*154CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
CLELAND, J.:¶ 1 I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the evidence was sufficient to prove Marquez guilty of the crime of third degree murder, and that he was not entitled to a jury charge on the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
¶ 2 To the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, however, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 3 In my view the evidence was insufficient to establish Marquez entered into an agreement to commit a specific crime— either murder, as the majority concludes, or assault, as Judge Klein concludes. Since the Commonwealth did not prove what crime Marquez and Jiminez agreed to commit, the Commonwealth did not prove the crime of conspiracy to commit murder.
¶ 4 “To prove conspiracy, ‘the trier of fact must find that: (1) the defendant intended, to commit or aid in the commission of the criminal act; (2) the defendant entered into an agreement with another ... to engage in the crime; and (3) the defendant or one of more of the other co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed upon crime.’” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 598 Pa. 263, 956 A.2d 926, 932 (2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 577 Pa. 275, 844 A.2d 1228, 1238 (2004) (emphasis added)).
¶ 5 The Crimes Code provides that a person is “guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (2) agrees with such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to .commit such crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. (emphasis added). Conspiracy, in other words, is not made out simply with evidence that the participants agreed to do something illegal; the Commonwealth must prove they have agreed to commit a specific crime.
¶ 6 I believe the evidence, as summarized by the majority, is sufficient to prove the defendant entered into an agreement with someone; and I believe the jury could fairly conclude based on the evidence that Marquez’s agreement was with Jiminez. Marquez was overheard on his cell phone saying “He is here, he is in the store” and imploring the person on the other end of the call to come. Shortly thereafter, Jimi-nez arrived on the scene.
¶ 7 Proving the existence of an agreement, however, does not prove the existence of a conspiracy. “Conspiracy” is not synonymous with “agreement.” Not all agreements constitute the crime of conspiracy. To prove the crime of conspiracy the Commonwealth must also prove the purpose of the agreement was to commit a specific crime. Here there was simply insufficient evidence to establish what crime it was Marquez and Jiminez agreed to commit.
¶8 The majority correctly notes that both an agreement and the purpose of an agreement may be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence.
¶ 9 The problem with the Commonwealth’s case is the insufficiency of evidence — either direct or circumstantial — of what crime Marquez and Jiminez agreed to commit. In essence, the majority concludes from the fact Jiminez murdered the victim that the murder must have been the purpose of the conspiracy. But proof of harm caused by Jiminez’s conduct is not a substitute for proof of Marquez’s intent. *155The result caused by the conduct of one party to an agreement may be some evidence of the purpose of the agreement, but it does not necessarily follow that the conduct of one of the parties was the conduct agreed to by the other, and that is the essence of the crime of conspiracy.
¶ 10 Conspiracy is an amorphous crime, made so by the historical willingness of courts to accede to the argument that because proving the specific crime the conspirators agreed to commit is so difficult then the Commonwealth should be permitted to bootstrap proof of harm into proof of intent. It is admittedly difficult to prove the specific crime which is the object of the agreement. This difficulty of proof, however, is not a reason to relax the Legislature’s definition of the crime of conspiracy.
¶ 11 I do not believe the evidence was sufficient to prove that Marquez agreed with Jiminez that he would murder the victim. Consequently, as to the majority’s decision upholding the conviction for conspiracy to commit third degree murder, I respectfully dissent.