewed it through the exceptional circumstances of Canon 6, the predecessor of DR 5-105, and In re Kamp, 40 N. J. 588, 595 (1963). In permitting representation of multiple clients, DR 5-105(C) partially provides:
* * * if he [the lawyer] believes that he can adequately represent the interests of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the facts and of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
However, this exception must be read in conjunction with the Disciplinary Rules as a whole and more particularly in light of DR 5-105 (B) and DR 9-101.
DR 5-105 (B)
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will l>e or *354is likely to he adversely affected by his representation of another client * * a\ [Emphasis supplied],
and
DR 9-101 (entitled)
Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety.
The latter rule then proceeds to enumerate some specific examples of impropriety, but the canon itself is all-inclusive. In Re Estate of Trench, 76 Misc. 2d 180, 349 N. Y. S. 2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1973). (Wise, Legal Ethics [2d ed] at 125).
DR 5-105(C) is presently read to mean that an attorney may represent both a buyer and seller and even a lender if he can impartially exercise his professional judgment following full disclosure to and informed consent of his clients. However, once an overt conflict arises, he is compelled to withdraw entirely from the matter. The majority has struck upon this distinction and has drawn the imperceptible line between actual and potential conflict. In practice, if a latent conflict actualizes, the attorney may not represent either party; but if a potential conflict remains such and does not rise to the level of a litigious matter, an attorney may remain as counsel to both parties.
Appearing by itself DR 5-105(0) reads simply. But how are we to interpret it in light of DR 5-105 (B) and DB 9-101 ? The two latter rules clearly indicate that an attorney must refuse multiple representation when his judgment “is likely to be adversely affected” and must scrupulously avoid all “appearance of impropriety.” In re Kamp, supra 40 N. J. at 595 stated that “A conflict of interest is inherent in the relationship of buyer and seller * * *” and every attorney should recognize this potential or inherent conflict.
I believe that if a conflict is perpetually lurking somewhere in the background, an attorney is likely to be swayed or adversely affected thereby, whether consciously or unconsciously. I, therefore, choose not to exempt so-called po*355tential conflicts under DR 5-105 (C). Because of the admittedly inherent nature of a buyer-seller situation and the dangers involved, true impartiality is only an ideal and not an actuality. No matter how honest and well intentioned an attorney is, the possibility for conflict always exists. Commencing with the negotiation of contract terms to the preparation and execution of that contract to sell, and then to the closing itself which may involve breached warranties as to incompleted work or delays or failure of payment, or warranties to be effective after the closing, or innumerable other complications, the attorney is dealing with two or more conflicting interests. To believe otherwise is illusory.
Two jurisdictions have recently recognized the dangers involved in dual representation and have, consequently, rigidly restricted its further use. The New York Court of Appeals in Kelly v. Greason, 23 N. Y. 2d 368, 296 N. Y. S. 2d 937, 244 N. E. 2d 298 (1968) has said:
Thus, with rare and conditional exceptions, the lawyer may not place himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently, affect, or give the appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship. [296 N. Y. S. 2d at 943, 244 N. E. 2d at 460].
While still accepting the concept of full disclosure and informed consent that Court concluded:
Thus, where a lawyer represents parties whose interests conflict as to the particular subject matter, the likelihood of prejudice to one party may be so great that misconduct will be found despite disclosure and consent. [296 N. Y. S. 2d at 945, 244 N. E. 2d at 462].
Similarly the Ohio Supreme Court in Columbus Bar Ass’n. v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St. 2d 208, 237 N. E. 2d 298 (1968) said:
* * * The fact that such misunderstandings are likely to occur under such circumstances must lead to the conclusion that only in the clearest eases should counsel hazard to represent interests which are or may become adverse, even after disclosing his dual representation. [237 N. E. 2d at 300].
*356While neither case dealt with the factual issues here involved, their admonitions should he heeded. A buyer-seller situation is not a clear-cut, mechanical situation in which the attorney can impartially act. There exists 'in every buyer-seller situation an inherent conflict of interests which even though inadvertent, may affect or give the appearance of affecting an attorney’s impartiality and professional relationship. Therefore, it becomes irrelevant whether full disclosure is made and informed consent is given.
This Court has itself recognized that circumstances may exist where one attorney is forbidden to represent both sides even with full disclosure and informed consent. Where a public interest or trust is involved, dual representation is impermissible. In In re A & B, 44 N. J. 331 (1965), an attorney with full disclosure could not represent both a governmental body and a private client in a real estate transaction. Also in In re Cohn, 46 N. J. 202 (1966), it was improper for an attorney to accept a retainer from a client who was to be the chief witness in another pending matter against the client he already represented. The Court in disciplining the attorney stated that there were conflicts of interest between the clients which, eevn if explained to them in advance, would make it impossible to adequately represent both parties in their respective proceedings. In each instance the possibility or potential for injustice was great. Thus, the Court repected dual representation.
I am fully cognizant of DR 5-105 (C), but I also recognize a higher public interest as exhibited in Kelly v. Greason, supra; In re Estate of Trench, supra; In re A & B, supra; In re Cohn, supra; DR 5-105 (B) and DR 9-101. While the majority and the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, in its Opinion 243, 95 N. J. L. J. 1145 (1971) have opined that the line can be drawn at negotiation or prepara- ■ tion and execution of the sales contract, i. e., dual representation is not available in these situations, I believe that such a limiting boundary is wholly imaginary and fails to fully *357deal' with the whole gamut of conflicts which runs throughout the entire spectrum of the buyer-seller and even the institutional lender situation.
It is virtually impossible for one attorney in any manner and under any circumstances to faithfully and with undivided allegiance represent both a buyer and seller. This concurrence, therefore, stands for the position of the majority and further holds that dual representation in a buyer-seller situation should be totally forbidden. The reasons for this seems to me fairly obvious. In this type of transaction, it is most certainly in the public interest to safeguard and protect both parties from any abuses, whether they be ill-advised or inadvertent. The potential conflict in home buying or selling may never come to fruition. However, when it does surface, both sides explode in anger and accusations. The attorney will then withdraw, leaving the situation no better than when it occurred and, for that matter, probably a bit worse. This is not fair to either party.
It is my contention that neither buyer nor seller can ever possibly fully appreciate all the complexities involved. That is precisely the reason why full disclosure and informed consent are illusory. What most people typically do is rely upon the representation of their attorney when he reassures them that everything will be properly handled. However, the attorney is, unfortunately, not a clairvoyant who can foresee problem areas, although he realizes that there is certainly the potential for genuine conflict. Even where his motives are of the highest, as they usually are, and in good faith believes that he can effect a meeting of the minds, he really is not sure. Because of that dangerous uncertainty, I believe attorneys would, generally, welcome this prohibition against potential conflict.
Numerous situations like the present instance require affirmative legal action and demand an attorney’s undivided loyalty. If two separate attorneys were individually retained, both parties would be sure that they were receiving the best *358possible legal attention.. If and when a conflict developed, they would be duly represented, instead of deserted. The inconvenience in retaining separate attorneys is minimal when weighed against the dangers involved, and the cost differential in the final analysis would be inconsequential.
While the present case dealt with the problem of full disclosure or more accurately the lack thereof, the potential for damage always existed and in fact actualized itself in the ease of Mr. Lanza. Any attorney or client who is foolhardy enough to believe that a buyer-seller situation is relatively problem free, is looking for trouble. These types of situations are just not that clear. The only thing that is readily apparent is that a danger of real conflict always exists, even though it may not be imminent or impending.
In purchasing a home, the parties usually are acquiring the most costly asset in their lifetime. The public interest demands that they be faithfully represented by counsel. I would, therefore, urge that this Court not allow any exclusions for dual representation in the buyer-seller situation. It is virtually impossible for an attorney to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. This impossible fact pattern is not conducive to the fulfillment of that high degree of undivided loyalty owed by a lawyer to his client.
We should decisionally or by Canons of Ethics discourage an attorney from taking any chances in this highly-charged potential for conflict. Misconduct may be found despite disclosure and consent.
I concur in the judgment of reprimand.
For reprimand — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Jacobs, Hail, Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman and Clie-eoed — 7.
Opposed — Hone.